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Objectives & Methodology
Matthias Brunner
1 Representative polls of the Palestinian population living in the oPT were conducted in January, June and 
November 2001, in April and November 2002, July 2003 as well as March and October 2004. 
2 In April 2002, we conducted a poll in the aftermath of the Israeli army’s reoccupation of the Autonomous 
Palestinian Territories. However, due to the difﬁcult conditions, the data were collected by phone on a sample that
is not totally random (see Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2002b). The data from this poll - covering only the 
West Bank - were not standardized with the other polls. 
The main objective of this study is to provide government ofﬁcials, donors and civil society representatives
with tools for monitoring the situation and the assistance in Palestine. It relies on polls that measure 
Palestinians’ perceptions about the situation and its evolution, the assistance received, its impact and 
their satisfaction with it, as well as many other topics relevant for individuals and organizations involved in 
assistance in Palestine.
In this part of the report, we will brieﬂy describe the objectives of the study, the methodology used and a 
short description of our independent variables will be provided.
1 Objectives
Since January 2001, eight relevant polls were conducted1. The fact that most questions remained the 
same throughout this period provides a unique wealth of monitoring information. Whenever possible and 
meaningful, the analysis in each chapter will refer to this evolution. For the purpose of our analysis, we 
standardized the results of seven of these eight polls to allow precise monitoring of the evolution of answers 
over time2.
 
The results of this standardization can be found on http://www.dartmonitor.org or http://www.unige.ch/
iued/palestine where the interested reader can ﬁnd all the relevant information, from question wording to
distribution frequencies as well as bivariate analysis with our list of independent variables. For this reason, 
no table of frequencies is included with this report.    
Because of data standardization, it is not possible to use question numbers to designate the variables used 
for the analysis. In the present report, the variables are referred to in the format o### where ### is the 
number of the variable. To ﬁnd the name of the variable that is related to a particular question, the interested
reader can use the correspondence table that is presented in Annex I just before the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire for the study (see Annex II and III) was elaborated in order to offer data on Palestinians 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on nine main topics that correspond to the nine parts of the report.
In the outline below, we present these nine chapters and give the list of relevant variables for each of 
them.
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Chapter 1 Mobility and security conditions
The general situation in terms of mobility and security conditions is presented in the ﬁrst part.  
 Variables:  o031, o113, o114, o115, o116, o118, o140, o164, o195.  
Chapter 2 Socio-Economic Conditions
A portrait of the socio-economic conditions is given in the second part of the report. It helps the reader 
in assessing change in the evolution of the perceptions on poverty and of Palestinians’ strategies for 
sustaining the hardship and coping with the situation. 
 Variables:   poverty3, o040, o057, o095, o108, o109, o131, o156, o162, o163, o177, 
   o194, o248.
Chapter 3 Labor Market
The labor market and the employment status (including the place of work, occupation and the effects of 
the Intifada on jobs) are under scrutiny in Part 3.  
 Variables:  o008, o009, o011, o012, o013, o014, o017, o019, o063, o100, o157, o196, 
   o197, o198, o199, o200, o201, o202, o204, o205, o206, o207, o208, o243, 
   o244, o245, o246.
 
Chapter 4 Needs and Infrastructure
Part 4 is a new chapter in report no8. It covers both the perceptions of the Palestinians on the territories’ 
infrastructure and of general services as well as an assessment of the needs and priorities for assistance 
they express.
 Variables:  o079, o080, o124, o174, o175, o254, o255, o278.
Chapter 5 Assistance Delivered in General
An overview of the assistance delivered according to type, value and source with emphasis on employment 
generation programs is offered in Part 4.  
 Variables:  o024, o025, o026, o035, o036, o037, o038, o123, o180, o250, o251, o252.
Chapter 6 Food
All the questions in Part 6 pertain to food. They cover perceived effectiveness of food distribution, type and 
source of food assistance provided, changes in food consumption patterns and types of food required.  
 Variables:  o074, o075, o077, o081, o107, o131, o166, o173, o181.
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Chapter 7 Health and Education 
Additional questions relate to health and education. They concern assistance received, priorities, access 
to basic services and educational attainment, and constitute the bulk of Part 7. 
 Variables:  educ, o056, o091, o126, o168, o169, o186, o187, o188, o190.
 
Chapter 8 Women and Children
Other questions in Part 8 concern Women and Children. The effect of the Intifada on children, parents’ 
responses, psychological support, children’s work and women’s contribution to the household’s income 
are investigated in this part. 
 Variables:  o061, o086, o105, o187, o192, o193, o219, o220, o221, o222, o223, o224, 
   o225, o226, o227, o228, o229, o230, o231, o232, o233, o234, o253.
Chapter 9 Refugees and UNRWA
 
An assessment of UNRWA’s strategies during the past months, the type of assistance provided by the 
UN Agency (in particular food aid, employment generation and ﬁnancial assistance), the patterns of aid
distribution and its effectiveness, as well as the satisfaction of its beneﬁciaries are the content of Part 9.
 Variables:  o002, o263, o264, o265. 
Chapter 10 Politics and Government
 
The last chapter of the report addresses issues related to politics and government such as the faction or 
leader Palestinians feel closest to, support for the PA and its executive as well as issues pertaining to the 
media.
 Variables:  o133, o134, o136, o176, o178, o256, o257, o258, o259, o260, o261, o262. 
The sampling and data collection was done by JMCC in the same way as for the previous polls (Bocco, 
Brunner and Rabah 2001a and 2001b; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2001; Bocco, Brunner, 
Daneels, Lapeyre and Rabah 2002; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels,Al Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah 2003). 
There was an over-sampling of refugee camps by 179 cases in the West Bank and 99 cases in the Gaza 
Strip. 
A representative sample of 1,498 Palestinians aged 18 and over, was interviewed face-to-face in late 
October 2004. The unweighted cases in the West Bank were 800 (762 after weighting) Palestinians, 540 
(542 after weighting) in the Gaza Strip and 158 (194 after weighting) in East Jerusalem.
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2   Methodology
Although each part of this report has its own logic 
of analysis, all the questions of the poll that were 
analyzed in this report were tested in their relationship 
with eight important independent variables. They are 
presented in the adjacent box.
Results were systematically tested for statistical 
signiﬁcance at a 95% conﬁdence level3.
On the http://www.dartmonitor.org  web site, the 
interested reader will ﬁnd the bivariate analysis
between the dependent and the independent 
variables with their level of statistical signiﬁcance
and the detailed number of cases. For this reason, 
the numbers of cases (N) and signiﬁcance levels
have been omitted in this report. 
Finally, whenever possible, consideration was given 
to data of our previous polls to analyze the evolution 
of the situation since the beginning of the second 
Intifada. The reader will also ﬁnd the frequencies
and analysis for the previous polls on the web site.  
3 Presentation of the main   
 independent variables
Palestinian society is rather unique because refugees 
constitute up to 50% of its population. The territory 
is split between areas that are not geographically 
contiguous, and this separation between the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip renders coordination and 
economic cooperation very difﬁcult. This situation
enforces a set of legal and socio-economic structures 
that are not homogenous. The split between the 
two areas and the forced detachment of Jerusalem 
from them further complicates efforts at obtaining a 
uniform system that is essential and a prerequisite for 
developing a viable and efﬁcient economic, social,
and political system. In addition to the damaging 
consequences of the occupation, other social and 
internal barriers such as a very large population 
growth rate (around 6%) and a large number of 
Independent Variables
Region of residence    (o059):
West Bank
Jerusalem
Gaza Strip
Area of residence    (o060):
City
Village
Refugee camp
Place of residence    (place):
West Bank refugee camps 
West Bank outside camps 
Gaza Strip refugee camps
Gaza Strip outside camps 
East Jerusalem
Poverty     (poverty3): 
Hardship cases
Those below the poverty line 
Those above the poverty line.
Refugee Status    (o02): 
Refugees 
Non-refugees
Education    (educ):
Low
Medium
High
Age category    (agec):
18 – 24 years
25 – 34 years
35 – 49 years
50 years or more
Gender    (o061):
Male
Female
 
Wall     (wall):
Directly affected by the wall
Not directly affected by the wall
3 For categorical or ordinal dependent variables we used 
Chi-square tests, for interval variables one-way analysis 
of variance. 
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dependent children (almost 50% are below the age of ﬁfteen) supplement the political difﬁculties that
characterize and inﬂuence the living conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The use of nine explanatory variables for analysis in this report is intended to reﬂect the speciﬁcities of the
Palestinian population.
The Palestinians in the OPT are divided in three 
different areas: the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the 
Gaza Strip. Place of residence, as shown in Figure 
0.1, summarizes these different geographical areas 
and divides the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
according to refugee camps. Of the entire data, 63% 
of the respondents are from the West Bank and 
Jerusalem and 37% are from the Gaza Strip.  
According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PCBS), more than two million Palestinians 
live in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and more than 
one million in the Gaza Strip. Refugees constitute 
approximately one third of the West Bank population 
and over 60% of the population in the Gaza Strip. The 
number of refugees residing in camps is estimated at 
approximately half a million of which about 130,000 
live in 19 refugee camps in the West Bank, and about 
370,000 reside in eight refugee camps in the Gaza 
Strip.
As shown in Figure 0.2, of all respondents, 43% said 
that they are refugees or descendents of refugees; 
57% stated that they are neither refugees nor 
descendents of a refugee family.
Throughout Palestine, the majority of refugees 
(registered and unregistered) live in the Gaza Strip 
(55%, see Figure 0.3). On the other hand, more than 
two-thirds (68%) of non refugees live in the West 
Bank. 
While 33% of all refugees live in camps, less than 1% of non-refugees do. One non refugee respondent 
out of ten lives in Jerusalem; for refugees, this proportion is one out of six  .
According to area of residence, a bit more than one half of our sample (51%, N=756) live in cities, 17% 
(N=258) in refugee camps and 32% in villages (N=484).
In the November 2001 report, we introduced the poverty variable to highlight the economic situation of 
the Palestinian households. Since November 2002, this variable not only takes into account the reported 
income of the respondent’s household but also the number of adults and children in the household.
In the present report, we use the third revision of the poverty variable. It is based on the reported household 
income (o057) but takes into account the number of adults (adults) and children (children) in the household. 
In November 2002, according to the PCBS ﬁgures, the average Palestinian household of two adults and
four children was considered to be below poverty line if its income was lower than NIS 1,600. If it was lower 
than NIS 500, they were considered to be hardship cases. Since the PCBS published a new poverty line 
Figure 0.1 Place of Residence (place)
Figure 0.2 Refugee status (o002)
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at NIS 1,760 at the beginning of 2003 and at NIS 1,800 in 2004 we adjusted to this evolution: For the eigth 
report, we consider the standard household to be below poverty line if its income is less than NIS 1800; 
Figure 0.3 Place of Residence (place) by Refugee Status (o002)
for the sixth and seventh at 1,760 while for the 2002 and 2001 reports, the ﬁgures remained unchanged4 
in the third and fourth revision.
 Figure 0.4 Poverty level (poverty3)
The evolution of poverty in the OPT can be seen in Figure 0.4.  While the percentage of those below 
the poverty line remained almost perfectly stable from 2001 to 2004, the percentage of hardship cases 
increased in November 2002, then decreased back to its previous level in July 2003, increased very 
slightly in February 2004 and decreased by the end of 2004. 
Education and gender will be analyzed respectively in parts 7 and 8. We won’t go into much detail about 
them for this brief methodological introduction.
4 It must be noted though that, for November 2001, we only recently calculated the value of poverty adjusted by 
household size. This is why it was not mentioned in that previous report. 
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Introduction
The period under scrutiny, from early March to late October 2004, was marked by the “preventive” 
assassination of two Hamas top leaders, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and Abdel-Aziz Rantissi, on 22 March and 
17 April 2004, respectively. This period also saw Israel launch its largest-scale military operations in the 
oPt since 2002. Conducted under the “ﬁght against terrorism” banner, these operations hit several Gazan
refugee camps, notably in Nusseirat and Bureij (in March), Rafah (in May) and Jabaliya (in October), 
resulting in the killing and wounding of thousands of civilians. During the same period, and despite the 
intense security measures adopted by the Israeli authorities, Palestinian militants afﬁliated to Islamist
factions and to the Al-Aqsa Brigades, managed to carry out a few attacks in Israel, causing the death of 
several dozens of Israeli civilians.
This deterioration of the relations between Israelis and Palestinians was paralleled by internecine feuds 
among various Palestinian security forces and political factions. Fueled by the release of Sharon’s 
disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip in March 2005, these feuds – including armed clashes, assassination 
attempts, and kidnapping of PA ofﬁcials - have further weakened the already crippled Palestinian Authority.
The degradation of the internal security situation in the oPt was highlighted when, for the ﬁrst time ever,
foreign voluntary workers working on behalf of the Palestinians in several locations of the Gaza Strip and 
in the West Bank city of Nablus were temporarily kidnapped in July 2004. The feeling of chaos emerging 
from the oPt was pointedly reported by the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process 
(Terje Roed-Larsen), who referred to a “steadily emerging chaos in Palestinian areas, lawlessness and 
gang rule are becoming common”. (Terje Roed Larsen, 2004)
Despite those internal and external pressures, the PA managed to preserve its very existence: monthly 
salaries to the PA personnel continued to be paid, and its health and educational systems continued to 
function relatively smoothly. Furthermore, the above-mentioned internal disturbances in the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank have not (yet) led to the collapse of the socio-political structure of the oPt; a phenomenon 
that observers have ascribed to the emergence of local formal and informal institutions, such as municipal 
and kinship-based networks, that have acted as a stabilizing forces. (ICG, 2004: 5-7) 
The inhabitants of the oPt have continued to suffer from the closure policy Israel has imposed on them 
since the start of the Intifada in September 2000, mainly in the form of a network of roadblocks, ditches, 
fences, military checkpoints and curfews. Aside from these restrictions within the oPt, Israel deprived the 
Palestinians from free access to its territory, which economy used to absorb a signiﬁcant of them prior to
the Intifada. The neighboring Arab countries, namely Jordan and Egypt, have also drastically restricted the 
immigration of Palestinians, lest Israel takes advantage of the uprising to expel them permanently from 
the OPT. 
Finally, affecting both the Palestinians’ freedom of movement and directly undermining their economy as a 
whole, the construction of the “Separation Wall” started by the Israelis in the West Bank in June 2002 has 
continued to expand, despite its condemnation by the International Court of Justice in July 2004. 
Using data drawn from the survey carried out for this report and complementary secondary sources, this 
chapter will be devoted to the impact of such developments on the Palestinian population in the oPt, both 
in terms of facts on the ground and of perceptions.
The ﬁrst section of the chapter deals with security issues. It analyzes the feeling of security/insecurity
among the Palestinians in the oPt during the period under scrutiny and looks into the causes of such 
feelings, including occurrences of casualties and incurred damage to public and private property.
The second section studies Israel’s closure policy, including the construction of the Separation Wall, 
in terms of the impact it has had on the mobility, access to services and business performance of the 
Palestinians.
Mobility & Security 29
1.1  Security assessment
1.1.1 Feeling secure/insecure
The continuous degradation of the security situation in the oPt during the period under scrutiny is illustrated 
by the higher percentage of Palestinians feeling insecure, from 76% in February 2004 to 82% in late 
October 2004. This surge in the feeling of insecurity was far more marked in the Gaza Strip, where most 
Israeli military incursions occurred, than in the other regions surveyed. For the ﬁrst time, the Gazans even
became more concerned with regard to their security then the West Bankers and the Jerusalemites. These 
results are portrayed in ﬁgure 1.1, below.
Figure 1.1. The feeling of insecurity (o118) according to region of residence, July 2003-February 2004-November 
2004 
Taking a closer geographical look, one ﬁnds that the feeling of insecurity has become more prevalent in the
camps than in the cities or villages, with a percentage of camp respondents sharing this feeling jumping by 
a margin of 16% between March 2004 and November 2004. The breakdown of results according to place 
of residence shows that this jump is mainly due to the desperate security situation in the Gaza camps, 
where the percentage of residents feeling insecure grew from 72% to 92%, while it also grew, but in a less 
dramatic way, in the West Bank camps from 85% to 92% during the same period of time.1
Figure 1.2. The feeling of insecurity (o118) according to area of residence, July 2003-February 2004-November 2004 
 
1 Feeling of insecurity is also a matter of socio-economic status. Our surveys shows that those respondents whose 
income posits them as “poor” (below the poverty line: 1,800 NIS) or as “hardship cases” (i.e. 900 NIS) do feel more 
insecure (77% and 79%, respectively) than those whose income posits them as non-poor (73%).
2 See introduction of the chapter. According to a leading Fatah member, the PA security forces in both the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank were running the services as if they were private ﬁefdoms .(Abu Toameh, K., October 20,
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How do Palestinians account for this feeling of insecurity? A priori, three main factors, particularly applicable 
to the security situation in the Gaza Strip during the period under survey, were likely to be brought up by 
the respondents. One factor is related to internal disorders within the Palestinian society, due mainly to 
internecine ﬁghting among different armed factions (PA various security forces, armed militias afﬁliated to
political factions, etc.) and to increased criminality due to the collapse of the PA security network.2 Another 
factor is of a socio-economic nature and has to do with the lack of positive signs for improvement of current 
living conditions. However, as is indicated in the following ﬁgure, in all three regions, including Jerusalem,
the leading insecurity factor remained the occurrence of Israeli military incursions in the oPt.
Fear of Israeli incursions remained the main cause 
for insecurity feelings, whatever the area of residence 
(village, city, refugee camp) or the place of residence 
(inside/outside camps in the West Bank and Gaza, 
and in Jerusalem). One may notice that, although 
most military incursions perpetrated by the Israeli 
military took place in Gaza’s refugee camps, economic 
insecurity, i.e. negative socio-economic expectations, 
is much more prevalent there than in other place or 
residence in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. One 
may also see that internal security problems are 
not, comparatively speaking, a signiﬁcant factor for
insecurity, except in the Jerusalem region where 
Palestinians are less subject to Israeli incursion and 
to economic chaos than in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip.
Figure 1.4. Reasons for feeling insecure according to place of residence (o119xplace)
The following sub-chapters will mainly focus on the Palestinians’ main reason for feeling insecure: i.e. 
the Israeli policies in the oPt and their impact in terms of casualties, destruction of infrastructure and 
property.
Figure 1.3. Reasons for feeling insecure according to 
region of residence (0119xo059)
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1.1.2 Casualties
1.1.2.1. General Figures
The number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces during the period under scrutiny was at 694 (86 deaths 
per month), with peaks during Israel’s military assaults in the Gaza Strip, namely in March (92 killed), in 
May (128 killed), in September (111 killed) and in October (142 killed). This per-month ﬁgure is signiﬁcantly
higher than the ﬁgures obtained during previous periods under scrutiny: On average, 64 were killed per
month during the January-July 2003 period and 42 were killed between August 2003 and February 2004. 
3 (Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS a), 2004) 
Overall, the March-October 2004 period was among the deadliest since the outbreak of the Intifada in 
September 2000.4 As shown in the following ﬁgure:
Figure 1.5. Average number of Palestinians killed monthly by 8-9 months period from 29 September 2000 to 31 
October 2004 
Source: www.palestinercs.org
The violent turn taken by the Intifada during the period under consideration is also illustrated by the rise 
in the number of Palestinians that sustained injuries. The number rose to 3145, i.e. an average of 393 
per month, which is signiﬁcantly more than during previous periods, when the per-month average usually
remained below 300 per month. (PRCS (a), November 2004) In addition, illustrating an ever-increasing 
trend toward the militarization of the conﬂict, this augmentation of the numbers of injuries stems chieﬂy
from an increase in the number of occurrences of bomb and shrapnel and live ammunition injuries.
 
3 According to the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem), during the 
same period, 12 Israeli civilians and 27 Israeli security forces personnel were killed by Palestinians in the occupied 
territories (including East Jerusalem). (B’Tselem, December 2004) 
4 Only the months of March and April 2002, when the Israelis re-occupied most West Bank cities causing the death 
of 234 and 245 Palestinians, respectively, were deadlier.
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Figure 1.6. Average number of Palestinians injured per months/5-6 months periods and per type of injury 
(September 2000 to October 2004)5 
Source: www.palestinercs.org
As noticed in previous reports, the major causes of injuries during the March-October 2004 are related to 
the use by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) of miscellaneous war devices such as bomb fragments and 
shrapnel (1236 occurrences, i.e. 39.3% of total injuries), and live ammunition (966 occurrences, i.e. 31%). 
In contrast, 10% and 18% of injuries were caused by rubber bullets and tear gas, respectively. 6 (PRCS 
(a), November 2004)
Estimates of the number of Palestinian casualties since the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000 
vary according to the source of information consulted. According to the Palestine Red Crescent Society, 
- which takes into account indirect Intifada-related causes of death and injuries such as prevention or 
delay of medical treatment, and heart attacks following clashes -, 3,417 Palestinians died between 29 
September 2,000 until 31 October 2004, while 28,113 were injured during the same period of time. (PRCS 
(c), November 2004) Conversely, the estimates provided by Israeli Information Center for Human Rights 
in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem), which refer only to casualties directly incurred during Israeli military 
actions, are lower: 2,998 Palestinian killed for the same period of time. 7 (B’Tselem (b), November 2004) 
1.1.2.2. Proﬁle of casualties
Location
Most Palestinians killed and injured were residents of the Gaza Strip, where respectively over 76% and 
59% of the Palestinians were killed and injured. (PRCS (b), November 2004) In the West Bank, Nablus 
and Hebron were the worst hit locations during the period under scrutiny. This information is overviewed 
in ﬁgure 1.7, below.
5 The number of injured Palestinians in the ﬁrst two months of the Intifada was far higher than average, reaching
5,984 in October 2000 and 3,838 in November 2000. However, most of these injuries were then caused by non-
military means: 72% of the injuries in late September-early October 2000 and 67% of them in November 2000 were 
caused by rubber/plastic bullets and tear gas. (PCRS a)
6 According to the Palestine Monitor, most injured people (44%) had wounds all over their body, 21% were hit at the 
head and neck, 15% at the chest, 5% at the abdomen, and less than 1% at the lower limb. For 15% of the injured 
people, the location of the wound could not be speciﬁed. (Palestine Monitor, December 2004)
7 According to B’Tselem, 210 Israeli civilians and 211 Israeli security personnel were killed by Palestinians in the 
September 2000-October 2004 period in the oPt (including East Jerusalem). (B’Tselem, December 2004)
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Figure 1.7. Number of Palestinians killed and injured according to locations from March 2004-October 2004
Source: www.palestinercs.org
Roughly speaking, these location-related ﬁgures reﬂect the general trend since the outbreak of the Intifada.
Overall, Gaza communities have emerged as the worst hit with 1,639 people killed and 9,957 people injured 
during the September 2000-October 2004 period, followed by Nablus, with 496 killed and 2,991 injured 
during the same period of time. However, due to the heavy military actions the Israeli army undertook in 
Jenin and Ramallah during its “Defensive Shield” campaign in March-April 2002, the number of casualties 
in these two cities is on average higher than in Hebron. In Jenin, 313 people were killed and 2,236 were 
injured, and 240 were killed and 5,030 were injured in Ramallah, whereas in Hebron, 230 people were 
killed and 2,737 were injured. (PRCS (c), November 2004) 
Involvement of casualties in suspected “terrorist activities” 
According to B’Tselem, at least 181 Palestinians were executed extra-judicially by Israel, either by the 
Israeli Air Force or by ground forces, on account of their involvement in “terrorist activities” against Israeli 
targets. In the course of these assassinations, 106 additional Palestinians were killed, 29 of them being 
underage. (B’Tselem (a), December 2004) 
Overall, more than half of the Palestinians killed were not involved in military hostilities when they were 
killed (at least 1,661 of 3,040 by late November 2004). (B’Tselem (a), December 2004) Among them are 
the women killed during Israeli attacks. According the PRCS, 176 women were killed within the framework 
of the Intifada, 24 of them during the March-October 2004 period under scrutiny in this report. 8 (PRCS (d), 
December 2004) Another “innocent victim category” is composed of the children. Their case is discussed 
in the following sub-section.
Age
During the period under scrutiny, 135 Palestinians below the age of 18 were killed. This represents 19.5% 
of the total number of Palestinians killed during the same period. Of these 135 underage Palestinians, 
26 were younger than 12 years old. Reﬂecting a more general trend, the number of underage casualties
amongst the young in May (30 killed), September (22 killed) and October (24 killed) are amongst the 
highest obtained since the outbreak of the Intifada. Only the two ﬁrst months of the uprising (October
and November 2000) were deadlier with respectively 33 and 37 underage Palestinians killed. (PCRS (d), 
December 2004)
8 The Palestine Monitor indicates that 209 women and girls (the latter not included in its account of women killed by 
the PRCS) were killed in the September 2000-September 2004 period. (Palestine Monitor, December 2004)
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According to the PRCS, most of the Palestinians killed within the context of the Intifada belong to the 19-25 
age category and about a quarter of them were still in school. (PCRS (d), December 2004)
Palestinian and international stakeholders have 
condemned the brutality of the Israeli raids in the Gaza 
Strip, especially with regard to their disproportionate 
use of force and indiscriminate targeting against 
civilians, arguing that such tactics betrayed a lack 
of respect for fundamental human rights principles.10 
They also pointed out that the children were bearing 
the brunt of Israeli military activities. (Defence for 
Children International/Palestine Section, 5 October 
2004; Amnesty International, 5 October 2004; UN 
Children’s Fund, 6 October 2004) 
Voicing deep concern over the deteriorating security 
situation in the Gaza Strip in general, several 
human rights institutions, backed by the UN Special 
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process 
(Terje Roed-Larsen), also condemned Israel’s 
breach of international law and called on it to respect 
international conventions, and more particularly 
the Fourth Geneva Convention and the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Ofﬁcials. (UN News Service, 26 October 2004; Human Rights Watch, 20 May 2004;
International Federation for Human Rights, 12 October 2004) Other humanitarian agencies continued to 
call for effective international intervention on behalf of the civilian population. (Oxfam, 8 October 2004)
1.1.2 Damage to private and public property
This sub-section examines damage to Palestinian property caused by the Israeli military’s major incursions 
in the oPt, including damage caused by the erection of the Wall in western regions of the West Bank.
1.1.2.1 Damage to homes 
Although destruction of property in the oPt occurred throughout the period under survey, most destructions 
took place during the two massive military incursions undertaken by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip: 
in Rafah (southern Gaza) in May 2004 (“Operation Rainbow”) and October 2004; and in Jabalia (northern 
Gaza Strip) during the “Days of penitence” operation in October 2004.
“Operation Rainbow”, which aimed both at widening the buffer zone between the Gaza Strip and Egypt 
(along the “Philadelphi Route”) and to prevent the construction of illegal tunnels allegedly used by Palestinian 
militants to smuggle arms from Egypt, led to the destruction or partial damage of more than 200 buildings, 
housing about 418 families (about 3,800 individuals) in the Rafah area.11 (European Commission, 11 August 
Figure 1.8. Distribution of Palestinian Deaths by age 
(September 29, 2000-30 November 2004)9 
Source: 
www.palestinercs.org/graphs/agedistribution2.jpg
9 The ﬁgures displayed by B’Tselem are slightly different. For instance, according to B’tselem 587 underage
Palestinians were killed (B’Tselem (a), December 2004), versus 777 according to the PRCS.
10 A case in point is the Israeli military’s use of tanks and helicopters to ﬁre on non-violent demonstrators in the
southern Gaza Strip in May 2004, which resulted in eight of these demonstrators being killed and dozens injured. 
(Human Rights Watch, 20 May 2004)
11 During “Operation Rainbow” itself (18-24 May 2004), a total of 167 buildings, housing 379 families (3,451 
individuals) were destroyed in Rafah.
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2004; UNRWA, 26 May 2004) UNRWA and other international bodies have condemned these destructions 
as disproportionate “collective punishment” contrary to international law regulations (the Fourth Geneva 
Convention more speciﬁcally) and have urged Israel to respect the UN Security Council Resolution 1544
of 19 May 2004 that expressed grave concern at the demolitions of homes. (AFP, 14 May 2004; UN 
Commission on Human Rights, 28 May 2004; International Federation for Human Rights, 12 October 2004) 
Rafah saw more house destruction take place later in the year, for instance in August when six houses 
were destroyed and in mid-October 2004 when another thirty houses destroyed. (Human Rights Watch, 18 
October 2004) In the southern part of the Gaza Strip, the Khan Younis camp was severely hit in July 2004 
when the Israeli troops invaded it, totally destroying 30 houses where 44 families (about 250 people) lived 
and partially damaging 10 other houses. (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 8 July 2004)
In late September 2004, the Israeli army launched the military operation “Days of Penitence” in Northern 
Gaza around the Jabalia camp, the Izbet Hanoun and the Beit Lahia areas in an attempt to prevent the 
ﬁring of Palestinian rockets into the Israeli town of Sderot.12 This incursion led to the destruction of 91 
homes housing 143 families, namely about 675 Palestinians. (UNRWA, 20 October 2004)
From January to October 2004, house demolitions rates across the Gaza Strip have reached peaks turning 
on average 1,360 Gazans (mainly refugees) per month, or 45 each day, into homeless people. (UNRWA, 
20 October 2004) Overall, since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, the Israeli military have 
demolished in the Gaza Strip over 2,500 homes housing over 16,000 Palestinians. Two-thirds of these 
destructions, i.e. 1,500 houses, occurred in the Rafah camp area alone. 13 (Human Rights Watch, 18 
October 2004) According to Palestinian sources, the total number of houses demolished and damaged 
across the oPt since the start of the Intifada reaches respectively 6,250 and 58,000. (Jerusalem Times, 8 
December 2004)
Re-housing efforts by institutions involved, starting with UNRWA and the PA, have failed to keep pace 
with the rhythms of the destructions. Funding is a crucial problem in this regard, re-housing costs being 
estimated at about 20,000 dollars per family. As far as UNRWA is concerned, the Agency had as of May 
2004 managed to ﬁnd new housing for only 1,000 people in the Gaza Strip. (AFP, 14 May 2004) UNRWA’s
unfunded shortfall for re-housing the eligible refugees category alone is estimated at over 35 million dollars, 
whereas the total sum required for re-housing all homeless in June 2004 was estimated at approximately 
45 million dollars. (AFP, 24 June 2004)
“Routine” destruction of houses conducted by the Israeli authorities in pursuance of their occupation 
policies is chronicled in Arij Monthly Reports on Israeli Colonization Activities. (www.arije.org) 
1.1.2.2. Damage to public installations and to physical infrastructure
Israeli military incursions continued to damage the oPt’s public installations during the period under scrutiny: 
Public premises including factories, commercial properties, PA security compounds, mosques, and even 
governmental and UNRWA schools were hit by Israeli shelling or by bulldozers. During the operation “Days 
of Penitence” for example, 19 public and commercial premises were destroyed and a further 16 buildings 
were damaged, including ﬁve UNRWA schools, one governmental school and a private kindergarten.
(UNRWA, 20 October 2004)
Damage to roads, water and sewage systems, as well as to electrical lines in areas targeted for incursions 
by the Israeli army has incurred heavy reconstruction costs. Total damage to physical infrastructure for the 
sole operation “Days of Penitence” was estimated at 355,000 dollars. (UNRWA, 20 October 2004)
12 Palestinian rockets ﬁred into Sderot have killed at least four Israeli citizens in months that preceded operation
“Days of Penitence” in late September 2004. (UNRWA. 20 October 2004)
13 The ﬁgures displayed by the PA are much higher.
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In the West Bank, the Israeli “pro-settlement” policy continued to create various types of infrastructural 
damage including, on the 9th of August 2004, the demolition by the Israeli army of three 600 year-old 
archeological buildings in Hebron in order to enable the Israeli authorities to continue the construction of a 
road between the Ibraheemi mosque and the Kyriat Arba Israeli settlement. (Palestinemonitor, 10 August 
2004) Other “routine” destruction of public places in the West Bank is chronicled in Arij Monthly Reports on 
Israeli Colonization Activities. (www.arije.org) 
1.1.2.3 Destruction of agricultural land and property
In the Gaza Strip, operation “Rainbow” and operation “Days of Penitence” in May and October 2004 as well 
as smaller scale offensives led by the Israeli military against the northern areas of the Gaza Strip on 28 June 
2004 (Beit Hanoun) and on 11 September (Jabaliya, Beit Lahiya, etc.) have also caused the leveling and 
razing of large swathes of agricultural land, including olive groves, citrus trees, and the destruction of water 
sources, irrigation systems and property, thus contributing to deeply undermine Palestinian livelihoods 
and prevent any kind of short-term socio-economic rehabilitation. Over 1,100 dunums (110 hectares) of 
agricultural land and 30 greenhouses were destroyed during operation “Days of Penitence” and at least 
1,400 dunums (140 hectares) were destroyedduring the offensive in Beit Hanoun. Since the beginning of 
the Intifada, this locality has lost more than half of all arable land and most of its irrigation systems need to 
be rehabilitated. (UN Commission on Human Rights, 28 May 2004; Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 
8 July 2004; UNRWA, 20 October 2004; Water and Sanitation and Hygiene Monitoring Project, 31 August 
2004) Large-scale military operations and other “routine” destruction of agricultural land in the Gaza Strip 
resulted during the three last months of the period under survey (August-October) in the conﬁscation of
1,073 dunums (107 hectares) and the destruction of 15’105 olive trees. Such destructions are chronicled 
in Arij Monthly Reports on Israeli Colonization Activities. (www.arije.org) 
In the West Bank, Israeli settlement policy led to further conﬁscation and damage to agricultural land. More
destruction and dispossession of Palestinian land is expected in the West Bank, as the Israeli Government 
approved the construction of 600 new homes there in August 2004. Around 245,000 settlers already live 
in the West Bank. (AFP, 2 August 2004) However, it is the continuous construction of the “Separation 
Wall” within the West Bank territory that continues to cause major concern among the Palestinians and 
the international community. Despite two landmark rulings in the summer of 2004 denying at different 
levels the Israeli undertaking14, new sections of it were constructed in the northern Jerusalem area and in 
the Hebron region in September 2004, thereby causing the razing of signiﬁcant pieces of land. As of July
2004, some 13,230 dunums (1,323 hectares) of land had already been cleared or damaged due to the 
Separation Wall construction. (OCHA a, 30 July 2004)
In the last three months of the period under survey, 2,271 dunums (227 hectares) of land were conﬁscated
by the Israeli authorities, mostly in the Hebron Region in August 2004 for the Separation Wall and the 
expansion of existing settlements such as the Qiryat Arba colony to the east of the city of Hebron. In 
addition, vast areas of arable land were damaged and about 11,200 olives trees were uprooted during this 
period of time, also at the hand of Israeli settlers. (see details of destruction in: www.arije.org) The Israeli 
army and Jewish settlers also regularly prevented Palestinian farmers from getting access to their lands, 
especially in the olive harvest season around October. (Palestine Monitor, 12 October 2004)
14 On the 30 June 2004, a ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the re-routing of parts of the Separation 
Wall for 18 miles northwest of Jerusalem. This stretch of the Wall would have separated 35,000 Palestinians from 
their crops. This ruling followed and preceded a number of temporary injunctions prohibiting construction of certain 
sections of the Wall: on 28 June, in al-Ram (between Jerusalem and Ramallah); on 1 July in Nu’man (Southeast of 
Jerusalem); on 11 July in Deir Ballut, Rafat, A-Zawiya (Salﬁt District).
On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice stated that the construction of the Wall constitutes a breach of 
international humanitarian law and should be dismantled.
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In various localities, the Israeli army and/or the settlers also hindered the provision of water. In the Hebron 
area for instance, poisoning of water cisterns – probably by the members of the Ma’on settlement south 
east of Hebron - was signaled in mid-July; in the Bethlehem region, Israeli soldiers prevented in early 
August the Palestinian municipality of Janata from installing water pipes aimed at providing drinking water 
to one of its neighborhoods; and later that month, Halmish Jewish settlers repeatedly tried to stop the 
supply of water to Bani Zeid al-Gharbiyeh (near Jericho) by closing the valve on several occasions. (Water 
and Sanitation and Hygiene Monitoring Project, 3 August 2004; 31 August 2004) More generally, the 
destruction and lack of maintenance of the water infrastructure systems have led to a degradation of the 
quality of the water supplies and in some case to their contamination.
Despite these developments, and maybe due to a break in the construction of the Separation Wall between 
June and September 2004 and its re-routing according to a line closer to the 1967 border (see above), 
damage inﬂicted to agricultural land seems to have impacted business to a lesser extent than was the
case in the 7th Perceptions report. Indeed, whereas in the November 2004 survey, 27% of the respondents 
ascribed business losses to damage done to their agricultural land, this was still the case for 36% of the 
respondents in the February 2004 survey. (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII: 48)
Bowing to pressure of the international community, the Israeli authorities have approved in late November 
2004 the disbursement of 1 billion NIS to improve the living conditions of the Palestinian communities living 
in the vicinity of the Separation Wall though the rehabilitation and expansion of physical infrastructure, 
such as paving of roads, building of underground passages between separated villages, and setting up 
of agricultural advancements. (Maariv International, 30 November 2004) However, it is doubtful whether 
these adjustments will be sufﬁcient to mend the agricultural, physical and social damage caused by the
construction of the Separation Wall so far and, more broadly, to reverse its undermining impact on the 
building of a viable Palestinian state in the oPt.
1.2 Israeli closure policies and their impact on mobility
1.2.1. Overview of the closure policies
As already emphasized in the previous Perceptions reports, Israel’s closure policies in the oPt have aimed 
at restricting the Palestinians’ mobility for alleged security reasons through a series of internal and external 
closure measures including roadblocks, military checkpoints, curfews, and closure of the entry points to 
Israel. These measures, as well as the construction of the Separation Wall in the West Bank, are believed 
to be one of the main factors behind the socio-economic crisis prevailing in the oPt. Restrictions on mobility 
have disrupted businesses, commerce, access to work and routine social exchange, and have fragmented 
the oPt landscape, thus severing vital economic ties between rural and urban centers. They have also 
led to the deterioration of social services, including health and education. (World Bank, October 2004 (a); 
WFP, 10 March 2004; UN Children’s Fund, 3 October 2004)
1.2.1.1. Internal closure
Internal closure measures take the form of a network of about 700 military checkpoints of various types 
(ﬁxed or moving, manned or unmanned) and the imposition of curfews. The following map illustrates this
network.
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Map 1.1. Mobility Restrictions in the West Bank (see below for possible option) 
Source: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem www.arij.org
 
The relative relaxing of the internal closure policy announced in the 7th Perceptions report (Palestinian 
Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 42-43) was short-lived. The period under scrutiny witnessed a re-
activation of the few roadblocks that had been de-activated in late 2003. Curfews, the most severe form 
of closure, were also re-imposed by the Israeli military whenever it carried out military operations, but their 
use was less frequent than before. Curfews were mostly used in the Gaza Strip (May, June and October), 
but were also occasionally imposed in the West Bank. In early September for instance, an Israeli military 
curfew was in force in several villages in the Jenin area as troops were conducting a massive search 
operation for wanted Palestinian militants. Completing the closure system, a discriminatory West Bank 
road regime has been informally established by the Israeli authorities, restricting Palestinian travel on 
forty-one roads crossing the West Bank, totaling more than 700 kilometers of roadway through a total or 
limited ban, or only accessible through special permits.15 (B’tselem (c), 9 August 2004)
Mobility restrictions have also undermined the work of the various humanitarian service providers such 
as UN agencies, NGOs, the PRCS and the PA Ministry of Health. All of those agencies have experienced 
problems providing assistance to beneﬁciaries. In the sole month of September 2004, PRCS and UNRWA
ambulance operators reported a total of 54 access incidents in which the provision of ﬁrst aid and/or
medical evacuations were hindered by the Israeli army, including 11 humanitarian access denials and 34 
15 The rules and regulations that constitute this regime for years have never been issued in writing.
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delay incidents in excess of the 30 minutes; furthermore, nine incidents were reported in which crews came 
under IDF attack. (OCHA, September 2004:2,3; PCRS (e), 14 September 2004.) Obstructions against 
UNRWA, the largest international humanitarian agency operating in the oPt, affected its services as a 
whole that also comprise regular health, educational, relief and social services. In September 2004, the 
Agency reported 47 incidents in which its employees encountered problems at Israeli military checkpoints. 
In these incidents, 360 staff members were affected and UNRWA lost more than 623 working hours. 
(OCHA, September 2004: 2, 3) 
More speciﬁcally, in Gaza, year 2004 has been the worst year by far since the start of the intifada for the 
movement of both personnel and commodities. Heightened security measures at the Karni commercial 
checkpoint forced the Agency to suspend its emergency food distribution program on two occasions. 
The most recent round of emergency distributions, due to begin on 10 June 2004, did not start until the 
beginning of October, affecting around 600,000 persons - almost two-thirds of the refugee population. In 
the West Bank, incidents of denied and delayed access continue to affect Agency operations. In September 
2004 alone, 1,228 duty hours were lost due to access problems.16 (UNRWA, 2005: 9). 
UNRWA’s top management was also affected by closure measures. In an unprecedented development, 
on 1 September 2004, Israel barred the Agency’s Commissioner-General from leaving the Gaza Strip 
to perform his duties in the West Bank; a step that was condemned by UNRWA as a failure by Israel 
– a signatory of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations - to live up to its 
obligations under international law. (UN News Service, 1 September 2004)
On 5 October 2004, twelve UN agencies operating in the Gaza Strip, including UNRWA, formally voiced 
their concern over the degradation of the humanitarian situation prevailing in this region and called on 
Israel to facilitate humanitarian operations through unrestricted and secure access of personnel and relief 
supplies into the Gaza Strip and free movement within it, and to respect its obligations under international 
law. (OCHA, 5 October 2004) Throughout the period under scrutiny, local and international NGOs such 
as Medecins du Monde (MdM), Médecin sans Frontières (MSF) and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) 
also criticized Israel for restricting access to the wounded in the Gaza Strip. (PHR, 18 May 2004; AFP, 4 
October 2004; MSF, 9 October 2004)
1.2.1.2. External closure
As the World Bank clearly put it, easing internal closure may well elicit some economic growth in the 
oPt, but it would not be sufﬁcient to spur economic activity to reduce unemployment and poverty. Ending
the current socio-economic crisis in the oPt depends chieﬂy on the opening of these territories’ external
borders, which does not only entail a rise of the number of Palestinians employed in the Israeli economy 
to pre-Intifada levels (i.e. 140,000 in 2000 instead of 57’000 in 2003); it also means opening PA borders 
to foreign trade and enable its private sector to trade in international markets.17 According to the Bank’s 
scenario, by 2006 exports would spur job creation and this would both reduce unemployment from a current 
34% to 23%, and the number of Palestinians with a monthly household income below the poverty line from 
a current 56% to 46%. In the longer run, priority should also focus on establishing sound educational and 
birth control policies. (World Bank, October 2004 (a): xi; World Bank, October 2004 (b), 34-38)
Opening the oPt’s external borders also concerns the passage of Palestinians to the neighboring Arab 
countries, starting with Egypt and Jordan. Israel’s frequent closure of the Rafah Terminal (southern border 
of the Gaza Strip), the only access point for 1.4 million Gazans to the rest of the world, and alleged 
harassment of young Palestinians (between 16 and 35) by the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal intelligence 
16 These difﬁculties in the West Bank were compounded by the staff strike in the autumn of 2004.
17 According to the World Bank’s projections, the mere removal of internal closure would only reduce the 
percentage of people living below the poverty line by 1%. Raising the number of Palestinians employed in Israel to 
pre-Intifada levels would reduce that percentage by 3%. (World Bank, October 2004 (b): 36-37)
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apparatus, at the Terminal have exempliﬁed the hardships faced by Palestinians when leaving or re-entering
the oPt. About 3,000 people, including children, elderly and persons in ill health have been stranded on 
both sides of the Terminal in the summer-autumn of 2004. They have received relief assistance by such 
humanitarian bodies as the Red Cross. (IFRC, 4 August 2004; ICRC, 2 August 2004)
Restriction of the Palestinians’ external mobility has also been imposed by the above-mentioned Arab 
neighboring countries. In order to prevent a Palestinian exodus from the oPt, these countries have since 
September 2000 imposed immigration restrictions on the Palestinians (see Palestinian Public Perceptions 
VI and VII, chapters 1), the removal of which may well also contribute to improve the Palestinians’ living 
conditions.
1.2.1.3. The Separation Wall
In the previous Perceptions report, the main 
characteristics of the Separation Wall were outlined.18 
A barrier composed of a series of concrete walls, 
barbed wire, electriﬁed fencing, control towers and
trenches, the Wall was about 205 km long in November 
2004. (OCHA b, November 2004; Palestinian Public 
Perceptions, VII, August 2004: 48-50) Allegedly 
aimed at temporarily securing Israel and the Jewish 
settlements against Palestinian attacks, the Wall has 
been ofﬁcially criticized by a wide range of actors
including Palestinian and international bodies (see 
footnote 14) for disrupting the lives of the Palestinians 
residing in its vicinity, and for grabbing chunks of 
the West Bank territory in order to impose deﬁnitive
borders with the future Palestinian state. 
After a temporary halt in the construction of the 
Wall following the 30 June 2004 Israeli Supreme 
Court and the 9 July International Court of Justice 
rulings that questioned both the Wall’s route and its 
very existence, the Israeli authorities resumed the 
construction in the Jerusalem and Hebron regions. 
In November 2004, 72 kilometers of the Wall were 
under construction. (OCHA b, November 2004) 
However, the Wall is now expected to follow a route 
closer to the 1967 border line so as to encroach less 
on Palestinian territory. 
So far, about one-third of the Israeli undertaking with 
regard to the Wall has been achieved. Ultimately, 
according to B’tselem, the Wall is expected to 
measure 600km-700 km and affect the lives of about 
875,000 West Bankers (38% of the total population) 
living in the areas crossed by the Wall, whether they 
live to the west of the Wall annexed de facto to Israel 
or whether they live to the east of it in terms of access 
18 The construction of the Separation Wall started in June 
2002.
  Map 1.2. Section of the Separation Wall
 Map 1.3. The Wall from north to south
Source: Gush Shalom www.gush-shalom.org
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to relatives, to farmlands and jobs, and to educational and health facilities. (B’tselem (d), 1.11.04)
In the previous Perceptions report, we had depicted the West Bankers directly affected by the Wall as an 
emerging speciﬁc underprivileged segment of the oPt community, one comparatively more affected by
problems of mobility and socio-economic difﬁculties than the rest of the population. (Palestinian Public
Perceptions, August 2004: 22) One of the aims of the survey conducted for this report is to see whether or 
not Israel’s commitment to redeﬁne the Wall’s route closer to the 1967 border has somewhat cushioned its
adverse socio-economic impacts (see below 1.2.2.3.).
1.2.2 Palestinians’ perceptions of mobility status
1.2.2.1 Mobility in general
Despite the lack of progress in allaying Israeli closure policy during the period under scrutiny, the oPt 
population at large did not express more concern about their mobility status in general (which includes 
such criteria as access to work, schools, and relatives) than previously. All in all, a large percentage of 
Palestinians continued to face either stiff or slight mobility problems, but the level of Palestinians affected 
remained relatively stable at 88% in November versus 90% in February 2004.  
Figure 1.9. Impact of mobility restrictions on Palestinians (o031), February - November 2004
However, this apparent status quo situation does not account for signiﬁcant trends that occurred at regional/
area levels. The results show that whereas mobility problems remained the highest in the West Bank, with 
92% of respondents saying they had experienced a lot or a few problems, it somewhat improved since 
February, when 95% of the respondents stated that they faced such problems. Conversely, the situation 
somewhat worsened in Jerusalem, probably on account of increased mobility restrictions (including the 
wall in construction there) with a larger percentage of Jerusalemites experiencing some kind of mobility 
problem, from 81% in February 2004 to 91% in November 2004. In the Gaza Strip also, the percentage 
of people affected by mobility restrictions receded region-wide from 85% to 80%, but severe problems 
persisted in the refugee camps where the percentage of respondents attesting to a lot of problems with 
regard to mobility increased by 16% (from 48% to 64%), an evolution due mainly to the relentless Israeli 
incursions in these places of residence during the period under scrutiny.
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Figure 1.10. Impact of mobility restrictions (o031) according to place of residence (place), February - November 
2004. 
1.2.2.2 Socio-economic impact of internal mobility restrictions
The respondents were much more assertive when it came to the negative impact of mobility restrictions 
during the period under scrutiny on their socio-economic status. Indeed, the percentage of those 
Palestinians who found it difﬁcult, very difﬁcult or almost impossible to work in the past six months rose by
a 12% margin, from 47% in February to 59% in November 2004. 
Figure 1.11. Possibility to go to work in the past six months (o114), February – November 2004.
The worsening access to the place of work can be noticed in all regions but, in line with the ﬁndings on
overall mobility outlined above, it was far more prevalent in (east) Jerusalem, where 59% of the respondents 
stated having faced problems in accessing their place of work in November 2004 versus 24% in February 
2004 (i.e. +35%), than in the West Bank (from 55% to 60%, i.e. +5%) and in the Gaza Strip (from 41% to 
58%, i.e. +17%) during the same period. As indicated in the ﬁgure 1.12, below, in the two latter regions the
worsening trend was particularly marked for camp residents.  
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Figure 1.12. Difficulties in accessing place of work (o114) according to place of residence (place), February - 
November 2004
The heavier strain on access to work places impacted directly on the Palestinians’ employment status. 
Indeed, among those respondents having experienced a change in their employment situation, inability 
to reach the place of work was referred to by 59% of them as the main cause of this change, largely 
ahead of work-related problems (employer no longer able to pay salary, bankruptcy, etc.). In the previous 
Perceptions survey, mobility restrictions were also referred to by a majority of respondents as a factor 
behind employment changes, but to a lesser extent (51%). (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII: 48) In 
the same vein, this survey also highlighted increased impact of mobility restrictions on business losses. 
Inability to reach the place of work, which was already referred to as the main factor behind business 
problems by half of the respondents in the previous February 2004 survey (Palestinian Public Perceptions 
VII: 48), was mentioned by 55% of the respondents in November 2004 (0140 c, e).19
One important social impact of mobility restrictions concerns children’s access to schools. The results 
show that in general, the situation in November remained stable compared to that in February 2004, when 
29% of the population had declared that their children had arrived late at school or missed classes due to 
closures in the past six months. Unlike the general oPt picture, however, the results indicate that while the 
situation in this regard improved in the West Bank and Jerusalem, it has greatly deteriorated in the Gaza 
Strip, surely due to the frequent military incursions in this region.20 
Figure 1.13. Children late or missed classes due to closures last 6 months (0113b) according to region of residence 
(o059), February 2004 - November 2004.  
19 Conversely, curfews saw their impact on business decrease from 35% to 29%. The socio-economic impact of 
closure will be analyzed in more detail in Part Two (Socio-economic conditions) and Part Nine (Refugees and 
UNRWA) of this report.
20 The issue of children and education will be analyzed in more detail in Part Eight of this report.
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In the Gaza Strip, children residing in the camps – the Israeli incursions’ main targets - were the worst hit as 
the percentage of them arriving late or missing classes jumped from 18% in February 2004 to 44% (+26%) 
in November 2004. During the same period, the percentage of Gazan school children living outside camps 
affected by mobility restrictions rose by 17%, from 10% to 27%. 
1.2.2.3 Impact of the Separation Wall on mobility
A majority (54%) of the inhabitants of Jerusalem and the West Bank admitted being directly affected by the 
Separation Wall. However, the results of the survey indicate that, in general, the negative socio-economic 
impact of the construction of the Wall has diminished signiﬁcantly since February 2004. This may be
explained by the re-routing of the Wall and increased passage opportunities through it following the Israeli 
Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice rulings (see above and footnote 14). It may also be 
explained by an increasing number of Palestinians adapting to the existence of the Wall, notably through 
coping strategies and new social and economic behaviors that take into account the existence of the 
Wall.
Figure 1.14 Various socio-economic impacts of the Separation Wall (o194 a-i), February 2004 - November 2004.
However, these rather positive developments are at variance with the speciﬁc situation experienced by
the inhabitants of the Jerusalem region, where the Wall is currently being extended. On several accounts, 
except for such factors as separation from relatives or from land and forced migration, this survey has 
found Jerusalemites worse-off than eight months ago. To a lesser extent, this also applies to the inhabitants 
of the West Bank camps in such ﬁelds as access to job and to basic services and increased prices for
material and transport.
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Figure 1.15 Selected socio-economic impacts of the Separation Wall (o194 c,f,i) according to place of residence 
(place), February 2004 - November 2004.
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1.3 Conclusion
• The period under scrutiny was one of the deadliest since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 
2000. The Gaza region, that witnessed several large-scale military incursions in May and October 
2004, was the worst hit. For the ﬁrst time, the level of insecurity there overtook that in the West
Bank and in Jerusalem.
• Fear of Israeli incursions remained the main cause for insecurity feelings, well ahead of economic 
uncertainties and internal security problems, whatever the region of residence (West Bank, 
Jerusalem and Gaza), the area of residence (village, city, refugee camp) or the place of residence 
(inside/outside camps in the West Bank and Gaza, and Jerusalem).
• Continuous Israeli military incursions and the pursuance of Israeli settlement policy in the West 
Bank and the Jerusalem region, including the construction of the Separation Wall, have resulted 
in the destruction of agricultural land in all parts of the oPt. However, the survey conducted for this 
report indicates that the impact of those destructions on business has decreased from February to 
November 2004. This may be due to re-routing of the Separation Wall according to a line closer to 
the 1967 borders following several rulings by the Israeli High Court of Justice in June 2004.
• The Israeli closure policy has continued to affect the lives of the Palestinians, in the West Bank 
particularly, where over 90% of respondents were affected. In terms of trend, however, the inhabitants 
of Jerusalem and of the Gaza refugee camps have seen their mobility status deteriorate since 
February 2004.
• While access to schools and to relatives somehow improved, access to place of work deteriorated 
during the period under survey, for the inhabitants of Jerusalem and of the Gaza refugee camps 
more particularly. Also, problems in accessing the place of work have had more negative impact on 
the job status and on business than in the February 2004 survey. 
• Although the Wall has continued to be an object of main concern for the majority of the oPt 
population, the results show that, except for the inhabitants of Jerusalem (and for those of the West 
Bank refugee camps to a lesser extent), the negative socio-economic impact of the construction of 
the Wall has diminished signiﬁcantly since February 2004. This may be explained by the re-routing
of the Wall and increased passage opportunities through it following the Israeli High Court rulings 
in June 2004 and to an increasing number of Palestinians adapting to the existence of the Wall.
2Socio-economic
Conditions
Frédéric Lapeyre
Chapter
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Introduction
The Israeli military strategy toward the oPt has deeply compromised Palestinian household welfare in the 
long run as many families have endured long periods without income generating activities. The transitory 
characteristic of mass poverty which is clearly associated to politics must be considered more and more as 
permanent as it has lasted now for over four years since the beginning of the second Intifada. Palestinian 
households had to cope with this situation by spending their savings, selling assets, borrowing money and 
making debt or changing their consumption pattern regarding both quantity and quality. The poorest have 
now exhausted their savings and are very vulnerable to malnutrition, while the economic vulnerability of 
the Palestinian society as a whole has greatly increased and many households are dependent on the 
humanitarian assistance mechanism to secure their livelihood. 
This chapter will provide a socio-economic proﬁle of the Palestinians from the oPt aiming at analyzing
the main trends regarding the evolution of poverty, understanding the factors determining the evolution 
of household’s income, identifying vulnerable groups, providing some information on social cohesion 
and ﬁnally assessing main coping strategies and the remaining means to cope with the hardship of the
poorest. 
2.1 Poverty: current situation and trends
The oPt continues to face a critical situation of mass poverty with an overall poverty rate of 55%. Since 
the poverty rate has remained at almost the same level as it stood in February 2004, there is no sign of 
improvement. Figure 2.1, below, shows that the rate of extreme poverty remains also very high at 22% 
which underlines the present level of harsh material deprivation in the oPt. Since the Israeli imposed 
paralysis of the Palestinian economy – through internal and external closure -  is the main cause of the 
major socio-economic crisis faced by the Palestinian population in the oPt, it is clear that there will be no 
improvement of their material situation until a clear change occurs in Israeli politics towards removing its 
mobility restriction measures. 
The estimates in the Palestinian Perceptions reports of the percentage of the population living in poverty 
or extreme poverty highlight the socio-economic impact of over four years of Intifada that have caused a 
dramatic decline in living standards of the Palestinians in the oPt - at the beginning of the second Intifada 
in September 2000, the World Bank estimated the poverty rate to be 21%. (World Bank, 2004: 15) Various 
other estimates have been made to evaluate and monitor poverty and whatever is the exact poverty rate, 
there is a large consensus to stress such a high rate. The latest World Bank estimates pointed to a poverty 
rate ranging between 38% and 51% and a subsistence poverty rate (identifying those individuals whose 
consumption is below subsistence level) of 16% for 2003. (World Bank, 2004: 11) The Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) for the period July-September 2004 gave a higher estimate as it reported an 
overall poverty rate of 64% and a poverty rate of 53% in the West Bank and 83% in the Gaza Strip. (PCBS, 
2004: 8) 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of poverty (poverty3), November 2002 – November 2004
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However, poverty rates signiﬁcantly differ from one place to another and a more detailed poverty analysis
shows that individuals living in the Gaza Strip are far more likely to be poor (71% are poor) than those living 
in the West Bank (55% are poor) or Jerusalem (15% are poor). The region of residence has also a great 
impact on the depth of poverty as 31% of the individuals living in the Gaza Strip are extremely poor as 
compared to 21% in the West Bank and 15% in Jerusalem. From a dynamic perspective, ﬁgure 2.2, below,
shows that the poverty rate barely changed in the different regions between February and November 
2004. However, the distribution of the poor below the poverty line has changed as extreme poverty has 
increased in the West Bank from 18% to 21%, whereas it has decreased from 35% to 31% in the Gaza 
Strip. As will be discussed below, this trend is the result of the evolution of the situation in the refugee 
camps in both regions. Another important result is the sharp increase in the rate of extreme poverty in 
Jerusalem where it reached 6% as compared to 2% in February 2004. This negative trend is new as in the 
previous surveys extreme poverty was almost insigniﬁcant in Jerusalem. It is very likely the consequence
of the continuation of the building of the wall around East Jerusalem which has a great negative impact on 
the living and working conditions of the Palestinians from Jerusalem.
Figure 2.2: Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to region of residence (o059), February 2004 – November 2004
Another very important variable to assess the poverty risk of the individuals is not only their region of 
residence but also their place of residence, and more speciﬁcally whether they live in refugee camps or not.
Within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the incidence of extreme poverty is higher in the refugee camps 
than outside. Extreme poverty rates in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank refugee camps were respectively 
33% and 29% as compared to 30% and 16% outside refugee camps. From a dynamic perspective, ﬁgure
2.3 shows that the poverty gap according to the place of residence in the Gaza Strip has dropped as a 
consequence of the sharp decrease of extreme poverty in the refugee camps.
.
This is an interesting result as one of the striking ﬁndings of the February 2004 poll was the sharp
deterioration of the material situation of the Gaza Strip refugee camps’ residents, with an increased rate 
of extreme poverty from 36% to 47% between July 2003 and February 2004. The main cause of this 
evolution was the repeated incursions of the Israeli military forces into the Gaza Strip and the following 
mobility restriction, destruction of civilian property and socio-economic infrastructures. 
Since February 2004, Israeli military forces have escalated attacks against Palestinian civilians and 
properties in the Gaza Strip and they have continued to close most border crossings of the Gaza Strip 
as it was stressed in Part One of this report. Moreover, following the Israeli Government approval in 
May of a plan to further expand the buffer zone in the southern end of the Gaza Strip, the Israeli military 
forces incursions went deep inside Rafah and at the end of September, Israeli forces began a large 
scale military operation called “Harvest of Flowers” - one of the largest in the four years of conﬂict - in the
heavily populated areas of the northern Gaza Strip. Thus, one could have expected between February and 
November 2004 a deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip, especially in the refugee camps, but this 
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did not happen. At the opposite, one can see a relative improvement of the situation in the refugee camps. 
This evolution may indicate the implementation of effective and well-targeted safety nets inside refugee 
camps by local and international organizations and the PA to compensate the negative effects of Israeli 
military interventions. 
Figure 2.3: Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to place of residence (place)
Figure 2.4: Importance of assistance in household budget (o250) according to place of residence (place)
Meanwhile, the Israeli military forces have continued to impose a tightened siege on the West Bank and 
maintained severe restrictions on the movement of Palestinian civilians, especially in Hebron, the North of 
the West Bank and Jerusalem. This situation has led to a sharp increase of the poverty and extreme poverty 
rates in the West Bank refugee camps where they reached respectively 62% and 29% in November 2004 
as compared to 55% and 16% in February 2004.  In a context of scarce resources for humanitarian and 
social policies, the mobilization of the system to relieve the hardship in the Gaza Strip refugee camps may 
have affected negatively the situation in the West Bank refugee camps. As the results in ﬁgure 2.4, above,
seem to indicate, 40% of the respondents stressed that the importance of assistance in their household 
budget has decreased between February and November 2004 as compared to 33% in the Gaza Strip 
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refugee camps. It is very likely that part of this perception about the evolution of assistance in household 
budget is linked to the results of PCBS estimates about the evolution of the median value of assistance 
from the main providers. PCBS shows that the value of assistance has sharply decreased in the West Bank 
between April-June and July-September 2004. The median value of assistance from UNRWA decreased 
from 44 to 27 US$, while that from the Ministry of Social Affairs decreased from 35 to 22 US$ and that from 
other PA institutions went down from 48 to 33 US$. On the other hand, the decline was less severe in the 
Gaza Strip where the median value of assistance declined respectively from 44 to 33 US$, from 35 to 24 
US$ and from 48 to 37 US$. (PCBS, 2004: 11 and 13)
There are also some signiﬁcant differences in poverty rates between rural, urban and camp areas of
residence. As indicated above, the poverty risk is much higher in the refugee camps than in the other 
areas as the poverty rate in the refugee camps overall is 65% compared to 53% in both urban areas and 
villages. Figure 2.5 gives also additional information as it indicates that extreme poverty has increased 
signiﬁcantly in the villages reaching 21% in November 2004 compared to 17% in February 2004. Lastly, as
discussed before, the improvement of the situation in the refugee camps is the result of the sharp decrease 
of extreme poverty in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.
Figure 2.5: Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to area of residence (o060)
Figure 2.6: Evolution of household income in the past six months (o108v2), July 2003 - November 2004
The prevailing public perception among Palestinians from the oPt is that their income has remained the 
same in the past six months. This situation explains the persistent mass poverty as it means that they 
are trapped in a situation characterized by a lack of income generating activities that could improve their 
livelihood. Figure 2.6 indicates that 59% of the respondents declared that their household income has 
remained the same in the past six months whereas 38% stressed it has declined and only 3% stated that 
their household income has increased.
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The main cause of the decline of household income is the problem of access to employment and decent 
jobs which has a very negative effect on income generation.  Figure 2.7 indicates that in both the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, job loss and working hour loss were considered as the main cause of income 
decline. In the West Bank, 42% of the respondents declared that their income has decreased as a result 
of a job loss and 28% explained that it decreased as a result of working hour loss. In the Gaza Strip, these 
rates were respectively 37% and 23%. Moreover, in the Gaza Strip, business and damaged land have 
also played an important role in the decline of household income as 20% of the respondents mentioned 
them as a cause compared to 10% in February 2004. This result must be linked to a very intense Israeli 
military intervention in the Gaza Strip during the summer and fall of 2004. In Jerusalem, job loss is also 
the ﬁrst cause of income decline, but one can see another important factor which is the increase in prices
of inputs and transportation related to the construction of the Wall and mobility restrictions (stated by 18% 
of the respondents). 
Figure 2.7, below, also illustrates about the cause of income decline according to poverty levels. The 
results show that the poorest are much more vulnerable to job loss as 52 % of them stated that it was the 
main cause of income decline compared to 20% of the non-poor. As will be discussed in Part Three of this 
report, this result can be explained by the fact that the poorest are characterized by a very high degree of 
vulnerability in the labor market because they are trapped in unemployment or very precarious jobs. 
Figure 2.7: First cause if income decreased (o109v2) according to region of residence (o059) and to poverty level 
(poverty3)
Table 2.1: Poverty risk 9poverty3) according to the level of education (educ)
Hardship cases Below poverty line
(excl. hardship 
cases)
Above poverty line
Until elementary 31% 35% 34%
Until secondary 25% 39% 36%
College and above 3% 29% 69%
When examining poverty risk, it is also important to stress that the educational level seems to protect 
individuals against poverty as two thirds of individuals who have completed their education until elementary 
school are below the poverty line whereas, by contrast, only one third of individuals who have completed 
their education until college and above are poor. Table 2.1 shows also that the rate of extreme poverty 
among the respondents that have a low level of education (until elementary school) is 10 times higher than 
among those that have a high level of education (college and above). 
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Finally, when examining the poverty rate according to the age group of the respondents, one can see that 
the young respondents (between 18 and 24 years) are more likely to be poor than the other age groups; 
60% of them were poor as compared to respectively 54% of the age group 25-34 years old, 55% of the age 
group 35-49 years old and 49% of those of 50 years or older. This is an important result for policy planning 
as services and programs for youth – especially to promote their access to decent jobs - by local and 
international organizations are rather limited while they are a very vulnerable group. Table 2.2 indicates 
that young people are also more likely to be extremely poor than the respondents of the other age groups 
at the exception of the age group 35-49 years which has the highest incidence of extreme poverty. This 
result may be explained by the impact of the family size which is a key variable determining the poverty 
situation of the individuals. Indeed, the age group 35-49 years is traditionally associated with a period 
of building and developing a family when most of the units of the household are too young for income 
generating activities. In the ﬁfth Perceptions report (Bocco et al., 2002: 18) it was already highlighted that
the rate of extreme poverty was ﬁve times higher for a family with 8 members than of that of a family with
4 members.
Table 2.2: Poverty (poverty3) according to age group (agec)
               Level of poverty
Age group Hardship cases Below poverty line (excl. hard; Cases) Above poverty line
18-24 24% 36% 40%
25-34 18% 36% 46%
35-49 25% 30% 45%
> 50 22% 33% 45%
2.2 Subjective poverty
In the previous section, the measure of poverty was based on income whereby the PCBS poverty line was 
used to cut off between the poor and non-poor. In the current section, the poverty analysis based on the 
objective measure of poverty will be complemented by a poverty analysis based on a subjective measure 
of poverty. The objective is to get the perception of the Palestinian people themselves about the magnitude 
of material deprivation. 
Figure 2.8: Average amount needed by the household to meet basic needs (o041) according to region of residence 
(o059)
To that end, a subjective ﬁnancial satisfaction poverty line has been elaborated. Respondents were asked
to estimate the average amount of money they need to meet the basic needs of their household. As 
illustrated in ﬁgure 2.8, the average amount was about 2400 NIS in the West Bank, 2150 NIS in the Gaza
Strip and 3560 NIS in Jerusalem. The differences from one region to another reﬂect some differences in
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the cost of living; meeting basic needs in Jerusalem being more expensive than in the other regions.
Once the respondents estimated what they need to meet their household basic needs, they were asked 
how close their household income was to this amount. It is important to note that this subjective poverty 
line is higher than the objective poverty line that was used before (2400 NIS instead of 1800 NIS in the 
West Bank for example). Giving a voice to the population about their living conditions leads to a better 
understanding of the impact of the economic crisis on household welfare. It is interesting to stress ﬁrst that
the subjective poverty rate (adding the percentage of respondents having stated that they had much less 
or slightly less of the minimum amount to meet their household basic needs) is very close to the picture 
given by the objective poverty line; 58% as compared to 55%. But according to the respondents, the depth 
of poverty is much worse than the picture given before as 37% of the respondents stated they had much 
less than what is needed whereas the rate of extreme poverty presented in ﬁgure 2.1 was 22%.
Figure 2.9: Subjective poverty (o041)
Figure 2.10: Subjective poverty (o041) according to place of residence (place)
When examining the results according to place of residence, as presented in ﬁgure 2.10, above, one can
see that it is in the Gaza Strip refugee camps that the perception of severe material deprivation is the 
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highest as 51% of respondents reported that their household’s income was much less than required to 
meet basic needs. The situation is also very difﬁcult in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps and in the
West Bank refugee camps where this rate reached about 40% whereas respondents from the West Bank 
outside refugee camps reported less often (36%) that their household income was much less than needed 
to meet basic needs. It is also important to stress that about one fourth of the respondents from Jerusalem 
have the feeling of severe material deprivation.
2.3 Income differentiation and social cohesion
Despite the economic and humanitarian crisis, the Palestinian society has displayed great social cohesion 
and coping capacities. Family and friends solidarity networks are still functioning and widespread even if 
some coping strategies are now exhausted or starting to become exhausted. This cohesion and resilience 
explain why the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been able to absorb such level of poverty and 
unemployment that would have led to the tearing of the social ties and the breaking of the social fabric in 
many other societies.
To check the level of social cohesion, interviewees were asked how they would evaluate their ﬁnancial
situation in comparison to that of others in their community. Overall, a very large majority of the respondents 
(68%) stated that they consider the ﬁnancial situation of their household to be similar to that of others in their
community. This means that the socio-economic crisis initiated by the second Intifada was not associated 
with any major trend towards income differentiation that could have led to social fragmentation. 
Figure 2.11: Perception of household’s financial situation (o095), July 2003 – November 2004
However, the proportion of respondents who thought that their household’s ﬁnancial situation is worse
than the rest of their community has increased from 16% to 21% between February and November 2004. 
This growing discontent has affected the three regions, but it mainly stems from the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank refugee camps where the respondents have reported much more often the feeling of income 
differentiation.  As illustrated in ﬁgure 2.12, below, the percentage of those who stated that their household’s
ﬁnancial situation was worse than that of others in their community increased from 19% to 25% in the
Gaza Strip refugee camps and more striking from 9% to 25% in the West Bank refugee camps. The latter 
result must be linked with the analysis of the evolution of poverty that was provided above, where a sharp 
increase of extreme poverty in the West Bank refugee camps was evident.
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Figure 2.12:  Perception of household’s financial situation (o095) according to place of residence (place)
There is, however, a signiﬁcant increase among the poorest of those thinking that they are the big losers
of the deep socio-economic crisis and that their household situation is worse than that of the rest of their 
community. According to the results in ﬁgure 2.13, more than half of the poorest respondents had that
feeling in November 2004 as compared to 45% in February 2004. In the long run, the persistence of that 
trend could erode social cohesion and could have a very negative impact on the Palestinian society.
Figure 2.13: Perception of household’s financial situation (o095) according to poverty level (poverty3)
2.4 Poverty and coping strategy
As discussed in the previous sections, there is no doubt that the Palestinians in the oPt have suffered 
a large decline in well-being since the beginning of the second Intifada. Still, they are not passive and 
entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance mechanisms. At the opposite, they have developed a set of 
coping strategies to balance the sharp decline in the average income and the paralysis of the labor market 
by the Israeli policy of mobility restrictions. 
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Overall, one third of the respondents has stated that they can cope ﬁnancially for as long as it takes,
whereas one half stressed that they could barely manage or were in serious conditions. It is in the refugee 
camps that the situation is the most dramatic as the percent of those who reported that they were in 
serious conditions was 18% in the West Bank refugee camps and 25% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps. 
These results are detailed in ﬁgure 2.14, below.
Figure 2.14: Ability to cope financially (o044) according to place of residence (place)
As expected, the poorest ability to cope with hardship is under serious stress. Figure 2.15, below, shows 
that 34% of the poorest are in ﬁnancially serious conditions, while 43% can barely manage. Only 6% of
them declared that they can manage as long as it takes as compared to 33% of the poor (excluding the 
poorest) and 51% of those above the poverty line. It is also important to emphasize that one fourth of the 
non-poor respondents stressed that they can barely manage, while 4% are in serious conditions. 
Figure 2.15: Ability to cope financially (o044) according to poverty level (poverty3)
There are clear signs that it is increasingly difﬁcult to cope with economic hardship in the oPt. Figure 2.16
shows that only 43% of the respondents declared that they still have some available means to cope with 
the hardship whereas 35% explained that they never had such means available or that they were already 
exhausted. This is a very important ﬁnding because it highlights a major emerging challenge as about
22% of the respondents have reported that their means will soon be exhausted which could lead to a 
great pressure on local and international humanitarian assistance institutions that will have to balance it 
to avoid any dramatic humanitarian crisis. Indeed, between February and November 2004, the percent of 
respondents who stressed that they still have some available means to cope with the hardship decreased 
from 47% to 43%.
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Figure 2.16: Available means to cope with the hardship (o177)
When considering coping capabilities according to place of residence, the results in ﬁgure 2.17, below,
indicate that it is in the West Bank refugee camps that the situation is the worse as only 29% of the 
respondents declared they still had available means to cope with the hardship and 24% speciﬁed that they
will be exhausted soon. Moreover, it seems that the situation is deteriorating very rapidly as these rates 
were respectively 46% and 20% in February 2004. In the Gaza Strip, the situation is also very problematic 
as about one fourth of the respondents in this region declared that their means to cope with hardship will 
soon be exhausted.
Figure 2.17: Available means for relieving the hardship (o177) according to place of residence (place)
Figure 2.18: Available means for relieving the hardship (o177) according to poverty level (poverty3)
Despite targeted humanitarian assistance policies which tend to reduce the negative impact of the crisis on 
the poor, the poorest tend to be disproportionately worse-off as a consequence of the duration of the crisis. 
It is clear that for the poorest, many coping strategies are exhausted and it is much more difﬁcult to relieve
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the hardship. Figure 2.18 shows that among the poorest, the rate of the respondents who declared that 
they still have available means dropped from 30% to only 19% between February and November 2004. 
Thus, more than half of the poorest have now no available means to cope with the hardship which is a very 
worrying situation from a humanitarian perspective.
Coping strategies play a crucial role for managing the hardship so it is crucial to understand the main 
strategies used by the poorest in their effort to secure their livelihood and to maintain the highest possible 
consumption levels. It is also very important to identify the changes that can occur in the households’ 
coping strategies because they give additional information on the level of economic deprivation. 
Figure 2.19 presents the main coping strategies used by households. The most common one is reducing 
expenses and was stated by 66% of the respondents. The other widely used coping strategies are using 
past savings (46%), buying on credit (48%) and not paying bills (46%), followed by selling jewelry or gold 
(27%) and receiving assistance from family and friends in the oPt or abroad (15% for each).
Figure 2.19: Main coping strategies (o131), February 2004 – November 2004
The ﬁrst coping strategies used by households at the beginning of the second Intifada were to reduce their
expenditures and to draw on their savings. They also relied on selling jewelry and other assets as a way 
to compensate for their reduced income. However, these strategies are not sustainable in a context where 
there are no income generating activities to regenerate savings and assets. The four consecutive years of 
deep socio-economic crisis have exhausted the savings of the poorest and have pushed them to reduced 
expenditure (both in terms of quantity and quality) as far as possible. Therefore, it appears that these 
coping strategies are no longer available for a growing number of poor leading to a rapid deterioration of 
the poorest. 
Indeed, the results show a signiﬁcant decrease of the percent of the poorest who were relying on past
saving, reducing their expenditures or selling assets as a coping strategy. One must admit that the 
decreased use of some of these coping strategies could reﬂect an improvement of their material situation
and thus a decreased need for those coping strategies. However, this scenario seems very unlikely 
taking into account the persistence of mass poverty and unemployment. Given the considerably reduced 
consumption by the poor during the past four years of Intifada, it is not a surprise to see that the percent 
of the poorest relying on reducing expenses to cope with the hardship has declined from 94% to 80%. The 
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results in ﬁgure 2.20, below, also indicate that a growing number of the poorest are no longer relying on
savings as the rate dropped from 77% in July 2003 to only 40% in November 2004. The main reason of 
this trend is simply that a growing part of them no longer have savings to relieve the hardship. 
Figure 2.20: Using past savings (o131b), July 2003 – November 2004
As some of the main initial coping strategies of the 
poor tend to be exhausted, they must rely heavily 
on other coping strategies such are not paying the 
bills and buying on credit. The results show that the 
poorest are much more likely to use such coping 
strategies than the non poor as 71% of the poorest 
were not paying their bills and 75% were buying on 
credit compared to respectively 27% and 31% of the 
non-poor.
From a geographic point of view, ﬁgures 2.21 and
2.22 show that these coping strategies are widely 
used in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it 
is in the West Bank refugee camps that they are the 
most common as the rates of respondents stressing 
that they are not paying bills or buying on credit are 
respectively 61% and 65%.
Another way to keep access to basic needs for 
the poor households is to increase the number of 
the household members earning an income. As a 
consequence of their reduced income, households 
tend to send more adult members into income 
generating activities to relieve the hardship. The 
results in ﬁgure 2.19, above, indicated that 25% of
the respondents reported that more adults from 
their household went to work to cope with material 
deprivation, whereas 6% declared that more children 
entered the labor market.  Moreover, the poor tend 
to put more adults and children into the labor market 
than the non-poor. For child labor, for example, ﬁgure
2.23 shows that 12% of the poorest relied on that 
coping strategy as compared to only 3% of the non-
poor. Child labor is concentrated where extreme 
poverty is the most severe which means in the Gaza 
Strip and in the refugee camps. 
Figure 2.21: Not paying the bills (o131g) 
Figure 2.22: Buying on credit (o131j)
Figure 2.23: Child labor (o131f) according to poverty 
level (poverty3) and place of residence (place)
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Lastly, to ﬁnish, it is valuable to stress the importance of assistance for households’ coping strategies. The
results in ﬁgure 2.24, next page, indicate that assistance is crucial in the Gaza Strip refugee camps where
one fourth of the respondents stressed that their household could not manage without it. Assistance also 
plays an important role in the West Bank refugee camps and more surprisingly in the West Bank outside 
camps where 18% of the respondents stated they could not manage without it even when assistance 
to the population of that region is more limited. Overall, ﬁgure 2.24 shows that, in the present situation,
assistance plays a key role as it helps a large part of the population to cope with the hardship. 
Figure 2.24: Importance of assistance for households’ coping strategy (o250) according to place of residence 
(place)
Finally, the results in ﬁgure 2.25, below, indicate that only 5% of the poorest and 12% of the poor could
manage without assistance. Therefore, assistance is crucial to reduce the negative impact of the crisis on the 
poorest as about 37% of them could not manage without it or could only manage with great difﬁculties.
Figure 2.25: Importance of assistance for households’ coping strategy (o250) according to poverty level (poverty 
level)
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2.5  Conclusion
In short, the main ﬁndings on the socio-economic conditions in the oPt that are worth reiterating are
summarized below: 
• There is a sharp deterioration of the poverty situation in the West Bank refugee camps.
• Both the depth of poverty and the poverty rate in the Gaza Strip refugee camps have decreased. 
• Extreme poverty in Jerusalem has increased.
• The main cause of the decline of household income is the problem of access to employment and 
decent jobs leading to either job loss or working hour loss which very negatively impact on income 
generation.  
• There is a growing feeling of income differentiation among the poorest. This trend may affect social 
cohesion.
• There is an exhaustion of the main coping strategies of the poorest (reducing expenses and using 
past savings) as a consequence of the duration of the crisis which explains that the poorest tend to 
be disproportionately worse-off 
• There are clear signs that it is increasingly difﬁcult to cope with economic hardship in the oPt. Less
than half of the respondents declared that they still have some available means to cope with the 
hardship, whereas about one fourth of the respondents have reported that their means will soon 
be exhausted. This situation could lead to a great pressure on local and international humanitarian 
assistance institutions that will have to balance it to avoid any dramatic humanitarian crisis.
• The results pointed to the great importance of assistance for coping strategies, especially in the 
Gaza Strip refugee camps and - more surprisingly - in the West Bank outside refugee camps.
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Introduction
As was the case with poverty in Part Two of this report, unemployment also remains difﬁcult to measure
accurately in a context such as the oPt during the second Intifada. However, there is no doubt about 
the broad picture which is a situation of mass unemployment and underemployment resulting from the 
paralysis of the Palestinian economy by Israeli military forces. Unemployment according to ILO standards 
(those who do not work, but are seeking a job) was estimated at 27% for the period July-September 2004 
(PCBS, Labor Force Survey: 4), while this rate was only about 10% mid-2000 at the eve of the second 
Intifada. (ILO, Report from the Director General, 90th session, Annex on the situation of the workers from 
the oPt, 2002: 11)
Since the beginning of the second Intifada, Palestinian workers face two major problems: Firstly, the crisis 
of the domestic Palestinian labor market marked by depressed labor demand and falling wages in the 
private sector, and secondly, the loss of access to work in Israel and the Israeli settlements marked by the 
long-term substitution of Palestinian workers by foreign workers. 
In the ﬁrst section of this chapter, the main trends regarding the evolution of employment, unemployment,
job precariousness and some characteristics of the vulnerable groups in the labor market will be analyzed. 
The next section will assess how mobility restrictions and the very negative business environment affect 
the workers’ ability to reach their workplace and the employers’ ability to run business. The following 
section will focus on the distribution of workers according to the type of occupation and of employers. 
Finally, we will highlight the poverty risks related to the labor market will be highlighted.
3.1 Employment, underemployment, unemployment and job precariousness
Figure 3.1 shows a clear deterioration of the employment situation between February and October 2004 
as the rate of full-time employment decreased from 49% to 44%. This is a very worrying result taking into 
account that full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty. However, this decline of full-time 
employment did not lead to an increase of unemployment which decreased slightly from 23% to 21%, 
but instead led to a sharp increase of underemployment and precarious jobs from 25% to 38% (when 
summing those working part-time – which is meanly involuntary part-time – and those working a few hours 
per day).  
This trend means an increase of the poverty risk for Palestinian workers. Although unemployment is a 
key factor of poverty, a signiﬁcant proportion of the poor are currently working. PCBS estimates that the
percentage of employees whose monthly wages are below poverty line increased from 43.5% in the third 
quarter of 2000 to 55.8% in the third quarter of 2004. (PCBS, 2004, Labor Force Survey: 5)
Figure 3.1: Distribution of the labor force (o008r), November 2002-November 2004
The decline of full-time employment was especially severe in the West Bank refugee camps where it 
decreased from 54% to 37% between February 2004 and October 2004. As illustrated in ﬁgure 3.2, in
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the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps, one can see the same negative evolution as full-time employment 
decreased from 50% to 39%. This trend is very likely the cause of both the sharp increase of extreme 
poverty in the West Bank refugee camps and of the slight deterioration of the poverty situation in the Gaza 
Strip outside refugee camps during the period under study. 
It is important to note that the decline of full-time employment led in the West Bank refugee camps to a 
sharp increase of underemployment and job precariousness as the proportion of those working a few 
hours per day increased from 3% to 22%, whereas unemployment decreased from 30% to 26%. At the 
opposite, in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps, unemployment increased from 16% to 21% whereas 
the proportion of those working a few hours per day increased from 22% to 26%. Figure 3.2 also indicates 
an improvement of the employment situation in Jerusalem as 55% of the respondents stated they were 
full-time employed and 15% that they were unemployed as compared to respectively 39% and 33% in 
February 2004. This positive evolution on the labor market could explain why the rate of subjective poverty 
has decreased in Jerusalem as the proportion of those stating they had much less income than they 
needed to meet the basic needs of their household decreased from 48% to 24%. However, this result 
should be interpreted very cautiously. It could be linked to some bias as there are a relatively limited 
number of individuals interviewed in Jerusalem.
Figure 3.2 : Distribution of the labor force (o008r) according to place of residence (place)
Figure 3.3 : Duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner (o100v2), February 2004-November 2004
In the oPt, less than half (47%) of main breadwinners of the household did have a job at any time during 
the second Intifada, whereas more than one-quarter (28%) of all respondents were long-term unemployed 
(unemployed for more than 12 months). Moreover, the results in ﬁgure 3.3, above, show that the very long-
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term unemployed (without work for more than two years) represent as much as 15% of the respondents. 
Mass and persistent unemployment of family breadwinners was a dramatic shock to Palestinian society, 
as income-generating activities by the main breadwinner were the main source of income. This evolution 
explains the sharp increase of the economic dependency ratio (number of population divided by number of 
employed persons) which increased in the oPt from 4.8 in 2000 to 6.2 at the end of 2004 (the change rate 
is 29.2%). The ratio in the West Bank increased from 4.3 to 5.4 (the change rate is 25.6%) and it increased 
in the Gaza Strip from 5.9 to 8.5 (the change rate is 44.1%). (PCBS, 2004, Labor Force Survey: 5)
When the duration of unemployment for the main breadwinner is analyzed by place of residence, it appears 
that Gaza Strip respondents living outside refugee camps report a lower unemployment risk for the main 
breadwinner, as 54% were never unemployed compared to 41% in Gaza Strip refugee camps, 52% in 
Jerusalem and 44% in the West Bank both inside and outside refugee camps. 
The results also indicate that a signiﬁcant proportion of main breadwinners in Gaza Strip and West Bank
refugee camps belong to the category of the long-term unemployed (more than one year) which affects 
respectively 35% and 37% of the main breadwinners. Very long-term unemployment is especially high in 
the West Bank refugee camps where 22% of the main breadwinners were unemployed since the beginning 
of the second Intifada as compared to about 15% elsewhere in the oPt.
Figure 3.4: Duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner (o100v2) according to place of residence (place)
The oPt labor market is not only characterized by mass unemployment and underemployment, but also by 
a great job precariousness. As can be seen in ﬁgure 3.5, below, a growing number of workers are trapped
in unstable jobs associated to a short-term horizon and a great insecurity of the income generating activity. 
Only 54% of the respondents stated that their current job is stable and that the probability to loose it is very 
unlikely, while 16% stated it was very likely. This is a very important result as poverty is closely related to 
unemployment or employment in the bad segments of the labor market.
Figure 3.5 : Probability of loosing job in the coming year (o244)
As was shown in ﬁgure 3.5, above, stable employment is not the most usual pattern of work in terms of
stock. Job insecurity is not only affecting jobs in the informal sector, but also jobs in the formal sector as 
the private sector is absorbing the full force of the economic crisis. Stable jobs have become rare and 
are principally provided by the PA and local and international humanitarian/development organizations. 
The growth of insecure jobs is responsible for the rising vulnerability of the Palestinian workers in the oPt, 
leading to a growing number of working poor. 
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The poorest are more likely to be unemployed but also to lose their current job. As one can see in ﬁgure
3.6, only 19% of the poorest declared to have stable jobs compared to 66% of the non-poor. Fighting 
poverty should then also include a pro-active employment policy to secure jobs for the most vulnerable 
workers so as to avoid such a negative process that pushes individuals from a zone of job precariousness 
and to a zone of exclusion from the labor market with the well-known consequence on poverty. 
Figure 3.6 : Probability of loosing job in the coming year (o244) according to poverty level (poverty3)
The results indicate that 61% of respondents that reported that their household received a salary from a 
long-term job were above the poverty line, whereas only 29% of workers who reported that their household 
received a salary from a short-term job were above the poverty line. Moreover, 6% of respondents reporting 
the receipt of a salary from a long-term job in their household were extremely poor, while 34% of workers 
reporting the receipt in their household of a salary from a short-term job were extremely poor. Thus secure 
long-term jobs are shown here to considerably reduce poverty risk and the depth of poverty, whereas 
short-term jobs do not ward off poverty. Figure 3.7 illustrates from a different perspective the dramatic job 
precariousness from the poorest as it indicates that in the past six months 26% of them had to search for 
a new job and 40% became unemployed, whereas 90% of the respondents who were above the poverty 
line did not face any change in their employment situation.
Figure 3.7 : Change in employment situation in the past 6 months (o012v2) according to poverty level (poverty3)
The main causes of change in the employment status of the Palestinian workers were all related to the Israeli 
policies towards the oPt. Figure 3.8 indicates the various ways the current crisis has negatively affected 
the oPt labor market. The inability to reach the workplace was identiﬁed everywhere as the main cause of
change in employment status. However, the percentage of respondents who stressed it is especially high 
in the West Bank as a consequence of the severity of the mobility restriction regime. Curfews, roadblocks, 
checkpoints and the Wall have cut off many workers in the West Bank from their workplace and forced 
them to ﬁnd another job or to loose their current job and remain unemployed. Mobility restrictions were
reported as the cause of change in employment status by 65% of the respondents outside West Bank 
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refugee camps and 70% inside those camps, whereas this problem is less pronounced in Jerusalem or 
in the Gaza Strip. However, for the latter, it is worthwhile to stress that as many as 58% of respondents in 
Gaza Strip refugee camps also named inability to reach the workplace as the main cause of their change 
in employment status. 
The second most important cause of change in employment status is the deterioration of the business 
environment and the fact that employers can no longer pay for the salaries of their workers. This problem 
is particularly severe in Jerusalem, where 41% of the respondents declared it was the cause of change 
in their employment status. Some explanations will be given about this trend in section 3.2 regarding the 
evolution in the business environment and the impact of the Wall, especially on Jerusalem. The results in 
ﬁgure 3.8 also indicate a high rate of bankruptcy of family businesses in the Gaza Strip which changed the
employment status of 22% of the workers outside refugee camps and 17% of the workers inside refugee 
camps. 
Figure 3.8: Main cause of change in employment status (o013) according to place of residence (place)
The next ﬁgure aims at highlighting the lack of relevance of the ILO unemployment deﬁnition in a context
such as the current one in the oPt. The ILO standard stresses that to be considered as unemployed, 
individuals must have sought actively for a job in the past weeks. However, when the labor market is 
paralyzed by mobility restrictions, searching actively for a job is most often a waste of time as the problem 
is not on the supply side, but on the demand side. This situation explains why only 45% of the non-poor 
– who are also the more educated and trained – did try hard to ﬁnd a job and 43% did not try at all. There
are very few job opportunities for them and as long as they can cope they will not start searching for any 
income generating activities in the bad segments of the labor market. The situation is different for the 
poor and, especially, for the poorest as 77% of the latter stressed that they had tried a lot to ﬁnd a new
job. As they have exhausted their coping strategies, the poorest are desperately searching for any source 
of income. Figure 3.10 shows that 44% of them stressed that their job did not match at all their training 
compared to 11% for the non-poor.
Figure 3.9 : Attempts to find a job when unemployed (o014) according to poverty level (poverty3)
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Figure 3.10: Extent of job matching training (o245) according to poverty level (poverty3)
Finally, it is interesting to see how Palestinians heard about their current employment. As indicated in 
ﬁgure 3.11, below, 50% of the respondents stated they heard about their current job through relatives and
friends, 21% work in the family business, while 25% of the respondents stressed the role of newspapers 
and radio in their search for their current employment. 
Figure 3.11: Source of information about current employment (o243)
Figure 3.12 shows that social capital plays a crucial role for the poorest as 73% of them declared that 
they got their job through information provided by relatives and friends. For the non-poor respondents, 
newspapers and radio play a more important role as 31% of these respondents declared that they heard 
about their current job through the media compared to only 11% of the poorest.
Figure 3.12: Source of information about current employment (o243) according to poverty level (poverty3)
3.2 Business environment and mobility restrictions
The great difﬁculties to conduct business in the oPt since the beginning of the second Intifada have
aggravated the situation of domestic employment. Mobility restrictions, curfews and closures imposed 
by the Israeli military forces have generated major disruptions in production and marketing processes 
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report VIII70
leading to signiﬁcant transaction costs, loss of economies of scale, and loss of access to markets. These
phenomena are at the heart of the crisis of the private sector and the related drop in the domestic labor 
demand.
As illustrated in the following ﬁgures, a large part of the respondents stated that their business had
suffered in many ways in the past six months. Problems are more or less severe depending on the place 
of residence, but the results indicate that it is still very difﬁcult to run business – and thus to create wealth
and employment – in the oPt. This situation explains why business investments have been reduced to 
a minimum amount during the second Intifada. The results in ﬁgure 3.13, below, indicate that only 15%
of the respondents have invested in business activities since the beginning of the second Intifada. The 
percentage is especially low in Jerusalem where only 9% said so as compared to 15% in the West Bank 
and 18% in the Gaza Strip.
Figure 3.13 : Business investment since the beginning of the second Intifada (o162) according to region of residence 
(o059)
Among the main problems to run business is the inability to market products which is especially high in 
the West Bank outside camps as a consequence both of the more severe mobility restriction regime in this 
region and of the construction of the Wall. The percentage of respondents reporting such a problem was 
39% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and 29% inside refugee camps as compared to 30% in the 
Gaza Strip outside refugee camps and 29% inside refugee camps. The results show an improvement of the 
situation outside refugee camps but a slight deterioration inside refugee camps as compared to February 
2004. However, one can also see a sharp deterioration of the situation in Jerusalem where the percentage 
of the respondents who stated business suffered due to the inability to market products increased from 
16% to 23% between February and November 2004. The main factor of this trend is the progress in the 
construction of the wall which is increasingly isolating Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank.
Figure 3.14: Business suffered due to inability to market products (o140a) according to place of residence (place), 
July 2003 – November 2004
Another important problem to run business is the difﬁculty to buy raw materials or inputs. As illustrated
in ﬁgure 3.15, below, the trends are the same as for the difﬁculty to market products. The situation has
improved outside refugee camps in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whereas it remained about 
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the same inside refugee camps and it has deteriorated sharply in Jerusalem where the percentage of 
respondents who stated that their business suffered due to difﬁculties in buying raw material increased
from 17% to 25% between February and November 2004.
Figure 3.15: Business suffered due to difficulties to buy raw material and products (o140b) according to place of 
residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004
The Wall has a very negative impact on business in the agriculture sector in both the West Bank and 
Jerusalem. About one fourth of the respondents from the West Bank stated that the Wall separated them 
from land and that agriculture was difﬁcult or impossible as a consequence of it. Moreover, 17% of them
stressed that the Wall cut their land from access to water. In Jerusalem, the situation is less severe as only 
6% of the respondents declared that agriculture was difﬁcult or impossible, while 15% declared that the
Wall separated them from land. The producers and businessmen in the agriculture sector from the area 
crossed by the Wall are not the only ones to carry the economic cost of it as it leads to higher prices for 
material and transport which lead to higher prices and to a lost of welfare for the consumers. Indeed, as 
overviewed in ﬁgure 3.15, 55% of the respondents from the West Bank and 74% of those from Jerusalem
declared that the Wall has increased prices for material and transport.
Figure 3.16 : Various business problems in the agricultural sector related to the separation wall (o164)
Mobility restrictions are not only for goods, but also for people in the oPt and this is a major obstacle for the 
business sector to operate on a regular basis. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and curfews are all contributing to 
the very negative business environment. Overall, 55% of the respondents stressed that business suffered 
due to problems in reaching the workplace. This problem is especially severe in the West Bank where 
about 64% of the respondents stressed it as compared to 47% in Jerusalem, 44% in the Gaza Strip outside 
refugee camps and 49% inside those camps. Figure 3.17, below, indicates that the situation worsened 
sharply in the refugee camps between February and October 2004 and especially in the West Bank 
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refugee camps where the rate increased from 40% to 63%, while it increased from 39% to 49% in the 
Gaza Strip refugee camps. One can also see a very worrying evolution in Jerusalem where the percentage 
of those who declared that their business suffered due to problems in getting to the workplace increased 
from 24% to 47%. 
As a whole, the problem of reaching the workplace is more severe in the West Bank as a consequence 
of the higher intensity of mobility restrictions and, especially, of the curfews that the Israeli military forces 
have enforced periodically since the Spring of 2002. Indeed, 46% of the respondents from the West 
bank outside refugee camps and 39% of those inside the camps stressed the problem of the curfews as 
compared to 11% of the respondents from the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps and 14% of those inside 
the camps. However, curfews are less problematic than before in the West Bank as a consequence of a 
relative softening of the curfew regime (indeed, in February 2004, the proportion of the respondents from 
the West Bank that stressed the negative impact of curfews on business was 54% outside refugee camps 
and 45% inside refugee camps).
Figure 3.17 : Business suffered due to problems to reach the workplace (o140c) according to place of residence 
(place), July 2003 – November 2004
Figure 3.18: Ability to go to work in the past six months (o0114v2) according to place of residence (place), February 
2004-November 2004
When considering the impact of mobility restrictions on the access of workers to their workplace, the results 
in ﬁgure 3.18, above, illustrate a signiﬁcant deterioration of the situation in the oPt. Overall, only 37% of
the respondents declared that it was not difﬁcult to go to work as compared to 53% in February 2004. The
evolution is particularly dramatic in Jerusalem where the proportion of the respondents who stressed it 
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was difﬁcult to reach their workplace jumped from 15 to 48% and those who declared it was very difﬁcult or
impossible increased from 9% to 12%. The workers of the Gaza Strip are also paying a high price for the 
intensiﬁcation of Israeli military operations in the region as the proportion of the respondents who declared
it was difﬁcult to reach their workplace increased from 25% to 43% outside refugee camps and from 33%
to 47% inside refugee camps, while the proportion of those stating it was very difﬁcult or impossible to
reach the workplace did not change. The West Bank is marked by some diverging trends as the problem 
of access to the workplace increased slightly outside refugee camps, but it increased very sharply inside 
refugee camps where the proportion of workers who faced some difﬁculties to go to work increased from
28% to 42% between February and November 2004. Moreover, the intensity of the obstacles to go to work 
increased as the proportion of respondents who stated that it was very difﬁcult or almost impossible to
reach their workplace increased from 18% to 23%.
Mobility restrictions are also affecting the access to land for the farmers. The results in ﬁgure 3.19, below,
indicate that the current situation is very negative for cultivating land which is a crucial sector for the 
Palestinian economy. The situation remained approximately the same in the West Bank between February 
and November 2004, but has worsened in Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip where the level of obstacles 
is now much higher than in the West Bank, whereas six months ago they were at the same level. Indeed, 
the proportion of respondents who stated that it was not difﬁcult to cultivate land dropped from 43% to 24%
in Jerusalem and from 48% to 27% in the Gaza Strip. However, the situation seems much more severe in 
Jerusalem where the proportion of respondents who stated that it was very difﬁcult or almost impossible to
cultivate land increased from 29% to 36%. 
Figure 3.19: Ability to cultivate land in the past six months (o0115v2) according to region of residence (o059), 
February 2004-November 2004
3.4 Types of occupation and employer
When examining the employment situation according to the type of occupation, one can note that the 
employees are the largest group of workers, representing 36% of them, while the second largest group 
consists of the skilled workers (29%) and the third largest group are the unskilled workers and the self-
employed (respectively 11% and 10%). One can ﬁnd the higher proportion of employees in the Gaza Strip
outside refugee camps (43%) and inside refugee camps (39%) as compared to 32% in the West Bank 
overall. The proportion of unskilled workers is much higher in the West Bank refugee camps (28%) than in 
the other places as it reached 15% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and respectively 5% and 9% 
in the Gaza Strip outside and inside refugee camps. This situation could explain the higher poverty risk in 
the West Bank refugee camps.
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Figure 3.20: Occupation or most recent occupation for the unemployed (o009)
The collapse of the private sector, the deep economic crisis and the large involvement of domestic 
and international organizations to avoid a major humanitarian crisis have all considerably changed the 
structure of employment in the oPt since the beginning of the second Intifada. Indeed, the share of local 
and international NGOs and of international agencies in the structure of employment is astonishingly high 
(9%) and reﬂects the current dramatic socio-economic situation. The private sector represents now one
third of the total employment and remains the main employer before the PA which is the second largest 
employer as it employs 23% of the workers. From a dynamic perspective, ﬁgure 3.21 shows that the share
of the PA in the distribution of workers decreased from 29% to 23% between February and November 
2004, whereas the share of the private sector increased from 24% to 33%. In the same period, petty trade 
– of agriculture or manufacture products – increased from 10% to 15%. The results show that the PA plays 
a crucial role for employment by securing a job and an income to a large group of workers and their family. 
The donors are aware of this situation and ﬁnancially support the PA to ﬁght poverty through securing
employment in the public sector and delivering basic services.
Figure 3.21: Type of employer (o063v2), July 2003-November 2004
To conclude, one can look at the distribution of employers according to the level of poverty of the workers. It 
is striking to see in ﬁgure 3.22 that one third of the non-poor work for the PA, 7% for international agencies
and 8% for international and local NGOs, which is a very peculiar distribution. 
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Figure 3.22: Type of employer (o063v2) according to poverty level (poverty3)
3.5 Employment and poverty risk
The integration into the labor market and the quality of this integration are two crucial elements to explain 
poverty and vulnerability. The strength of the links between the employment situation and other dimensions 
of economic and social life (family, health, income or living conditions) suggests that those people in 
situations of occupational precariousness - whether they are in an insecure job or whether they are 
unemployed - are at great risk of becoming poor. In the oPt, the rise in unemployment and the changing 
structure of employment causing an increase in precarious jobs, represent the main source of uncertainty 
and vulnerability. One can see two main processes contributing to that: (i) high unemployment and job 
precariousness for groups of people who were more or less well integrated before into the labor market 
(before the second Intifada, for example, a large number of the current poor were working in Israel and in 
the Israeli settlements), and (ii) greater difﬁculty in entering the labor market for young people.
Full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty. Figure 3.23, next page, indicates that the poverty 
risk is relatively low among full-time workers as 72% of them are above the poverty line. At the opposite, 
the poverty risk is very high among the unemployed and the workers trapped in precarious jobs as only 
13% of the unemployed, 22% of those working only a few hours per day, and 38% of those working part-
time are above the poverty line. Unemployment and precarious jobs are also associated to severe material 
deprivation as the percentage of extremely poor respondents among the unemployed is 14 times higher 
than among the full-time employed (56% compared to 4%)
The results also indicate a dramatic level of working poor. The income generated by workers working 
few hours a day is too low and uncertain to secure their livelihood. Thus, the poverty rate of this group 
of workers is as high as 78%, and their extreme poverty rate as high as 32%. Working poor are also 
numerous among those working part-time (62%) and more surprisingly among those working full-time as 
more than one quarter of them are below the poverty line. 
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Figure 3.23: Poverty risk (poverty3) according to employment status (o008r)
In order to better understand which kinds of workers have been particularly vulnerable to unemployment 
and precarious jobs, it is useful to compare their characteristics to those of the remainder of the labor force. 
The unemployed tend to have less education than the employed workers. They also tend to be younger. 
As detailed in ﬁgure 3.24, below, young workers are particularly vulnerable to unemployment. Indeed,
the unemployment rate of the age group 18-24 is much higher than the one of the other age groups as 
one third of the former are unemployed compared to about one fourth of the age group of 25-49 years. 
Moreover, when they have a job they have less often a full-time job than the workers of the other age 
groups as only 44% of young workers held a full-time job compared to about half of the workers in the age 
group of 25-49 years. The level of full-time employment is also relatively low for the workers of 50 years or 
more as only 44% of them are full-time employed; meanwhile 35% of respondents in this age group work 
only a few hours a day or part-time compared to 28% in the age group of 25-49 years and 23% in the age 
group of 18-24 years.
Figure 3.24: Employment situation of the labor force (o008r) according to age group (agec)
The results in ﬁgure 3.25, below, show that the unemployment rate is nearly six times higher among
respondents with a low level of education than among those with a high level of education (46% compared 
to 8%). The proportion of respondents stating that they work part-time or a few hours a day is also much 
higher among the former (40%) than among the latter (25%). Thus, the level of education is a key variable 
to explain workers’ vulnerability in the labor market and should be a key element of any policy aiming at 
ﬁghting poverty. Considering the importance of the access to full-time jobs on the poverty risk, it is striking
to see that only 15% of the low educated workers are full-time employed.
Figure 3.25: Employment situation of the labor force (o008r) according to level of education (educ)
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Individuals living in households where the main breadwinner is unemployed are more likely to be poor than 
others. It is the same for those living in households with many non-working dependents and few workers. 
Figure 3.26, below, shows a strong link between the employment status of the main breadwinner and the 
poverty risk. Indeed, the poverty risk is relatively low when the main breadwinner is able to maintain access 
to employment and secure a main source of income to the household. Indeed, 63% of the respondents 
above the poverty line stated that the main breadwinner of their household had never been unemployed 
since the beginning of the second Intifada, while only 12% stated that he or she had been unemployed for 
more than 12 months. Alternatively, only 13% of the extremely poor reported that the main breadwinner of 
their household had never been unemployed during the Intifada, whereas 59% reported that he or she had 
been unemployed more than 12 months. 
Figure 3.26: Poverty risk (poverty3) according to unemployment duration of main household breadwinner (o100)
In a context marked by both the exclusion of Palestinian workers from the Israeli labor market and mobility 
restrictions, the place (or most recent place) of work has a great correlation with the poverty risk. Figure 
3.27 shows that the rate of poverty among workers who work or used to work in the settlements (67%) or in 
Israel (79%) is much higher than the average for the oPt. These workers are the big losers of the closures 
because there is very little hope of returning to pre-September 2000 employment levels inside Israel and 
the settlements. This exclusion put great pressure on the oPt labor market and will require an even greater 
effort to create employment opportunities in Palestine. One can also note that compared to February 2004, 
the rate of extreme poverty among the workers working in Jerusalem increased sharply from 5% to 13% 
which is very likely the consequence of the expansion of the Wall.
Figure 3.27: Poverty risk (poverty3) according to workplace (o011)
The type of employer also has a very signiﬁcant impact on the poverty risk. The private sector is associated
with a high poverty risk as only 38% of the respondents employed in the private sector are above the poverty 
line, while 31% of them are extremely poor. Harshly hit by closures, infrastructure destructions, and the 
deep economic crisis, the private sector is less and less able to provide decent jobs as one can see from 
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the deterioration of the situation since February 2004. At that time, still 43% of the respondents employed 
in the private sector were above the poverty line and 29% of them were in a situation of extreme poverty. 
The results in ﬁgure 3.28, below, show that the PA, international agencies and local and international
NGOs guarantee many of their employees a better level of income and job security  and, as such, protect 
them from poverty as the poverty rates among respondents in this group are much lower than the average. 
Moreover, the extreme poverty rate is only 4% for the workers employed by the PA, 3% for those employed 
by international agencies and nearly non-existent for those employed by local and international NGOs. 
Self-employment (including the various forms of petty-trade) is the type of employment that has the highest 
risk of poverty. The situation is particularly dramatic for the workers employed in agricultural petty-trade 
activities as only 17% are above the poverty line and nearly half of them are extremely poor. The depth 
of poverty is less extreme for those employed in manufacture petty trade activities and the other self-
employed, but the poverty rates still reached respectively 60% and 70%.
Figure 3.28: Poverty risk (poverty3) according to type of employer (o063v3)
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3.6  Conclusions
• The results show a clear deterioration of the employment situation between February and 
November 2004 as the rate of full-time employment decreased from 49% to 44%, while the rate of 
underemployment and precarious jobs increased from 25% to 38%.
• The decline of full-time employment was especially severe in the West Bank refugee camps where 
it decreased from 54% to 37% between February 2004 and November 2004, while the proportion 
of those working a few hours per day increased from 3% to 22%
• The results indicate that a signiﬁcant proportion of main breadwinners in Gaza Strip and West Bank
refugee camps belong to the category of the long-term unemployed (more than one year),  with 
respectively 35% and 37% of the main breadwinners in these places affected.
• The oPt labor market is characterized by great job precariousness. One can see a growing number 
of workers trapped in unstable jobs that are associated with a short-term horizon and a great 
insecurity of the income generating activity. Only 54% of the respondents stated that their current 
job is stable and that the probability to loose it is absolutely or very unlikely, while 16% stated it was 
very likely.
• The main causes of change in the employment status of the Palestinian workers in the oPt are 
all related to the Israeli politics toward the oPt. The inability to reach the workplace was identiﬁed
everywhere as the main cause of change in employment status.
• The great difﬁculties to conduct business in the oPt since the beginning of the second Intifada
have aggravated the situation of domestic employment. Mobility restrictions, curfews and closures 
imposed by the Israeli military forces have generated major disruptions in production and marketing 
processes leading to signiﬁcant transaction costs, loss of economies of scale, and loss of access
to markets.
• Among the main problems to run business, the inability to market products is especially high in the 
West Bank outside camps as a consequence of both the more severe mobility restriction regime in 
the West Bank and the construction of the Wall.
• The Wall has a very negative impact on business in the agriculture sector in both the West Bank and 
Jerusalem. About one fourth of the respondents in the West Bank stated that the Wall separated 
them from land and that agriculture was difﬁcult or impossible as a consequence of it. Moreover,
17% of them stressed that the wall cut their land from access to water.
• Mobility restrictions are not only for goods, but also for people in the oPt and this is a major obstacle 
for the business sector to operate on a regular basis. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and curfews are all 
contributing to the very negative business environment. Overall, 55% of the respondents stressed 
that business suffered due to problems in reaching the workplace.
• When considering the impact of mobility restrictions on the access of workers to their workplace, 
the results indicate a signiﬁcant deterioration of the situation in the oPt. Overall, only 37% of the
respondents declared that it was not difﬁcult to go to work as compared to 53% in February 2004.
The evolution is particularly dramatic in Jerusalem where the proportion of the respondents who 
stressed it was difﬁcult to reach their workplace jumped from 15% to 48%, while those who declared
that it was very difﬁcult or impossible to reach the workplace increased from 9% to 12%.
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report VIII80
• Mobility restrictions are also affecting the access to land for the farmers. The current situation is 
very negative as agriculture is a crucial sector for the Palestinian economy. The situation remained 
approximately the same in the West Bank between February and November 2004, but has worsened 
in Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip where the level of obstacles is now much higher than in the 
West Bank. 
• Full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty. The poverty risk is relatively low among 
full-time workers as 72% of them are above the poverty line. At the opposite, the poverty risk is 
very high among the unemployed and the workers trapped in precarious jobs as only 13% of the 
unemployed, 22% of those working only a few hours a day, and 38% of those working part-time are 
above the poverty line. Individuals living in households where the main breadwinner is unemployed 
are more likely to be poor than others. 
• The type of employer also has a very signiﬁcant impact on the poverty risk. The private sector is
associated with a high poverty risk as only 38% of the respondents employed in the private sector 
are above the poverty line, while 31% of them are in a situation of extreme poverty. Harshly hit by 
closures, infrastructure destructions, and a deep economic crisis, the private sector is less and 
less able to provide decent jobs as is obvious from the deterioration of the situation since February 
2004.
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Introduction
Before analyzing various issues related to assistance in part 5 of the report, it is necessary to ﬁrst establish
what the needs are of the Palestinian people, both on a household level and on the community level, 
but also more speciﬁcally with regard to needed community and communication facilities. In addition,
it is important to overview which services – and to what extent - are already available in the occupied 
Palestinian territory. These are the main concerns of this part of the report.
4.1  Household needs
Respondents were asked to state the two most important household needs from a predetermined list. 
When the two most important needs are examined together – as is the case in ﬁgure 4.1, below, -  food is
clearly the most frequently cited household need, followed by the need for employment. In comparison to 
the results to the same question in the survey conducted in February 2004, the importance of employment 
and –especially – of food has increased considerably. Since February 2004, the importance of the 
remaining household needs, such as health, ﬁnancial assistance, housing and re-housing, and education
has decreased.
When the ﬁrst most important need is considered separately, food (30%) is no longer the most important 
household need, but is superceded by the need for employment (44%) in the household. One can also 
notice in ﬁgure 4.1, below, that the importance of food as a ﬁrst household need has almost doubled since
February 2004 (from 16% to 30%).
Figure 4.1: The two most important household needs (o079), November 2004 - February 2004
When analyzing the most important household needs together according to the region in which respondents 
reside, one can see that the household need for employment in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip is 
higher than in Jerusalem, while the need for food in the household is – perhaps unexpectedly - higher in 
Jerusalem than in the West Bank and even the Gaza Strip. Also clear from ﬁgure 4.2, next page, is that
the importance of ﬁnancial assistance as a household need is higher in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
than in Jerusalem, while the importance of education as a household need is similar in the West Bank and 
in Jerusalem, and is lower in the Gaza Strip.
When examining the ﬁrst most important household need separately, the results indicate a similar 
importance of employment as a household need in all three regions under study, while the household 
need of food is much more a concern for respondents in the Gaza Strip than it is for respondents in the 
West Bank and Jerusalem.
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Figure 4.2: The two most important household needs (o079) according to region of residence (o059)  
When analyzing the two most important household needs together according to the area in which 
respondents reside, the results in ﬁgure 4.3, below, indicate that there is no substantial difference in the
need for employment in the household according to whether interviewees reside in cities, villages or refugee 
camps. This is not the case concerning food as food seems to be much more of an issue in households in 
cities than in households in refugee camps or villages. Conversely, the need of ﬁnancial assistance seems
more pressing in households in refugee camps and villages than in households in cities. Finally, it is worth 
noting that the household need of housing and re-housing is the highest in refugee camps.
When examining the ﬁrst most important household need separately according to area of residence, it is 
clear that employment is more frequently a ﬁrst most important household need in villages than in cities
and refugee camps, while the opposite is the case concerning food as a ﬁrst most important household
need. Furthermore, the percentage of respondents who indicated that ﬁnancial assistance is their ﬁrst
most important household need is the lowest in cities, while the proportion of respondents specifying that 
education is their household’s ﬁrst most important need is the highest in villages.
Figure 4.3: The two most important household needs (o079) according to area of residence (o060)  
When considering the two most important household needs together according to poverty level, it is clear 
that employment is a more pressing need in households living in hardship than in households with a living 
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standard below or above the poverty line. Conversely, food is an important household need to a higher 
percentage of the respondents in households with a monthly income above the poverty line and below the 
poverty line than to respondents in households living in hardship. Similarly, the results in ﬁgure 4.4, below,
indicate that the household needs of health and education are more an issue to the relatively better-off in 
Palestinian society than to the extremely poor segments of the population. As for the household need of 
ﬁnancial assistance, not surprisingly, the need for such assistance increases according to the increased
poverty endured by the households.
When studying the ﬁrst most important household need separately according to poverty level, similar 
trends appear as when the two most important household needs were analyzed together, whereby a higher 
percentage of the poorer households than the relatively better-off attach importance to the household 
needs of employment and ﬁnancial assistance, while a lower percentage of the former than the latter
consider food, health, or education to be their ﬁrst most important household need.
Figure 4.4: The two most important household needs (o079) according to poverty level (poverty3)  
Lastly, a statistically signiﬁcant relationship also exists between the two most important household needs
and the educational attainment of the respondents. When examining the two most important household 
needs together according to educational level, it appears that the household need for employment is the 
highest among the medium educated, while the need for health is the lowest in this subgroup. Furthermore, 
the household need for food is the lowest among the least educated, while the importance attached to 
education as a household need is the highest among the high educated.
 
When considering the ﬁrst most important household need separately, the importance given to food and 
education is the highest among the high educated, while the importance given to the household needs of 
employment and ﬁnancial assistance is the lowest in this subgroup.
When the analysis purely focuses on the ﬁrst most important household need, the results in ﬁgure 4.6,
next page, clearly indicate that employment is by far the ﬁrst most important household need (44%).
However, its importance differs according to the subgroups within Palestinian society that one chooses to 
concentrate on. While there is, for example, no major difference in the importance attached to employment 
as a ﬁrst household need according to the region in which respondents reside, there is such a difference
when looking at the issue according to area of residence, poverty level and educational level. As such, the 
results show that a higher percentage of respondents in villages than in cities or refugee camps consider 
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employment to be their ﬁrst most important household need. Furthermore, the importance of employment
as a ﬁrst household need swells with an increase in poverty. Lastly, employment is considered to be the
ﬁrst most important household need among a larger proportion of medium educated than among low or
high educated respondents.
Figure 4.5: The two most important household needs (o079) according to educational level (educ)  
Figure 4.6: The first most important household need (o079) according to different variables
While employment is the most important household need, it is also the most important unmet household 
need. As the results in ﬁgure 4.7, next page, indicate 32% of the respondents stated that employment is
their most important unmet household need, which is an increase of 3% compared to the results on the 
same question in the survey of February 2004. The importance of food as an unmet household need 
has also increased since February 2004, from 10% to 15%. Notice also that the importance of ﬁnancial
assistance as the most important unmet household need has increased from 23% in February 2004 to 27% 
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in November 2004, making it the second most important unmet household need. The remaining unmet 
needs of health, education, and housing and re-housing have all lost importance since February 2004.
Figure 4.7: The most important unmet household need in general, November 2004 - February 2004
When considering the most important unmet household need according to different variables such 
as region and area of residence or refugee status, several interesting ﬁndings appear. Concerning
employment, for example, the results in ﬁgure 4.8, below, portray how employment is more of an unmet
need in households in the Gaza Strip (34%) than in households in the West Bank (31%) and Jerusalem 
(28%). Also, employment is more of an unmet concern to households in cities (34%) than to households in 
villages (31%) and refugee camps (27%). Lastly, employment is much more of an unmet household need 
among non-refugees (34%) than among refugees (28%). Similarly, concerning the second most important 
unmet household need, i.e. ﬁnancial assistance, the results indicate that it is more of an unmet need in the
Gaza Strip (28%) than in the West Bank (26%) and Jerusalem (24%), and also more of an unmet need 
in refugee camps (31%) and among refugees (30%) than in villages (28%) and cities (24%), or – more 
generally – among non-refugees (24%).
Figure 4.8: The most important unmet household need according to region of residence (o059), area of residence 
(o060) and refugee status (o002)
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Interesting differences were also detected in the analysis of the most important unmet household need 
according to the poverty level, the educational level and the gender of the respondents. With regard to 
employment, its importance as an unmet household need is higher among the poorer segments of society 
than among the relatively better-off. Furthermore, employment is considered to be an unmet need more 
frequently among the medium educated (34%) than among the high (30%) and low (27%) educated, 
and also among male (34%) than among female (29%) respondents. As for the second most important 
unmet household need of ﬁnancial assistance, again, its importance swells with increased poverty, while
it decreases with increased levels of educational attainment. Lastly, a higher percentage of female (30%) 
than male (25%) respondents consider ﬁnancial assistance to be the most important unmet household
need. 
Figure 4.9: The most important unmet household need according to poverty level (poverty3), educational level 
(educ) and gender (o061)
4.2  Community needs
As was the case with the analysis of household needs, the question of the two most important community 
needs will be discussed ﬁrst as the two most important community needs together and, secondly, as only 
the ﬁrst most important community need separately. 
When looking at the two most important community needs together in general and in comparison to the 
results on the same question in the February 2004 survey, the importance of employment as a community 
need has remained quite stable and quite high. Also noticeable is that the importance of food and – to a 
lesser extent – ﬁnancial assistance has gained in importance as needs for the community since February
2004. The importance of health as a need for the community has remained quite stable since February 
2004, while the importance of housing and re-housing, and education have decreased since February 
2004.
When analyzing the ﬁrst most important need of the community separately, employment (60%) remains 
by far the most important community need and is only followed in a distance by food (16%) and ﬁnancial
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assistance (14%) as important community needs. These results are detailed in ﬁgure 4.10, below.
Figure 4.10: The two most important needs of your community (o80), in general, November 2004 - February 2004
When considering the two most important community needs together according to the region in which 
respondents reside, employment is perceived to be the most pressing need for the community in all 
three regions, but even more so in the Gaza Strip. Food and ﬁnancial assistance are considered least a
concern to the community in Jerusalem, while the importance of the need of housing and re-housing for 
the community is by far the highest in Jerusalem. Also apparent from the results detailed in ﬁgure 4.11,
below, is that health as a need for the community is far less important in the Gaza Strip than it is in the 
West Bank and Jerusalem.
When examining the ﬁrst important community need separately, a signiﬁcantly lower percentage of
respondents in Jerusalem (49%) than in the West Bank (59%) and in the Gaza Strip (62%) think of 
employment as the most important need of their community. Food as a ﬁrst important community need is
also slightly less important to respondents in Jerusalem (13%) than to their colleagues in the West Bank 
(17%) and the Gaza Strip (17%), while the community needs of housing and re-housing, and education are 
perceived to be considerably more important in Jerusalem than in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Figure 4.11: The two most important needs of your community (o080) according to region of residence (o059)
A statistically signiﬁcant relationship could also be established between the two most important needs
of the community and the educational level of the respondents. When studying the two most important 
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community needs together, the importance of employment and education as needs for the community 
swells with increased levels of education of the respondents, while the perceived importance of ﬁnancial
assistance as a community need decreases with increased levels of education.
When considering the ﬁrst most important need of the community separately according to educational 
attainment, a larger percentage of respondents with high educational attainment (61%) than those with 
medium (59%) or low educational attainment (54%) stated that employment is the ﬁrst most important
need of the community. Conversely, ﬁnancial assistance is seen as the ﬁrst most important community
need by a far larger proportion of low educated respondents (23%) than it is by respondents with medium 
(15%) or high levels of educational attainment (9%).
Figure 4.12: The two most important needs of your community (o080) according to educational level (educ)
Moving on from the two most important needs in the community to the two most important facilities needed 
in the community, it is clear that – whether one looks at the two most important facilities together or only at 
the ﬁrst most important facility needed – water is by far considered to be the most important facility needed
in the community. When looking at the two most important facilities together, the results in ﬁgure 4.13,
below, suggest that there is no signiﬁcant difference between the need in the community for a sewage
network or a solid waste disposal network. However, when only the ﬁrst most important need is analyzed,
a higher percentage of respondents believed that a sewage network (26%) is the most important facility 
needed in their community than respondents stating that the solid waste disposal network (16%) was the 
ﬁrst most important facility needed. The lowest proportion of respondents speciﬁed that, in their opinion,
an electricity network is the most important facility needed in their community.
Figure 4.13: The two most important facilities needed in your community (o124) in general
When studying the question of the two most important facilities needed in the community according to 
refugee status, the results indicate that a higher percentage of refugees than non-refugees believe a 
water network and an electricity network to be the most important facilities needed in their community. 
Conversely, a higher percentage of non-refugees than refugees stated that a sewage network and a solid 
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waste disposal network are the two most important facilities needed in their community. These results are 
detailed in ﬁgure 4.14, below.
Figure 4.14: The two most important facilities needed in your community (o124) according to refugee status (o002)
The perceived importance of the various facilities needed in the community also varies according to the 
poverty level of the respondents’ household. Whether one examines the two most important facilities 
needed in the community combined or merely the ﬁrst most important facility needed, the perceived need
for a water network in the community is lower in households living in extreme poverty than in households 
that are relatively better-off, while, on the other hand, the perceived need for a sewage network in the 
community is higher in the households living in hardship than it is in households with a living standard 
either below or above the poverty line. These results are overviewed in ﬁgure 4.15, below.
Figure 4.15 The two most important facilities needed in your community (o124) according to poverty level (poverty3)
Moving from the two most important facilities needed in the community to the even more speciﬁc need in
the community for communication facilities, respondents were asked from a predetermined list to specify 
which communication facility (ﬁxed phone line network, mobile phone network, or permanent connection
to the internet or satellite) is, in their opinion, the most needed in their community. In general, 60% of the 
respondents thought that a ﬁxed phone line network is the most needed communication facility in their
community, 23% speciﬁed that it was a permanent connection to the internet, 13 % indicated that it is a
mobile phone network, while 4% stated that to have satellites is the most important communication facility 
needed in their community.
Figure 4.16: The most important communication facility needed in the community in general (o278)
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When examining the issue of the most needed communication facility in the community according to region 
of residence and refugee status, the results in ﬁgure 4.17, below, indicate that the highest percentage of
respondents specifying that a ﬁxed phone line network is the most needed communication facility in their
community are the ones residing in Jerusalem (78%) and the refugees (65%). The highest percentage 
of respondents considering that a mobile phone network is the most important communication facility 
needed in their community reside in the Gaza Strip (18%). Furthermore, a considerably higher percentage 
of respondents in the West Bank (28%) than in the Gaza Strip (18%) and in Jerusalem (13%) consider 
a permanent connection the internet to be the most important communication facility needed by the 
community. This is also the case when one compares the views of non-refugees (26%) to the ones of 
refugees (19%) on this issue.
Figure 4.17: The most important communication facility needed in the community (o278) according to region (o059) 
and refugee status (o002)
Lastly, a statistically signiﬁcant relationship could be established between the issue of the most important
communication facility needed in the community and the poverty level and educational level of the 
respondents. The importance attached to both a ﬁxed phone line network and a mobile phone network
as needed communication facilities in the community is higher in household living in hardship or below 
the poverty line than in households with a monthly income above the poverty line, while the importance 
attached to a permanent connection to the internet was higher among the respondents above the 
poverty line than among those below the poverty line and those living in extreme poverty. As for the most 
important communication facility needed in the community according to the level of education attained 
by the respondents, the results in ﬁgure 4.18, below, illustrate that a higher percentage of low educated
respondents than medium or high educated respondents felt that a ﬁxed phone line network is the most
important communication facility needed in the community. Furthermore, a higher percentage of high 
educated respondents than medium or low educated ones speciﬁed that a permanent connection to the
internet is the most important communication facility needed in the community.
Figure 4.18: The most important communication facility needed in the community (o278) according to poverty 
(poverty3) and educational level (educ)
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4.3  Availability of services
Having overviewed different types of needs of the Palestinian population, it is important ﬁrst to overview
what services are available to Palestinians and, secondly, to see if the importance attached to the need 
for certain community facilities and communication facilities might be affected by the availability - or lack 
thereof - of certain services.
In general and as summarized in ﬁgure 4.19, below, the large majority of Palestinians are connected to
an electricity network (97%) and a water network (94%), and an as large majority have in their household 
their own latrines, sewer or septic tank (97%). Slightly more than 40% of the respondents make use of 
a well, 64% are connected to a sewage disposal network, while 53% beneﬁt from a solid waste disposal
service. Concerning the availability of communication facilities, the coverage by a mobile phone network 
(61%) is nearly as large as the coverage of the ﬁxed phone line network (66%). More than two thirds of the
respondents speciﬁed that their households have satellite TV (69%), while 17% of the households have a
permanent connection to the internet.
Figure 4.19: Availability of services in general
Hereunder, each of the services under study will be overviewed separately in order to check if their 
availability varies according to the different independent variables at hand.
Starting with the household connection to the electricity network, it is clear that electricity is widely available 
in the occupied Palestinian territory and, therefore, the only statistically signiﬁcant difference that could be
established was according to the poverty level of the households. As illustrated in ﬁgure 4.20, below, only
93% of the households living in extreme poverty are connected to the electricity network compared to 98% 
of the households with a monthly income below the poverty line and 99% of the households with a living 
standard above the poverty line.
Figure 4.20: Household connection to the electricity network (o174) according to poverty level (poverty3)
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As for the household connection to the water network, the results in ﬁgure 4.21, below, illustrate that about
the same percentage of households in the West Bank (93%) and the Gaza Strip (94%) are connected to 
the water network, while the percentage reaches 100% in Jerusalem. When analyzing the issue according 
to area of residence, one can notice that the household connection to the water network is lowest in 
villages (90%), followed by camps (93%), while it is the highest in cities (97%).
Figure 4.21: Connection to the water network (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence 
(o060)
In general, the results showed that 42% of the households have a well. This percentage, however, varies 
considerably depending on the region and area of residence of the respondent and the refugee status of 
the respondent. As the results in ﬁgure 4.22, below, indicate a far larger percentage of households in the
West Bank (58%) than in the Gaza Strip (27%) and in Jerusalem (23%) make use of a well. This is also 
the case for a far larger percentage of households in villages (65%) than for those in cities (34%) and in 
refugee camps (25%). Lastly, a larger percentage of non-refugees (48%) than refugees (35%) make use 
of a well.
Figure 4.22: Availability of a well (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060), and 
refugee status (o002)
The household connection to a sewage disposal network varies according to region and area of residence, 
refugee status, and level of poverty of the households. While in general, 64% of the households in the 
occupied Palestinian territory are connected to a sewage disposal network, this is far less often the case in 
the West Bank (50%) than in the Gaza Strip (76%) and in Jerusalem (87%). According to area of residence, 
household connection to a sewage disposal network is far more frequent in refugee camps (86%) and in 
cities (75%) than it is in villages (36%). Furthermore, a higher percentage of refugee respondents (76%) than 
non-refugee respondents (55%) stated that their household is connected to a sewage disposal network. 
Lastly, household connection to a sewage disposal network seems to be more available in households 
with a living standard above the poverty line (72%) than in households below the poverty line (58%) or 
households that live in hardship (59%). 
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The ﬁndings concerning the household connection to a sewage disposal network according to refugee
status and poverty level might explain why – in the previous section - a lower percentage of refugees and 
respondents with a monthly household income above the poverty line than non-refugees and relatively 
poorer respondents attached great importance to the need of a sewage network in their community.
Figure 4.23: Household connection to a sewage disposal network (o174) according to region of residence (o059) 
and area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3)
The availability in the households of their own latrines, sewer or septic tank is widespread. Still, some 
varying degrees of availability of latrines, a sewer or a septic tank to the households could be found 
according to the region in which respondents reside and the educational level attained by the respondents. 
As indicated in ﬁgure 4.24, below, fewer households in Jerusalem (91%) than in the West Bank (98%) and
in the Gaza Strip (98%) have their own latrines, sewer or septic tank. Moreover, fewer respondents with 
low levels of education than those with medium or high levels of education ascertained that their household 
has their own latrines, sewer or septic tank.
Figure 4.24: Availability to the household of own latrines, sewer or septic tank (o174) according to region of 
residence (o059) and educational level (educ)
With regard to the availability to the household of solid waste disposal services, the results show that 
these services are more available in cities (57%) and camps (56%) than in villages (46%), among a higher 
percentage of refugees (58%) than non-refugees (50%), and among a higher percentage of households 
with either a monthly income above (56%) or below the poverty line (54%) than among those households 
facing extreme poverty (48%).1
Again, the ﬁndings concerning the availability to the household of solid waste disposal services according
 
1 Although there is a 6% and 8% difference between the hardship cases and the households with either an income 
below or above the poverty line concerning the availability of solid waste disposal services, it is worth pointing out 
that strictly there is no statistically signiﬁcant relation between those variables as the Chi square is 0.055.
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to refugee status and poverty level might explain why – in the previous section - a lower percentage of 
respondents who are relatively better-off and the refugees than the extremely poor respondents and the 
non-refugees attached great importance to the need of a sewage network in their community.
Figure 4.25: Availability to the household of solid waste disposal services (o174) according to area of residence 
(o060), refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3)
Moving on to the availability of more communication-related services and facilities, such as the connection 
to a ﬁxed phone line network, the connection to a mobile phone network, a permanent connection to the
internet, and the availability of a satellite TV in the household, one can see in the ﬁgures below, that the
availability of these services to the household systematically varies according to the region and area of 
residence of the respondents, their poverty level and their educational attainment.
Beginning with the household connection to a ﬁxed phone line network, the results indicate that the
availability of such a service is higher in Jerusalem (85%) than in the West Bank (65%) and in the Gaza 
Strip (61%), and higher in cities (69%) than in villages (64%) and refugee camps (61%). Moreover, a 
higher percentage of respondents from households with a monthly income above the poverty line (80%) 
than those from households with a living standard below the poverty line (67%) and those from households 
living in hardship (40%) speciﬁed that their household is connected to a ﬁxed phone line network. Lastly,
the results in ﬁgure 4.26, below, show that a higher percentage of high educated respondents (77%) than
medium (63%) or low (45%) educated respondents ascertained that their household is connected to a 
ﬁxed phone line network.  
The ﬁndings on the household connection to a ﬁxed phone line network according to poverty level and
educational level, again, could help explain why in the previous section a higher percentage of the 
poorer and less educated respondents than the relatively better-off and the higher educated stressed the 
importance of a ﬁxed phone line network as a needed communication facility in the community.
Figure 4.26: Household connection to a fixed phone line network (o174) according to region of residence (o059), 
area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)
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Moving along to the household connection to a mobile phone network, one sees the same variety in the 
availability of such a service as was the case with the household connection to a ﬁxed phone line network.
As overviewed in ﬁgure 4.27, below, the highest percentage of households with a connection to a mobile
phone network can be found in Jerusalem (84%), in cities (66%), among the better-off (76%), and among 
the higher educated (70%). 
When comparing these results with the ones regarding the most important communication facility needed 
in the community (see the previous section), it is noticeable that the importance attached to the need 
of a mobile phone network is highest in the Gaza Strip, where such a service is least available to the 
household, and also highest among the poorer segments of society, who also seem to be least connected 
to a mobile phone network.
Figure 4.27: Household connection to a mobile phone line network (o174) according to region of residence (o059), 
area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)
As for the availability of a permanent internet connection to the household, such a service seems to be 
most widely available in Jerusalem (28%), in cities (21%), in households with a living standard above the 
poverty line (24%), and among the high educated (25%). 
Against the backdrop of the results regarding the most important communication facility needed in the 
community (see the previous section), it seems that the respondents with a high level of education and 
those from households that are relatively better-off who represent the segment of society that most 
frequently enjoys the availability of a permanent internet connection to the household, sees the potential 
of the availability of such a service, as it is this subgroup who also most frequently stressed the importance 
of such a communication facility as a need for the community.
Figure 4.28: Availability of a permanent internet connection to the household (o174) according to region of 
residence (o059), area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)
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Lastly, concerning the availability of satellite TV to the household, the results in ﬁgure 4.29, below, indicate
that satellite television is most widely available in households in Jerusalem (80%), in cities (74%), among 
the high educated (80%) and in households with a living standard above the poverty line (80%).
Figure 4.29: Availability of satellite TV to the household (o174) according to region of residence (o059), area of 
residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)
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4.4  Conclusion
The main ﬁndings concerning needs and availability of services can be summarized as below:
• Employment and food are the two most important household needs. About the same level of 
importance is attached to employment as a ﬁrst household need in the three regions of the oPt,
whilst employment is considered to be the most important household need in villages, among the 
hardship cases and among people having a medium level of education. Food as a ﬁrst household
need is most important in the Gaza Strip, among the higher educated and the relatively better-off, 
whilst it is considered least important in villages.
• Employment is the most important unmet household need, whilst ﬁnancial assistance is the
second most important unmet household need. The importance of both unmet household needs 
has increased since the February 2004 survey conducted for the seventh Palestinian Perceptions 
Report. Employment is most frequently mentioned as an unmet household need in the Gaza Strip, in 
cities, among non-refugees, among the poorer segments of society, among the medium educated, 
and by men. Financial assistance is most often referred to as an unmet household need in the 
Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among refugees, among the hardship cases, by the least educated, 
and by women.
• Employment and food are also the two most important community needs. Employment as a ﬁrst
community need is most important in the Gaza Strip and among the high educated. About the same 
degree of importance is attached to food as a ﬁrst community need in the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank, whilst food is also considered to be the most important among the highest educated.
• The two most important facilities needed in the community are a water network and a sewage 
network. The perceived need for a water network in the community is the highest among refugees 
and the relatively better-off. On the opposite, the perceived need for a sewage network in the 
community is highest among non-refugees and among Palestinians living in hardship.
• A ﬁxed phone line network is the most important communication facility needed in the community,
while a permanent connection to the internet comes as a distant second most important 
communication facility. A ﬁxed phone line network is most frequently mentioned as the most
important communication facility needed in the community in Jerusalem, among refugees, among 
the hardship cases, and among the low educated. A permanent internet connection is most often 
referred to as the most important communication facility needed in the community in the West 
Bank, among non-refugees, among the ﬁnancially better-off, and among the high educated.
• Concerning the availability of services to Palestinians, it is worth remembering that – although the 
availability of services often varies according to different independent variables – in general, the ten 
services under study in this report are widely available to the population. It is, however, interesting 
to see that there is a clear link between the availability – or lack thereof – of certain services and 
the indicated need by respondents for certain community and communication facilities.
5Assistance Delivered
in General
Isabelle Daneels
Chapter
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Introduction
When analyzing assistance, it is important to ﬁrst establish the need for assistance in its different degrees.
Once this is clear, one can examine the delivery of assistance itself in its different facets (types of assistance, 
source and value of assistance, etc). Only after this analysis, it makes sense to evaluate the provision of 
the various types of assistance by determining the recipients’ level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the delivered assistance. All these components of assistance are the subject of analysis in this part of the 
report. In addition, a special section will be devoted to employment assistance in its various aspects.
5.1  Individual needs for assistance
While it is important to analyze the percentage of households who received assistance, the analysis 
becomes far more relevant when one links the reception of assistance with the household need for 
assistance. Such an approach, on the one hand, allows for a better understanding of where the gaps are 
in the distribution of assistance, and, on the other hand, provides an indication of where the targeting of 
assistance can be improved. 
As the results in ﬁgure 5.1, below, indicate, in general, 46% of the households received assistance in the
past six months. Of the remaining 54% who did not receive assistance, 29% of the households were in 
need of it, while 25% did not need any assistance. More concretely and compared to the results on this 
question in the February 2004 survey, these results indicate that in the survey conducted for the current 
report 6% more households received assistance, 8% less did not receive and did not need assistance 
(which points to an improved targeting of assistance), while 2% more did not receive assistance although 
they were in need of it (which points to a slight deterioration in the targeting of assistance). Overall, 
however, compared to the last survey, a higher percentage of households have received assistance and 
the targeting of such assistance seems to have slightly improved.
For the ﬁrst time in this report, the households that received assistance were further divided between those
who needed assistance and those who did not need it. As also illustrated in ﬁgure 5.1, below, of the 46% of
households who received assistance, the large majority of 41% were in need of such assistance, while 5% 
of the recipients of assistance were not in need of it. In practical terms, these results show that, in general, 
5% of the provided aid was ill-targeted.
Figure 5.1: Household need for assistance, in general, February 2001-November 2004
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The general analysis of the provision of assistance and the household need for it can be taken a step 
further by examining this issue according to the various independent variables at hand. 
More speciﬁcally, when looking into the household need for assistance according to region and area of
residence and according to refugee status, one can notice that consistently in the Gaza Strip, in refugee 
camps and among refugees, the percentage of households needing and receiving assistance is higher 
than in the other categories. Furthermore, as the results in ﬁgure 5.2, below, indicate, also the percentage
of households that received assistance and do not need it is consistently higher in those three subgroups. 
Conversely, the percentage both of households that did not receive assistance, although they need it and 
of households that did not receive assistance and do not need it, is consistently the lowest in the Gaza 
Strip, in the refugee camps and among refugees.
Figure 5.2: Household need for assistance according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and 
refugee status (o002)
Figure 5.3: Household need for assistance according to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)
When examining the household need for assistance according to the poverty and educational levels, 
further statistically signiﬁcant relationships could be established. A closer look at the categories of the
hardship cases and the low educated respondents in ﬁgure 5.3, above, reveals that these subgroups
contain the largest percentage of households that received assistance and needed it, while they hold the 
lowest percentage of households that received assistance, although they did not need it, and the lowest 
percentage of households that did not receive assistance and were in no need of it. Still, it is worth pointing 
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out that the percentage of households that did not receive assistance, although they were in need of it 
in those two categories is also relatively high. In fact, the percentage of households that did not receive 
assistance, although they needed it is higher among hardship cases (35%) than among those with a 
monthly household income that falls below the poverty line (30%) and the relatively better-off (26%).
A further and more speciﬁc manner to verify the need
and importance of assistance is to check the evolution 
in the importance of assistance in the household 
budget in the past six months. As overviewed in 
ﬁgure 5.4, below, 24% of the respondents stated
that the importance of assistance in the household 
budget had increased in the six months prior to the 
November 2004 survey, 43% declared that it did not 
change much, while 34% said that the importance of 
assistance in the household budget had decreased 
during that period. In other words, in general, the 
percentage of respondents indicating that the 
importance of assistance in the household budget 
has decreased in the past six months is larger than 
the percentage of respondents who speciﬁed that
the importance of assistance in their household has 
increased in the past six months.
When analyzing the evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six 
months according to region of residence, the results show that only in the Gaza Strip a higher percentage 
of respondents said that the importance of assistance in the household budget has increased (31%) rather 
than decreased (24%). These results are detailed in the ﬁgure, below.
Figure 5.5: Evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months (o251) 
according to region of residence (o059)
There are also noticeable differences in opinions about the evolution in the importance of assistance in the 
household budget in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey according to area of residence. As 
illustrated in ﬁgure 5.6, below, the highest percentage of respondents who speciﬁed that the importance of
assistance in the household budget increased can be found in the refugee camps (31%). The opinion that 
the importance of assistance in the household budget has decreased in the past six months is by far more 
prevalent in villages (46%) than in refugee camps (35%) and in cities (27%).
Figure 5.4: Evolution in the importance of assistance in 
the household budget in the past six months (o251), in 
general
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Figure 5.6: Evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months (o251) 
according to area of residence (o060)
Respondents in the survey were not only queried about the evolution in the importance of assistance to 
their household budget “in the past six months”, but they were also asked to specify the importance of 
assistance in the household budget “since the beginning of the Intifada”.
In general, nearly half of the respondents (46%) stated that the received assistance only helps to alleviate 
the hardship under difﬁcult circumstances, 17% explained that for them assistance is a useful component
to the regular household budget, while 15% admitted that they could not manage without the assistance 
and another 10% speciﬁed that they would only be able to manage with great difﬁculty. Of the remaining
12% of the respondents, 9% declared that they would manage without the assistance, while another 3% 
said that assistance was not important to their livelihood.
Figure 5.7: Importance of assistance in the household budget since the beginning of the Intifada (o250), in general 
and according to poverty level (poverty3)
When studying the importance of assistance in the household budget since the beginning of the Intifada 
according to poverty level, it is clear that Palestinians facing hardship are considerably more dependent 
on assistance than their compatriots that live in households with a monthly income below and above the 
poverty line. As the results in ﬁgure 5.7, above, indicate, the highest percentage of respondents who
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explained that they could not manage without assistance (24%) or that they would only be able to manage 
with great difﬁculty (13%) can be found among the hardship cases. Furthermore, least respondents
facing hardship mentioned that they would manage without assistance (4%) or said that assistance is not 
important to their livelihood (1%).
5.2  Assistance distribution
Having established the need for assistance, this section will concentrate on the actual distribution of 
assistance, whether it concerns the assistance delivery, the value of the delivered assistance, the nature 
of such assistance, the providers of assistance, or the level of satisfaction with the provided assistance.
5.2.1 Distribution of assistance 
5.2.1.1 The assistance received and its evolution since 2001
Respondents were asked both whether or not they or any of the household members received any type of 
assistance “since the beginning of the Intifada”, and whether or not they or any of the household members 
received any type of assistance “in the past six months”. 
In general, 51% of the respondents reported that their households received assistance since the beginning 
of the Intifada, which constitutes an increase of 3% since the February 2004 survey. Furthermore, in the 
survey conducted for the current report 44% of the respondents stated that their households received 
assistance in the past six months, which is an increase of 5% since the February 2004 survey.
When analyzing the issue of received assistance in the past six months according to region of residence, 
the results indicate that the highest percentage of households that received assistance are situated in the 
Gaza Strip (60%), followed by the West Bank (37%), and only then by Jerusalem (25%). Furthermore, 
while the percentage of households in the Gaza Strip that have received assistance in the past six months 
has remained stable since the February 2004 survey, the percentage of households that have received 
assistance has increased since then by 6% in the West Bank and by 20% in Jerusalem. These results are 
detailed in ﬁgure 5.8, below.
Figure 5.8: Received assistance in the past six months (o035), in general and according to region of residence 
(o059), February 2001-November 2004
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5.2.1.2 Geographical trends in assistance delivery
The results in ﬁgure 5.9, below, compare the answers of respondents who said that their household has
received assistance since the beginning of the Intifada with the answers of the respondents who speciﬁed
that their household has received assistance in the past six months according to place of residence. 
Logically, the percentage of households that received assistance in the past six months is lower in all 
places of residence than the percentage of households that have received assistance since the outbreak 
of the Intifada. The results also indicate that the highest percentage of assistance received –whether in 
the past six months or since the beginning of the Intifada – can be found in the Gaza Strip refugee camps, 
closely followed by the West Bank refugee camps. Furthermore, and both concerning received assistance 
in the past six months and received assistance since the start of the Intifada, the percentage of received 
assistance is signiﬁcantly higher outside refugee camps in the Gaza Strip than it is outside refugee camps
in the West Bank.
Figure 5.9: Percentage of received assistance since the beginning of the Intifada (o035b) and during the past six 
months (o035) according to place of residence (place)
Figure 5.10: Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) according to 
area of residence (o060), February 2001-November 2004
When examining the geographical trends in the delivery of assistance according to area of residence, more 
interesting results appear. As detailed in ﬁgure 5.10, above, the percentage of respondents in refugee
camps who declared that their household has received assistance in the past six months has decreased by 
4% since the February 2004 survey and has reached its lowest level since November 2001. Furthermore, 
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the percentage of respondents in villages who stated that their household has received assistance in the 
past six months has increased by 11% since the February 2004 survey. These results help to understand 
the earlier ﬁndings that - in comparison to February 2004 – the delivery of assistance in the West Bank has
increased, while this delivery has remained stable in the Gaza Strip as there are more camp residents and 
fewer villages in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Lastly, the delivery of assistance in cities since the 
November 2001 survey until the survey conducted for the current report follows about the same path as 
the delivery of assistance to the overall population during this time-frame.
5.2.1.3 Targeting the poor and the refugees
Logically one would assume that the provision of assistance mainly concentrates on the poorer segments 
of society and, perhaps, also on the refugee population as on average they are poorer than the non-
refugee Palestinians. However, as the analysis below will indicate, in reality the picture is not always as 
straightforward.
When examining the percentage of the population who received assistance in the past six months according 
to poverty level, it is clear that the highest percentage of respondents who received assistance in the past 
six months are those living in hardship, whilst the lowest percentage are the households with a living 
standard above the poverty line. Still, as illustrated in ﬁgure 5.11, below, major changes have occurred in
the delivery of assistance since the February 2004 survey. More speciﬁcally, the results show that since
the February 2004 survey assistance delivery to Palestinians facing hardship has decreased by 6%, while 
the delivery of assistance to Palestinians with a living standard above the poverty line has increased by 
9%. Assistance to respondents with a monthly household income that falls below the poverty line has 
increased by 6%. As such, it appears that although the percentage of respondents who received assistance 
in the past six months has increased considerably since the February 2004 survey, the main additional 
beneﬁciaries of such assistance are not the hardship cases as one would expect, but the households with
a living standard above the poverty line.
Figure 5.11: Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) according to 
poverty level (poverty3), February 2001-November 2004
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Analysis of the issue of received assistance in the past six months according to refugee status reveals that 
- as has traditionally been the case - a far higher percentage of refugees than non-refugees have received 
assistance. Since the February 2004 survey the percentage of non-refugees receiving assistance has 
increased slightly more than the percentage of refugees receiving assistance. The results are detailed in 
table 5.1, below.
Table 5.1: Percentage of the total population who received assistance in the past six months (o035) according to 
refugee status (o002), November 2001-November 2004
Date Refugee status
Refugees Non-refugees
Received assistance in the past six 
months
November 2004 58% 33%
February 2004 54% 27%
July 2003 68% 32%
November 2002 67% 30%
November 2001 64% 23%
When one takes the analysis a step further and looks into the percentage of refugees and non-refugees 
who received assistance in the past six months according to poverty level, the results show that the 
extremely poor refugees are more catered for than the extremely poor non-refugees. Indeed, whereas 
75% of the refugee hardship cases have received assistance in a six month time-frame, this is the case for 
only 52% of the non-refugee hardship cases. Similarly, concerning the households with a living standard 
that falls below the poverty line, 74% of the refugees in this category received assistance compared to 
39% of the non-refugees. In addition to the fact that quite a high percentage of the relatively better-off 
segments of society have received assistance in the six months prior to the survey, this is again more the 
case for the refugees in this category than for the non-refugees. These ﬁndings are overviewed in ﬁgure
5.12, below.
Figure 5.12: Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) according to 
refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3), November 2002-November 2004
As was established previously in this chapter, assistance delivery in the six months prior to the survey 
conducted for this report had decreased in refugee camps, but it still had increased for refugees. The 
analysis of assistance delivery to refugees and non-refugees according to place of residence can help to 
understand these ﬁndings. As overviewed in ﬁgure 5.13, below, even outside the camps in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip a higher percentage of refugees than non-refugees receive assistance.  Moreover, the 
visible gap in assistance delivery between refugees and non-refugees residing outside refugee camps is 
more pronounced in the Gaza Strip (34%) than in the West Bank (9%). Lastly, compared to the results in 
the February 2004 survey, irrespective of the place of residence in the oPt, the delivery of assistance to 
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refugees has increased to a larger extent than compared to this delivery to non-refugees.
Figure 5.13: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance in the past six months (o035) 
according to place of residence (place), February 2004-November 2004
5.2.2 The value of delivered assistance
After analyzing the percentage of the population who received assistance, it is important to consider 
the value of the distributed assistance, in general, and then for the most important types of assistance. 
However, before doing so, it is worth remembering that the real value of the assistance disbursements 
made in Palestine does not fall in the scope of the analysis. Rather the analysis evolves around the 
perceived value of the assistance received in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey conducted 
for this report. The perceived value of the delivered assistance will be presented in New Israeli Shekels 
(NIS). At the time of the writing of this report, currency rates were as follows:
NIS 100 = US$ 23.25 (US Dollars) = EUR 17.5 (Euro) = CHF 27 (Swiss Francs)
5.2.2.1 The median value of various assistance types and their evolution over time
In ﬁgure 5.14, below, the median values1 of the reported types of assistance received by the household 
are presented in the time-frame between the February 2001 survey and the November 2004 survey. In 
the ﬁgure, the median values of food, ﬁnancial, employment, in-kind, coupon and medical assistance
are presented as well as the median values for all those types of assistance combined (“any type of 
assistance).
As displayed in ﬁgure 5.14, below, the total value of the received assistance has increased almost constantly
since February 2001 and stands for the current report at NIS 400. Concerning the various types of received 
assistance, the median value of food assistance has not increased since the February 2004 survey and 
is NIS 200, while the median value of ﬁnancial assistance has increased by NIS 100 since February 2004
and reaches NIS 600. The median value of employment assistance has remained stable at NIS 900 since 
February 2004, while the median value of medical assistance reaches NIS 150. The median values of in-
1 The median was used instead of the mean because it is far more robust for the extreme values that were 
sometimes reported by the respondents. The medians were only calculated if the respondents gave a value for the 
received assistance types. Furthermore, medians bases on less than 20 cases are not used nor displayed in the 
analysis.
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kind assistance and coupon assistance are not provided because they were respectively mentioned only 
on 4 and 9 occasions.
Figure 5.14: The median value of the received assistance (o036), February 2001-November 2004
5.2.2.2 Differences according to geographical area and poverty
When looking into the median of the total reported value of received assistance according to region of 
residence, it is clear that the value is far higher in Jerusalem with NIS 800 (N is only 44), than it is in the 
West Bank (NIS 396) and in the Gaza Strip (NIS 380). Still, compared to the results in February 2004, the 
median values have increased both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but especially so in the latter 
region (from NIS 260 to NIS 380).
There are also signiﬁcant differences in the total reported value of assistance according to place of
residence. As detailed in table 5.2, below, the total value of assistance is highest outside refugee camps, 
both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (NIS 400). While in the February 2004 survey the value of 
received assistance was lower in the Gaza camps (NIS 200) than in the West Bank refugee camps (NIS 
300), the opposite results were obtained in the survey conducted for the current report.
At this stage it is worth mentioning that there were no statistically signiﬁcant differences concerning the total
reported value of assistance according to the area of residence and the refugee status of the recipients of 
assistance.
Table 5.2: Median value of received assistance (o036v1v) according to place of residence (place)
Mentioned assistance types: value in NIS
Place of residence N Median
West Bank outside camps 237 NIS 400
West Bank refugee camps 29 NIS 286
Jerusalem 44 NIS 800
Gaza Strip outside camps 193 NIS 400
Gaza Strip refugee camps 115 NIS 320
Total 617 NIS 400
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Figure 5.15, below, depicts the median value of assistance according to the poverty level of the recipients 
over a time-span of three years. The analysis over time clearly shows that the median value of assistance 
has increased considerably for the three poverty categories since November 2001. However, it is important 
to notice that, whereas in February 2004 the median value of assistance to hardship cases was higher 
than that of the assistance delivered to respondents below the poverty line and above the poverty line, 
the picture has reversed since. In the November 2004 survey, the median value of assistance to hardship 
cases remained stable at NIS 350, while the median value of assistance to recipients with a living standard 
below and above the poverty line has increased to NIS 400, which signiﬁes an increase in the median
value of about NIS 100.
Figure 5.15: Median value of the received assistance (o036v1v) according to poverty level (poverty3), November 
2001-November 2004
5.2.3 Nature of delivered assistance
Having analyzed the distribution of assistance as well as its perceived value, the focus in this section will 
be on the various types of delivered assistance.
Figure 5.16: Type of received assistance (o036), in general, February 2001-November 2004
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In general, and as can be discerned from ﬁgure 5.16, above, about 1/3rd of the households in the oPt 
have received food assistance, 13% have received ﬁnancial assistance, while 9% have beneﬁted from
employment assistance. None of the remaining types of assistance were received by more than 3% of the 
respondents in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey.
More speciﬁcally, the percentage of the recipients of food assistance has remained quite stable since
the February 2004 survey. However, the percentages of the distribution of both ﬁnancial assistance and
employment assistance have increased by respectively 4% and 6%. The distribution of coupon assistance 
and in-kind assistance has been reduced to quasi zero.
As food assistance is the largest type of delivered assistance, it will be discussed in detail in a separate 
part (Part Six) of this report. For in-kind, coupon and medical assistance, the small number of cases of 
these types of assistance does not allow any signiﬁcant or relevant analysis. As such, in this section of the
report, only the percentages of the total population who received ﬁnancial and employment assistance will
be analyzed further according to the various signiﬁcant independent variables at hand.
Concerning ﬁnancial assistance, statistically signiﬁcant differences could be established in the percentage
of the total population who received such assistance according to region and area of residence, place of 
residence, refugee status and poverty level. More speciﬁcally, the highest percentages of respondents
receiving ﬁnancial assistance in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey can be found in the
Gaza Strip (21%), in refugee camps (18%), and especially in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip (24%). 
Furthermore, ﬁnancial assistance was delivered to a higher percentage of refugees (16%) than non-
refugees (10%), and to a higher percentage of households facing hardship (17%) and living below the 
poverty line (17%) than to households with a living standard above the poverty line (7%). These results 
are detailed in ﬁgure 5.17, below.
Figure 5.17: Received financial assistance (o036fin) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence 
(o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)
Concerning received employment assistance2, no statistically signiﬁcant differences could be detected,
except according to poverty level. As overviewed in table 5.3, below, 10% of the households living in 
2 Employment assistance and its different types will be discussed in greater detail in section 5.3 of this chapter.
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hardship, 13% of the households with an monthly income below the poverty line, and 5% of the households 
with a living standard above the poverty line have received employment assistance in the six months prior 
to the November 2004 survey conducted for this report.
Table 5.3: Received employment assistance (o036emp) according to poverty level (poverty3)
Received employment assistance
No Yes Total
Hardship cases 90% 10% 100%
Below poverty line 87% 13% 100%
Above poverty line 95% 5% 100%
Total 91% 9% 100%
5.2.4 Sources of assistance
This section will concentrate on the perceived sources of assistance. Once again, it is important to stress 
that the analysis concerns the perceptions by Palestinians on which organizations or bodies provide them 
with assistance. As such, it is in no way within the aim of this chapter to provide the actual and broader 
picture of the sources behind assistance delivery in the oPt. However, focusing on the perceived sources 
of assistance to the Palestinian households is useful as it allows one to comprehend the smaller picture 
that shows which sources of assistance are visible to the Palestinian public.
In general, when looking at the main sources of received assistance, the main provider remains UNRWA 
(20%), followed by the Palestinian Authority (13%), and - in third place - the trade unions (9%). Concerning 
the remaining sources of assistance delivery, the visibility of NGOs and of private sources has increased 
by respectively 2% since February 2004, while the visibility of Islamic organizations (- 1%), international 
organizations (- 3%) and Arab organizations/governments (- 1%) has decreased within that time-frame.
Figure 5.18: Main sources of received assistance (o036t), in general, February 2001-November 2004
As illustrated in ﬁgure 5.18, above, since February 2001, UNRWA has been the single most cited source
of assistance. As for the Palestinian Authority, the percentage of respondents that perceive it as the source 
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of their received assistance has increased by 3% since February 2004. Lastly, concerning the trade unions 
as a perceived source of received assistance, they were only included in the surveys conducted for the 
Perception reports since November 2001. After a sharp decrease in the visibility of trade unions as sources 
of received assistance between November 2002 and February 2004, recently their visibility seems to be 
improving.
From the general overview of the main sources of assistance, one can perform analyses that provide a 
better picture of where and to which subgroups of Palestinian society the various assistance providers 
have been delivering their assistance. These proﬁles of the beneﬁciaries of assistance will be presented in
the remainder of this section for the following providers: The Palestinian Authority/municipalities, UNRWA, 
trade unions, NGOs, Islamic organizations, and international organizations.
Starting off with the Palestinian Authority/municipalities, the largest percentages of the beneﬁciaries of their
assistance can be found in the West Bank (57%), in cities (54%), among non-refugees (68%), and among 
the poorer segments within Palestinian society. As detailed in ﬁgure 5.19, below, 38% of the hardship cases
and 37% of the households with a monthly income below the poverty line reported the PA/municipalities 
as their sources of assistance.
Figure 5.19: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from the Palestinian Authority/municipalities 
(o036tpna) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty 
level (poverty3)
Whereas the PA/municipalities seem to have a larger percentage of beneﬁciaries in the West Bank
and among non-refugees, the majority of UNRWA’s beneﬁciaries reside in the Gaza Strip (69%) and
are refugees (94%). Conﬁrming that UNRWA’s assistance is far from limited to refugee camps is the
composition of its beneﬁciaries according to area of residence. As indicated in ﬁgure 5.20, below, 47%
of UNRWA’s beneﬁciaries live in cities, 42% reside in refugee camps, and 11% can be found in villages.
Whereas the PA quite evenly provides assistance to households living in hardship and to households with 
a monthly income that falls below the poverty line, UNRWA’s beneﬁciaries are more often classiﬁed as
“below the poverty line” (47%) than as “hardship cases” (29%). As was the case with the PA, about 1/4th of 
UNRWA’s beneﬁciaries have a monthly household income that is above the poverty line.
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Figure 5.20: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from UNRWA (o036tunr) according to region of 
residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)
As was the case with the beneﬁciaries of UNRWA’s assistance, the majority of the beneﬁciaries of
assistance received from trade unions can also be found in the Gaza Strip (56%), and more in cities (49%) 
than in refugee camps (26%) and villages (25%). Furthermore, the beneﬁciaries of assistance from trade
unions are quite evenly divided between refugees (49%) and non-refugees (51%). As for the composition 
of the beneﬁciaries of assistance received from trade unions according to poverty level, compared to the
beneﬁciaries of assistance from the PA and UNRWA, there is a lower percentage of beneﬁciaries of trade
union assistance with a household income above the poverty line (18%).
Figure 5.21: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from the trade unions (o036ttu) according to 
region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)
Very much like the PA/municipalities, NGOs concentrate their assistance mostly in the West Bank (72%), 
more in cities (52%) than in villages (41%) and in refugee camps (7%), and more on non-refugees (79%) 
than on refugees (21%). NGOs have as many beneﬁciaries facing hardship (39%) as beneﬁciaries with
a monthly household income that falls below the poverty line (39%). These ﬁndings are detailed in ﬁgure
5.22, below.
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Figure 5.22: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from NGOs (o036tngo) according to region of 
residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)
As for the composition of beneﬁciaries of assistance from Islamic organizations, they are mainly residing
in the Gaza Strip (79%) and more in cities (54%) than in refugee camps (37%) and villages (9%). Islamic 
organizations also provide more assistance to refugees (59%) than to non-refugees (41%). Lastly, of all 
the assistance providers under review, assistance from Islamic organizations is best targeted towards 
the households with a monthly income below the poverty line (47%) and the hardship cases (36%). As 
indicated in the ﬁgure, below, only 17% of the beneﬁciaries of assistance from Islamic organizations have
a living standard above the poverty line. 
Figure 5.23: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from Islamic organizations (o036tisl) according 
to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)
Lastly, concerning the beneﬁciaries of assistance provided by international organizations and in comparison
with the beneﬁciaries of other main providers of assistance that were discussed above, the international
organizations have the largest percentage of beneﬁciaries that reside in Jerusalem (25%) and the largest
percentage of beneﬁciaries that enjoy a living standard above the poverty line (53%). Moreover, the results
in ﬁgure 5.24, below, show that although there are less beneﬁciaries of assistance from international
organizations in refugee camps (22%) than in villages (28%) and cities (50%), there is a larger percentage 
of refugees (67%) than non-refugees (33%) who speciﬁed that international organizations provided them
with assistance.
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Figure 5.24: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from international organizations (o036tio) 
according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level 
(poverty3)
5.2.5 The level of satisfaction with the provided assistance
Having looked into assistance in all its facets in the previous sections of this chapter, this section will 
provide an evaluation of the provided assistance by examining the respondents’ level of satisfaction with 
the assistance that they have received. 
In general, the majority of the beneﬁciaries of assistance evaluate this provision positively. More concretely,
3% of the beneﬁciaries are very satisﬁed with the received assistance and 53% are satisﬁed, while 36%
are dissatisﬁed with the received assistance and 9% are very dissatisﬁed with it. Compared to February
2004, the evaluation of assistance by its beneﬁciaries is slightly less favorable. Indeed, although the
percentage of the satisﬁed and dissatisﬁed beneﬁciaries has remained quite stable since February 2004,
the percentage of the very satisﬁed and the very dissatisﬁed have swapped places. The 9% of beneﬁciaries
who were very satisﬁed with the received assistance in February 2004 shrunk to a mere 2% in the survey
conducted for the current report. In addition, the 2% of very dissatisﬁed beneﬁciaries in February 2004
have increased to 9% in the November 2004 survey. Still, in comparison to the February 2001 survey the 
general level of satisfaction with the provided assistance has considerably improved. Whereas at that time 
the majority of 70% of the recipients of assistance were dissatisﬁed with it, in the November 2004 survey
conducted for this report 44% remain dissatisﬁed. These ﬁndings are detailed in ﬁgure 5.25, below.
Figure 5.25: Level of satisfaction with the received assistance (o037), in general, February 2001-November 2004
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Although further analysis of the results on the level of satisfaction with received assistance has shown that 
the general level of satisfaction does not differ according to region, area or place of residence, nor does it 
vary according to refugee status, educational level or age, it does ﬂuctuate according to the poverty level
of the households. 
A comparative look between the results on the evaluation of received assistance between February 2004 
and November 2004 reveals that the percentage of very dissatisﬁed households living in hardship has
increased by 6% from 2% to 8%, while the percentage of very satisﬁed households in this subgroup
has decreased by 9% from 11% to 2%. In addition, the percentage of the satisﬁed households that are
classiﬁed as being above the poverty line has increased from 54% to 68% between the February 2004
and the November 2004 survey.
When one merely concentrates on the results of the November 2004 survey in ﬁgure 5.26, below, it is clear
that the households living in hardship are far less satisﬁed with the received assistance than those with a
living standard above the poverty line. More concretely, whereas the majority of 52% of the beneﬁciaries
who live in hardship evaluate the received assistance negatively, “only” 27% of those with a monthly 
household income above the poverty line do so.
The signiﬁcantly more negative evaluation of received assistance by the extremely poor in comparison
to the relatively better-off could be partly explained by the decrease in the percentage of the former and 
the increase in the percentage of the latter receiving assistance in the six months prior to the November 
2004 survey (see ﬁgure 5.11 in section 5.2.1.3 above). In addition, the obvious greater discontent among
the extremely poor than among the better-off could also be further explained by the perceived lower 
median value of the received assistance by the former in comparison to the median value of the received 
assistance by the latter (see ﬁgure 5.15 in section 5.2.2 above).
Figure 5.26: Level of satisfaction with the received assistance (o037) according to poverty level (poverty3), February 
2004-November 2004
Respondents who were dissatisﬁed with the received assistance were asked to state the reason behind
their negative evaluation. In general, 48% of the dissatisﬁed beneﬁciaries of assistance were dissatisﬁed
because of the low frequency of the assistance, 33% were discontented because of the small quantity of 
the received assistance, while another 15% were unhappy with the quality of the received assistance. The 
results of the reasons behind the negative evaluation of the received assistance are quite different from 
the results in the February 2004 survey. Since then, the discontentment because of the low frequency of 
the assistance has decreased by 12% and the dissatisfaction because of the bad quality of the assistance 
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has also declined by 2%. It is the dissatisfaction with the small quantity of the received assistance that has 
increased by 12% since February 2004.
When one examines the reasons behind dissatisfaction with received assistance according to poverty 
level, more signiﬁcant differences appear. The results in ﬁgure 5.27, below, show that dissatisfaction with
assistance because of the small quantity and the bad quality of the received assistance is particularly 
high in the households with a living standard above the poverty line and lowest in the households living 
in hardship. It is in the latter (58%) that the concern about the frequency of the assistance is a lot higher 
than in households that are relatively better-off (24%). One could perhaps even argue from these results 
that the need for assistance in the extremely poor households is so dire that they do not really care about 
the quantity or quality of the assistance, as long as they receive the assistance frequently enough and on 
a regular basis. 
In any case, to sum up, for the extremely poor households and those with a living standard below the 
poverty line, the low frequency of the provided assistance is by far the main reason for their dissatisfaction, 
followed by the small quantity of the assistance, and only in last instance because of the poor quality. The 
main concern for the households with a monthly income above the poverty line is the small quantity of the 
assistance, followed by the poor quality of it, and only in third place because of the low frequency of the 
distribution of assistance.
Lastly, although not visualized in the ﬁgure below, it is worth noting the differences in the reasons behind the
dissatisfaction with received assistance according to the region and area of residence of the beneﬁciaries,
and according to their refugee status. The data reveal that concern about the low frequency of assistance 
is most prevalent in the Gaza Strip (58%), in refugee camps (55%) and among refugees (52%). The small 
quantity of assistance is of greatest concern to beneﬁciaries in the West Bank (44%), those in villages
(43%), and among non-refugees (45%). As for the poor quality of assistance, the level of dissatisfaction is 
similar in the West Bank (15%) and the Gaza Strip (15%), while it is most pronounced in refugee camps 
(23%) and among refugees (20%).
Figure 5.27: Reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the received assistance (o123), in general, February 2004-
November 2004, and according to poverty level (poverty3)
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Finally, respondents were not only queried about their level of satisfaction with all the types of assistance 
combined, but also about their evaluation of speciﬁc types of received assistance. However, the evaluation
of food assistance will be discussed in detail in Part Six of this report. Employment assistance in its several 
aspects and the perceptions about such type of assistance will be discussed in section 5.3, below. As 
for in-kind and coupon assistance, there were too few cases in the November 2004 survey to be able to 
analyze these types of assistance. As such, the only remaining analysis concerns the general level of 
satisfaction with the provided ﬁnancial assistance and medical assistance. Here, once more, the analysis
has to be kept on a general level as all cross-tabulations with the various independent variables at hand 
proved to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
Concerning ﬁnancial assistance, the large majority of 77% of the beneﬁciaries evaluated this type of
assistance positively (respectively 6% were very satisﬁed and 71% were satisﬁed. Of those who viewed
received ﬁnancial assistance in a less favorable manner, 20% were dissatisﬁed, while the remaining 2%
were very dissatisﬁed. The results in ﬁgure 5.28, below, also show the level of satisfaction with received
medical assistance, with 69% of satisﬁed beneﬁciaries, 29% of dissatisﬁed beneﬁciaries and 2% of very
dissatisﬁed recipients of such type of assistance.
Figure 5.28: Level of satisfaction with financial (o036fint) and medical assistance (o036medt), in general
5.3  Employment assistance
As employment assistance has gained importance since the beginning of the Intifada, as the analysis 
tackles both employment assistance received personally and received by the household, and as 
employment assistance is divided into different types of such assistance (long-term jobs, short-term jobs, 
unemployment funds, and resources for the self-employed), it deserves special attention in a separate 
section of this chapter. 
At this stage it is also worth remembering that in Part Four of this report on needs and infrastructure, 
employment was the top priority for the household and for the community. Employment in the November 
2004 survey also remained the most important unmet household need.
5.3.1 In general
Since the beginning of the Intifada, unemployment (and consequently poverty levels) has risen dramatically. 
As a result, several new or intensiﬁed efforts were taken to provide employment assistance to the
Palestinians, albeit in an ‘artiﬁcial” economic environment that is characterized by closures, checkpoints,
movement restrictions of persons and goods, restricted possibilities for export, and so on. 
The efforts to alleviate the unemployment rates in the oPt are noticeable in the surveys conducted for the 
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Perceptions reports. As illustrated in ﬁgure 5.29, below, both the percentages of employment assistance
received by the household and employment assistance received personally have been increasing over 
time. More speciﬁcally, whereas in February 2004, 22% of the respondents said that their household
has received employment assistance in the six months prior to the survey, this was the case for 29% 
in the survey conducted for the current report. Similarly, concerning personal employment assistance, 
the percentage of respondents who speciﬁed that they had personally beneﬁted from such assistance
increased from 10% in the February 2004 survey to 18% in the November 2004 survey.
Figure 5.29: Employment assistance received by the household (o026) and personally (o024), in general, November 
2002-November 2004
Figure 5.30, below, presents the differential evolution of household employment assistance since February 
2004 according to place of residence. The results clearly indicate an increase in received household 
assistance in all places of residence, except in the Gaza refugee camps where such assistance remained 
stable since February 2004. The largest increase of beneﬁciaries of household employment assistance
occurred in the West Bank refugee camps, where between February 2004 and November 2004 the 
percentage increased from 9% to 33%. Still, the highest percentage of beneﬁciaries of household
assistance remains to be found in the Gaza refugee camps (45%), followed by the Gaza Strip outside 
camps (34%), and only then the West Bank refugee camps (33%). In the West Bank outside camps, 26% 
of the respondents reported that their household had received employment assistance, while this was 
the case for 20% of the Jerusalem respondents. As such, one can easily deduce from these ﬁndings that
household employment assistance remains the highest in the Gaza Strip, although between February 
2004 and November 2004, the percentages of such assistance have increased far more in the West Bank 
and Jerusalem than in the Gaza Strip.
Figure 5.30: Employment assistance received by the household (o026) according to place of residence (place), 
February 2004-November 2004
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5.3.2 Types of employment assistance
Figure 5.31, below, provides an insight into the various types of personal and household employment 
assistance, and compares the distribution of the answers on those types of employment assistance 
between February 2004 and November 2004. 
With regard to household employment assistance, 13% of household beneﬁciaries received long-term
employment, 38% obtained a short-term job, 40% beneﬁted from unemployment funds, while the remaining
9% received resources for the self-employed in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey. In 
comparison with the February 2004 results, the proportion of long-term employment has increased by 3%, 
the proportion of received short-term employment has increased by 2%, while the proportion of received 
unemployment funds has decreased by 4% and that of received resources for the self-employed has 
decreased by 1%.
With regard to personal employment assistance, 10% of personal beneﬁciaries received long-term
employment, 35% obtained a short-term job, 46% beneﬁted from unemployment funds, while the remaining
9% received resources for the self-employed in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey. In 
comparison with the February 2004 results, the proportion of long-term employment has increased by 
3%, the proportions of received short-term employment and that of received unemployment funds have 
remained stable, while the proportion of received resources for the self-employed has decreased by 3%.
Figure 5.31: Types of household (o026) and personal (o024) assistance, February 2004-November 2004
When looking at the various types of employment assistance from a different perspective, it is clear that 
since February 2004 all types of received household employment assistance have increased. As overviewed 
in ﬁgure 5.32, below, the percentage of received long-term jobs by the household has doubled since
February 2004. Moreover, in comparison to the February 2004 survey, an additional 6% of the respondents 
in the November 2004 survey speciﬁed that their household had beneﬁted from short-term jobs and an
additional 5% reported that their household had received unemployment funds. Between February 2004 
and November 2004, the percentage of households receiving resources for the self-employed increased 
only slightly by 1%.
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Figure 5.32: Types of employment received by the household (o026a, b, c, d), in general, February 2004-November 
2004
When examining the various types of received household employment assistance according to place 
of residence, it appears that the highest percentage of households that have received all these types of 
assistance are residing in the Gaza refugee camps, while the lowest percentage of households that have 
received all these types of assistance are residing in Jerusalem. More in detail, long-term job distribution is 
considerably higher in the Gaza and West Bank refugee camps (respectively 16% and 10%) than outside 
the camps in those regions. The same is valid for short-term jobs. Also apparent from the results in ﬁgure
5.33, below, is that the distribution of unemployment funds is about the same to households inside and 
outside camps in the West Bank, while it is considerable higher in the Gaza Strip, especially inside the 
refugee camps. Finally, the distribution of resources for the self-employed is about 4-5% in all places of 
residence.
Figure 5.33: Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026, o026a, b, c, d) according to place of 
residence (place)
Finally, concerning the received household employment assistance according to poverty level, in general, 
a far higher percentage of households living in hardship (45%) and below the poverty line (37%) than those 
with a living standard above the poverty line (15%) have beneﬁted from such assistance in the six months
prior to the November 2004 survey. As detailed in ﬁgure 5.34, below, the most marked differences between
the extremely poor and the poor households, on the one hand, and the relatively better-off households, on 
the other hand, concerns the received short-term jobs and the unemployment funds, whereby a far higher 
percentage of the former than the latter have beneﬁted from such types of employment assistance. There
are no such striking differences across the poverty levels concerning the distribution of resources for the 
self-employed. Finally, concerning long-term jobs, twice as many households facing hardship (8%) than 
those with a living standard above the poverty line (4%) have beneﬁted from such type of employment
assistance in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey.
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Figure 5.34: Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026, o026a, b, c, d) according to poverty 
level (poverty3)
5.3.3 Sources of employment assistance
Having overviewed the distribution of the various types of assistance, in this section the perceived providers 
of employment assistance will be brieﬂy overviewed.
Figure 5.35, below, details the mentioned sources of employment assistance that was personally provided 
to the respondent, both in the February 2004 survey and in the November 2004 survey.
In the survey conducted for this report, it is clear that UNRWA is the main perceived provider of personal 
employment assistance. Moreover, compared to February 2004, 7% more respondents mentioned UNRWA 
as the source of their personal employment assistance. The second main perceived provider of personal 
employment assistance are the trade unions (16%), closely followed by the Palestinian Authority (15%). 
Both trade unions and the Palestinian Authority were mentioned by respectively 6% less respondents in 
November 2004 than in February 2004. However, in parallel to the employment provision by the PA, it is 
also important to mention the increase by 4% of the provision of personal employment assistance provided 
by municipalities, from 10% in February 2004 to 14% in November 2004. Lastly, it is worth noting the 
increased visibility of international organizations as providers of personal employment in the six months 
prior to the November 2004 survey. Whereas a mere 2% of the respondents in February 2004 mentioned 
international organizations as the sources of their personal employment assistance, this is the case for 7% 
of the respondents in November 2004.
Figure 5.35: Source of personal employment assistance (o024s), in general, February 2004-November 2004
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5.3.4 Level of satisfaction with employment assistance
The beneﬁciaries of employment assistance were also asked to evaluate this type of assistance. Those
who evaluated employment assistance negatively, were asked to explain the reasons behind their 
dissatisfaction.
In general, a majority of 59% of the employment assistance beneﬁciaries evaluated it positively, while the
remaining 41% of the beneﬁciaries held a more negative view. As the results detailed in ﬁgure 5.36, below,
indicate, the level of satisfaction with the provided employment assistance has improved substantially over 
time.
Although not portrayed in the ﬁgure, below, it is worth mentioning that the level of satisfaction with the
received employment assistance is clearly inﬂuenced by the poverty level of the households, whereby the
level of dissatisfaction with such assistance increases in parallel with increased levels of poverty. More 
speciﬁcally, whereas 52% of the extremely poor respondents and 59% of the respondents in households
with a monthly income below the poverty line evaluated the received employment assistance positively, 
this is the case for 69% of the respondents in households with a living standard above the poverty line.
Figure 5.36: Level of satisfaction with employment assistance, received personally and/or by other household 
members (o025), in general, February 2004-november 2004
As for the reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the received employment assistance, 38% of the 
beneﬁciaries are dissatisﬁed because the amount is too little, while 59% of them are dissatisﬁed because
the employment period is very short. Compared to the results in the February 2004 survey, there is an 
increase of 10% in the dissatisfaction with the received employment assistance because the amount is 
too little, while there is a decrease of 6% in the dissatisfaction with employment assistance because the 
employment period is very short. These ﬁndings are overviewed in ﬁgure 5.37, below. On a ﬁnal note, the
reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the received employment assistance do not vary when analyzed 
according to any of the independent variables at hand. 
Figure 5.37: Reasons behind dissatisfaction with the received employment assistance (o025d), in general, February 
2004-November 2004
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5.4  Conclusion
In conclusion, there are several ﬁndings with regard to the delivered assistance that are worth remembering.
They are summarized in the bullets, below:
• In general, 46% of the households received assistance in the six months prior to the November 
survey. Of these 46%, 41% were in need of such assistance, while 5% of the recipients were not 
in need of it. Of the 54% who did not receive assistance, 29% of the households were in need of 
it, while 25% did not need any assistance. Overall and compared to the February 2004 survey, a 
higher percentage of households have received assistance and the targeting of such assistance 
seems to have slightly improved.
• The percentage of respondents indicating that the importance of assistance in the household 
budget has decreased in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey is larger than the 
percentage of respondents who speciﬁed that the importance of assistance in their household
budget has increased during that period.
• In general, 51% of the respondents reported that their households received assistance since the 
beginning of the Intifada, while 44% stated that their households received assistance in the six 
months prior to the November 2004 survey. This constitutes an increase of 5% since the February 
2004 survey. The highest percentage of households receiving assistance in the six months prior to 
the survey can be found in the Gaza Strip, in the refugee camps, among refugees and among the 
poorer segments of society.
• The total perceived median value of the received assistance has increased almost constantly since 
the outbreak of the Intifada and stands for the current report at NIS 400. The total reported median 
value of assistance is the lowest in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, and among the extremely 
poor Palestinian households.
• Concerning the various types of delivered assistance, about 1/3rd of the households in the oPt 
have received food assistance, 13% have received ﬁnancial assistance, while 9% have beneﬁted
from employment assistance. The percentage of recipients of food assistance has remained quite 
stable since the February 2004 survey, while the percentages of the distribution of both ﬁnancial
and employment assistance have increased substantially. A mere 3% of the households received 
medical assistance, while only 1% of the households received in-kind assistance.
• Regarding the main perceived sources of received assistance, the main provider remains UNRWA, 
followed by the Palestinian Authority, and – in third place – the trade unions. The visibility of NGOs 
and of private sources as providers of assistance has increased since February 2004, while the 
visibility of Islamic organizations, international organizations and Arab organizations/governments 
has decreased within that time-frame.
• A majority of 56% of the beneﬁciaries of assistance evaluate the provided assistance positively,
while 44% evaluate it negatively. This constitutes a slightly less favorable evaluation of the provided 
assistance than in February 2004, but it is still way more positive than in the beginning of the 
Intifada. A majority of 52% of the extremely poor households evaluate the received assistance 
negatively, compared to 27% of those with a monthly household income above the poverty line.
• Concerning the reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the received assistance, 48% of the 
dissatisﬁed beneﬁciaries were discontented because of the low frequency of the assistance, 33%
were dissatisﬁed because of the small quantity of the received assistance, while another 15% were
unhappy with the quality of the received assistance.
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• Both percentages of employment assistance received by the household and received personally 
have increased since the February 2004 survey. Employment assistance remains the highest in 
the Gaza Strip, although between February 2004 and November 2004, the percentages of such 
assistance have increased far more in the west Bank and Jerusalem than in the Gaza Strip. 
Furthermore, a far higher percentage of extremely poor and poor households than the relatively 
better-off households have received employment assistance. Since February 2004, all types of 
received employment assistance under study – whether it concerns long-term jobs, short-term 
jobs, unemployment funds or resources for the self-employed – have increased. UNRWA is the 
main perceived provider of employment assistance, followed by the trade unions, which are closely 
followed by the Palestinian Authority. The visibility of municipalities and international organizations 
as providers of employment assistance has increased since the February 2004 survey. Lastly, 
a majority of the 59% of employment assistance beneﬁciaries evaluated it positively, while the
remaining 41% of the beneﬁciaries held a more negative view. The level of dissatisfaction with
employment assistance increases in parallel with the increased levels of poverty. As for the 
reasons behind the dissatisfaction with employment assistance, 59% are dissatisﬁed because the
employment period is very short, while 38% are dissatisﬁed because the amount is too little.
6Food
Jamil Rabah
Chapter
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Introduction
Food assistance is one of the main types of assistance that is delivered to the Palestinian people. 
Traditionally, food was distributed primarily by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine 
People (UNRWA) as well as by a few other international agencies. The deterioration of the living conditions 
in the past four years that resulted from the strict closure of the oPt and the subsequent increase in 
unemployment and the reduction in the income sources of the Palestinian households, prompted other 
local and international organizations to intervene and to intensify their relief efforts to the Palestinian 
people.
This chapter will examine the perceptions of the Palestinian public with respect to the households’ food 
situation, food assistance, targeting of food assistance, sources and value of food assistance, and the 
level of satisfaction.  However, an assessment of the extent to which the Palestinians prioritize the need 
for food, relative to other priorities, will provide an overview of the food situation in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip.
6.1 Need for food
The percentage of the Palestinians who stated that food is the main priority of the Palestinian households 
has increased rather sharply. As explained in ﬁgure 6.1, below, 30% of the respondents in November 2004
stated that food is the main priority of their household compared to 16% in February 2004, an increase 
of 14% within an eight month period. Moreover, when adding the two ﬁrst most important priorities, food
comes out more often than any other need, including the need for employment, despite the fact that the 
need for employment emerged as the top most important need for the Palestinian households with 44% of 
the respondents identifying employment as their household’s main priority.
Figure 6.1 The two most important needs of the Palestinian households (o079), a comparison between February 
2004 and November 2004
Food, as a ﬁrst priority, differs according to the different sectors and locations of the Palestinian population.
As can be seen in ﬁgure 6.2, below,  the above the poverty line respondents, for example,  stated that
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food is the main household need with about 33% of them stating that food is the most important household 
need compared to 23% of the hardship cases. Also noticeable is the higher proportion of higher educated 
respondents, city dwellers, refugees, and Gaza Strip non-camp respondents than their counterparts who 
identiﬁed food as their households’ most important need.
Figure 6.2 Food as a first priority (o079) according to poverty (poverty3), educational level (educ), age (agec), and 
refugee status (o002)
Figure 6.3 Most important unmet need of the Palestinian households (o180)
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The need for food comes even clearer when 
respondents were asked what their household’s 
most important unmet need is. As illustrated in ﬁgure
6.3, above, 15% of the respondents identiﬁed food as
the most important unmet need. This can imply that 
approximately 15% of the Palestinian households 
recognize food as their main need that is not even 
met.  When analyzing this question according to a 
number of explanatory variables, it shows that food 
as an unmet need is highest among those who are 
below the poverty line (17%), among refugees (15%), 
among city and refugee camp respondents (19%), 
and among the Gaza Strip non-camp respondents 
(18%).
The importance of food to the households is also 
evident when respondents were asked to state 
what they perceive as the most important need of 
their community. Again, food came out the second 
most important after employment with 16% of the 
respondents considering food as the most important 
need of the community they live in. However, the 
percentage reached 32% when the respondents 
were prompted to state what they believe is the 
second most important need of their community. 
These results are described in ﬁgure 6.4, below.
6.2 Change in household food consumption
An analysis of the changes in the consumption patterns of various food items provides an indication about 
the quality of food intake. When comparing the results of the food consumption patterns between February 
and November 2004, not much has changed with the exception of fruits and vegetables where it seems 
that the decrease in the consumption of these food items was much higher in November 2004 than in 
February 2004. Whereas 41% of the respondents said that their consumption of fruits and vegetables 
had increased in February 2004, the percentage is only 13% in November 2004.  The changes in food 
consumption are outlined in ﬁgure 6.5, below.
Figure 6.5  Change in the consumption of various food items in the household (o081), comparison between 
February 2004 and November 2004
Figure 6.4 The two most important needs of the 
community (o080)
Food 131
6.2.1 Change in household food consumption according to poverty
Although the food consumption of various food items has generally remained relatively unchanged, further 
examination of food consumption reveals that while the consumption of dairy and meat products remained 
unchanged, it is clear that not much improvement has occurred, especially not for the Palestinian households 
who live below the poverty line. As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.6, below, respondents living in abject poverty feel
that 63% of their consumption of dairy products and 70% of their meat consumption has decreased in the 
six months prior to November 2004.
Figure 6.6 Change in consumption of dairy products (o081v1a) and meat (o081v1b) according to the poverty level 
(poverty3)
6.3 The most needed food items in the household
It is evident from the above that while the situation did not worsen with respect to food consumption, 
not much improvement has occurred between February and November 2004. It is also evident that the 
importance the Palestinians give to food has increased signiﬁcantly.
The following paragraphs will examine what Palestinians feel are the most important food items for their 
households. This analysis will help to understand the expectations of the food assistance recipients from 
the food assistance providers with respect to the types of food assistance provision.
Figure 6.7 The two most needed food items in the household (o107)
As can be deduced from ﬁgure 6.7, above, 69% of the respondents, irrespective of their living standard or
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where they reside, mentioned commodities as the main needed food item in the household.  Although - as 
was discussed earlier - the consumption of dairy and meat products have not witnessed any increase, the 
emphasis on commodities could be attributed to the fact that these are the main types of food that could be 
stored and consumed through a large part of the food assistance cycles without any damage. Since, as will 
be discussed later in this chapter, food assistance distribution is generally carried out approximately twice 
a year, it is also logical that the respondents emphasize commodities as the most important needed food 
item rather than such food items as meat and dairy products that are perishable and at the same time are 
consumed on such a regular basis that it is not possible for the food assistance providers to distribute it.  
6.4 Source of food
More Palestinian households rely on food assistance in November 2004 than they did in February 2004. As 
can be seen in ﬁgure 6.8, below, 12% of the respondents stated that they rely primarily on food assistance
compared to 8% in February 2004.  Reliance on family assistance remained almost unchanged with 8% 
saying that the family is their main source of food, compared to 7% in February 2004. Accordingly, 20% of 
the Palestinian households rely on sources other than their own for their food.
Figure 6.8 Primary source of food in the Palestinian household (o077)
6.4.1 Primary source of food according to the poverty level
Figure 6.9 Primary source of food (o077) according to the poverty level (poverty 3)
Naturally, the reliance on outside sources for food is more among the economically less advantaged, 
especially those who live under extreme poverty conditions. An examination of ﬁgure 6.9, above, reveals
that around 45% of the hardship cases rely on either the extended family or on relief assistance for their 
households’ food needs. This is much higher than even those who live below the poverty line, but not 
under such extreme poverty conditions. As is also evident in ﬁgure 6.9, only 15% of the below poverty
level respondents rely on sources other than their personal resources. A possible explanation for that is 
the emphasis that the food assistance providers put on the special hardship cases.
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6.4.2 Primary source of food according to refugee status
The role of UNRWA as the major food assistance provider explains why more refugees than non-refugees 
rely on outside sources for their food. While 23% of the refugee respondents rely on food assistance, 
(whether from family or from various local and international organizations) the proportion is 18% among 
the non-refugee respondents. These ﬁndings are elaborated in ﬁgure 6.10, below.
Figure 6.10  Primary source of food (o077) according to refugee status (o002)
The role of UNRWA also explains why more respondents from the refugee camps rely on outside sources 
for food than city or village dwellers. Whereas 23% of camp respondents rely on food assistance, the 
percentage is respectively 9% and 11% among city and village respondents. The results are illustrated in 
ﬁgure 6.11, below.
Figure 6.11  Primary source of food (o077) according to area (o060)
It is also worth noting that the reliance on family for food is signiﬁcant among many respondents who said
that they did not receive assistance. As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.12, below, of the respondents who said that
they did not receive assistance, 6% said that they rely on the extended family for food.
Figure 6.12  Main source of food in the household (o077) according to those receiving assistance
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6.5 Food assistance
The importance of food for the Palestinians could explain why food is the main type of provided assistance 
to the Palestinians. Of course, one may argue that employment assistance is more important, however, 
food assistance is logistically much easier to organize, it can be distributed to a much larger segment of 
the population, and it is also less costly and perhaps more urgent than other types of assistance, even 
compared to employment assistance. Another possible explanation could be the difﬁculties associated
with the provision of employment assistance under severe mobility restrictions.
As can be shown in ﬁgure 6.13, below, there has been a 5% increase in the number of people reported
to have said that they have received assistance. While the percentage was 39% in February 2004, the 
proportion increased to 44% by November 2004.  
The major part of the reported assistance received (main assistance) was food which comprised 58% 
of the assistance provided in the six months prior to November 2004. As can also be noticed from ﬁgure
6.13, the proportion of food assistance has in fact dropped from the February 2004 ﬁgure. Whereas food
assistance comprised 76% of all types of assistance in February, the proportion in November 2004 was 
58%: a drop of 18%.
Figure 6.13 Proportion of food assistance compared to the overall assistance provided (o035)
Figure 6.14: Food distribution (o036foo) according to area (o060) and region of residence (o059), a 
comparison with July 2003
As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.14, above, 51% of the food assistance was distributed in cities, 26% in refugee
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camps, and 24% in villages. When compared to the 
distribution of food assistance in February 2004, the 
main increase was observed in the villages where 
the proportion has increased from 19% in February 
2004 to 24% by November 2004. 
The results also revealed that the proportion of 
respondents who stated that they received food 
assistance was 47% in the West Bank, 46% in 
the Gaza Strip, and 7% in Jerusalem. The most 
signiﬁcant change occurred in the Gaza Strip
where the percentage dropped by 9% from 55% of 
the overall distribution in February 2004 to 46% by 
November 2004. 
Further examination of the data shows that refugee camps received 24% of the overall food assistance 
and the remainder went to non-camp areas. As indicated in ﬁgure 6.15, above, 17% of the respondents
who stated that they have received food assistance were from Gaza Strip refugee camps, 7% from West 
Bank refugee camps, 40% from West Bank non-camp areas, and 29% from Gaza Strip non-camp areas. 
The remaining 7% who received food assistance reside in Jerusalem.
Figure 6.16, below, shows the distribution of food assistance, as reported by the respondents, in the 
various districts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The largest distribution of food assistance was in 
the Tulkarem District with 10% of all reported food assistance, and Gaza City, with a percentage of 16% 
making it the district that received most food assistance compared to all other districts in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip.
 Figure 6.16: Food distribution (o036foo) according to district
When examining food distribution according to the poverty level, it is clear that the majority of food distribution 
was to the respondents who are either below the poverty line or to those who live in abject poverty. As 
illustrated in ﬁgure 6.17, below, 37% of the received food assistance was reported by the extremely poor
respondents and 38% by the respondents who are below the poverty line. These ﬁgures, when compared
to the results of the February 2004 survey, shows that more food assistance was delivered to respondents 
who are economically better-off in the period prior to November 2004. While in February 2004, 15% of 
the food recipients had a living standard above the poverty line, this was the case for 26% of them in 
November 2004. 
Figure 6.15: Food distribution (o036foo) according to 
place of residence (place)
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report VIII136
Figure 6.17: Food distribution (o036foo) according to poverty (poverty3), comparison with February 2004
6.6 Source of food assistance
As mentioned earlier, UNRWA is the single most 
important source of food assistance. As can be seen 
in ﬁgure 6.18, adjacent, 49% of the food recipients
stated that the UNRWA was the main source of their 
received food assistance, followed by the Palestinian 
Authority with 16%, local NGOs with 15%, trade 
unions with 12%, and religious organizations with 
5%. Although international organizations are one of 
the main providers of food assistance, especially 
to non-refugee Palestinians, the proportion of food 
assistance by these organizations, as reported 
by the respondents did not exceed 2%.1 This is 
attributed primarily to the fact that the main part of 
the food assistance provided by such international 
organizations as the World Food Program, is carried 
out through the Ministry of Social Services and 
through their partner organizations and NGOs such 
as the Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC). 
Figure 6.19: Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and poverty level (poverty3)
Generally speaking, 74% of the provided food assistance is distributed to households with a living standard 
that is below the poverty line and 26% was distributed to respondents who are economically better-off. 
As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.19, above, 50% of the Palestinian Authority’s food assistance goes to the special
hardship cases, compared to 26% of UNRWA’s distribution, and 56% of the food distribution of the trade 
unions, and 45% of the NGOs. Only 20% of the food assistance provided by the religious organizations 
reached the households that are living under extreme poverty conditions.
Figure 6.18: Providers of food assistance (o036foos)
1 Not much analysis can be made due to the small number of cases. Only 8 respondents said an international 
organization (other than UNRWA) had provided their household with food assistance.
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Due to the role UNRWA plays with respect to the provision of services to the Palestinian refugees, it 
is natural that the bulk of the organization’s food distribution targets the refugees. As shown in ﬁgure
6.20, below, 96% of the food assistance provided by UNRWA targets the refugee population. Conversely, 
the 86% of the food distribution carried out by the Palestinian Authority is distributed to the non-refugee 
population. Similarly, NGOs also target the Palestinian non-refugee population with 95% of their food 
distribution efforts focusing on this subgroup.
Figure 6.20:  Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and refugee status (o002)
It is also natural that the distribution of food assistance by UNRWA is concentrated more where the refugee 
population is concentrated. Accordingly, very little of UNRWA’s food assistance reaches the villages, while 
the bulk is distributed in refugee camps and in cities. It is for this reason that 44% of the Palestinian 
Authority’s food distribution and 47% of the NGO’s food distribution is geared towards the rural population. 
A brief examination of ﬁgure 6.21, below, reveals that the trade unions and the religious organizations also
distribute a sizeable proportion of their food distribution in the refugee camps, although they also distribute 
in cities and villages.
Figure 6.21: Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and area of residence (o060)
Figure 6.22: Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and region of residence (o059)
Thus, when examining the manner by which food assistance is distributed by the various food assistance 
providers, it becomes increasingly clear that some food assistance providers focus more on one region, 
while others focus on another. As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.22, above, 96% of the food assistance recipients
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who stated that their source of food assistance were NGOs were from the West Bank. Naturally the high 
concentration of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip explains why 64% of the UNRWA food assistance 
recipients come from the Gaza Strip and why 64% of the Palestinian Authority’s food distribution reside in 
the West Bank. 
Closer analysis of the food distribution of the various food assistance providers reveals that 14% of the 
respondents stating that UNRWA is the main provider of their most important assistance are from West 
Bank refugee camps compared to 41% in Gaza Strip refugee camps. A small amount of the Palestinian 
Authority’s food assistance is reported to have been distributed to the Gaza Strip refugee camps (3%) 
compared to 16% of the PA’s food distribution reported in the West Bank refugee camps.  As for the food 
distribution of the NGOS, 91% were in the West Bank outside camps, and none in the Gaza Strip outside 
camps. These results are outlined in ﬁgure 6.23, below.
Figure 6.23: Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and place of residence (place)
6.7 Frequency of food assistance
It has been established above that food assistance 
is the primary source of food for a signiﬁcant
number of Palestinian households, particularly those 
households who live in extreme poverty.  Accordingly, 
the frequency of food distribution is an essential 
aspect of the food assistance efforts given the role 
this effort plays with respect to those beneﬁciaries.
According to the respondents, 35% received food 
assistance only one time during the six month period 
before the November 2004 survey, 16% said three 
times, 7% four times, and 41% said that they received 
food assistance almost on a monthly basis. These 
results are indicated in ﬁgure 6.24, adjacent.
As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.25, next page, trade unions, NGOs, and the religious organizations provided food
more often than the major food assistance providers, such as UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority2. 
Understandably, and given UNRWA’s large proportion of beneﬁciaries, 48% of the organization’s food
Figure 6.24: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3)
2 It is important to note at this juncture that the survey was carried out in the period of Ramadan when many local 
organizations increase their food assistance. 
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assistance recipients said that they received it only once during the six months under scrutiny.  A possible 
explanation is the suspension of the emergency food distribution rounds between the months of June 2004 
and September 2004 (i.e. three months out of the six months covered by this survey) as a consequence 
of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.
Figure 6.25: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) by source of food assistance (o036foos)
When examining the frequency of food assistance according to area of residence, refugee camps residents 
seem to be receiving food assistance more frequently than their counterparts in villages and cities. 
Whereas, for example, 49% of food assistance recipients in the refugee camps said that they received 
food assistance almost monthly (ﬁve times during a six-month period), the percentage is 41% in villages
and 37% in cities. Conversely, the one-time distribution is higher in cities than it is in villages or refugee 
camps. These ﬁndings are detailed in ﬁgure 6.26, below.
Figure 6.26: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) according to area of residence (o060)
The highest frequency of food distribution is reported in the West Bank where 53% of the respondents 
received it almost on a monthly basis, compared to 31% in the Gaza Strip. In this context, it is important to 
note that although food assistance seems to be more prevalent in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 
the frequency in the latter is signiﬁcantly higher than in the former. These ﬁndings are clearly established
in ﬁgure 6.27, below.
Figure 6.27: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) according to region of residence (o059)
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As for the food distribution according to the standard of living, the results in ﬁgure 6.28, below, clearly show
that food assistance is more regularly distributed to those households whose living standard is below the 
poverty line, particularly to those living under abject poverty.  Whereas 49% of the hardship cases stated 
that they have received food assistance on an almost monthly basis, the percentage is only 30% among 
those whose standard of living is above the poverty line. As is also indicated in ﬁgure 28, only 6.28% of
the hardship cases that have received food assistance said that they received it only once during the six-
month period under scrutiny.
Figure 6.28: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) according to the poverty level (poverty3)
6.8 Attitude towards food assistance
In addition to the frequency of food assistance, the attitudes of the recipients of food assistance are, 
undoubtedly, instrumental in generating a better picture about the environment surrounding food assistance. 
In the following pages an assessment of the Palestinian attitude towards food assistance will be provided 
with respect to targeting, the organization of food distribution, the level of satisfaction of the recipients, and 
the value of the provided food.
6.8.1 Attitudes towards the targeting of food assistance
As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.29, below, 26% of the respondents feel that food assistance targets the needy,
and 24% said that food assistance is carried out indiscriminately. However, the majority of the respondents 
believe that although the food assistance targets the needy, often those who do not need it also receive 
it. 
Figure 6.29: Attitudes toward the targeting of food assistance (o166)
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The attitudes towards targeting of assistance differ from one place to another. The West Bank is signiﬁcantly
more positive about the targeting of food assistance than the Gaza Strip. As can be seen in ﬁgure 6.30,
below, only 17% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip believe that the food assistance targets the needy, 
compared to 33% in the West Bank. However, more respondents in the West Bank said that the food 
assistance is distributed indiscriminately compared to their counterparts in the Gaza Strip. Whereas 26% 
of the former believe this is the case, the percentage is 21% among the latter. Respondents from Jerusalem 
were the most positive with over 40% stating that food assistance primarily targets the needy. 
Figure 6.30 Attitudes toward the targeting of food assistance (o166) according to region of residence (o059)
The more positive attitude towards the targeting of food assistance in the West Bank is not attributed to the 
higher concentration of the village population in this region or the higher concentration of refugees in the 
Gaza Strip. As indicated in ﬁgure 6.31, below, the attitudes of the West Bank camps regarding the targeting
of food assistance is closer to the West Bank non-camps than it is to the Gaza Strip camps. Similarly, the 
attitudes of the Gaza Strip camp respondents are closer to the Gaza Strip non-camp respondents, than to 
the attitudes of the West Bank camp respondents on this issue.
Figure 6.31: Attitudes toward the targeting of food assistance (o166) according to place of residence (place)
The living conditions of the respondents provide an explanation as to why there are differences in attitude 
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among the Palestinians on the issue of targeting. A close look at ﬁgure 6.32, below, shows that the better-
off the respondents, the less positive they are about the targeting of food assistance. Whereas 33% of 
the respondents who live under extreme poverty conditions stated that food assistance targets primarily 
the needy, the percentage among the respondents whose living condition is above the poverty line is only 
14%. 
Figure 6.32: Attitudes towards the targeting of food assistance (o166) according to poverty level (poverty3)
6.8.2 Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution
The attitude of food beneﬁciaries about the manner in which food distribution is organized, is also mixed.
While 13% of the respondents stated that food distribution is organized, 28% stated that it was badly 
organized. As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.33, below, 59% believe that there is still room for improvement.
Figure 6.33: Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution in general (o075)
This negative attitude towards the organization of food assistance runs through most sectors of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip irrespective of the place, area, or region of residence, who is the provider of the 
food assistance, or the refugee status, gender, or the educational level of the beneﬁciaries.
The only variable that is statistically signiﬁcant with the attitudes towards the organization of food distribution
is the poverty level. As indicated in the ﬁrst part of ﬁgure 6.34, next page, the beneﬁciaries whose living
condition is below the poverty line are less positive about the organization of food distribution than the 
respondents whose economic condition is relatively better. Whereas 20% of the beneﬁciaries who are
above the poverty line think that the food organization efforts are negative, the percentage is 30% among 
the hardship cases and 29% among the beneﬁciaries who are slightly better-off, yet still considered as
falling below the poverty line.
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Figure 6.34: Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution (o075) according to poverty level (poverty3) and 
source of food assistance (o036foos)
The second part of ﬁgure 6.34, above, clearly shows that the attitude towards the organization of food
distribution is similar concerning all the food assistance providers.
6.8.3 Level of satisfaction with food assistance
Despite the generally negative attitude of the food beneﬁciaries have the organization and targeting of food
assistance, 71% of them remain either satisﬁed or very satisﬁed, and 29% are very dissatisﬁed or satisﬁed
with the food assistance they have received.
When examining the reasons behind those who are not satisﬁed with the delivered food assistance, it is
clear that the main reason is the infrequency of the food distribution. As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.35, below,
44% of the beneﬁciaries said that their dissatisfaction with food assistance is due to its low frequency. 
In addition to frequency, 33% of the dissatisﬁed beneﬁciaries attributed their dissatisfaction to the low
quantity of food distribution and 22% attributed it to the low quality of the distributed food.
Figure 6.35: Level of satisfaction with food assistance (o036foot)
Dissatisfaction with food assistance differs depending on the region of residence and the provider of food 
assistance. No statistical difference was observed with regard to area or place of residence, refugee 
status, educational level, or the poverty level.
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Satisfaction with food assistance seems to be slightly more positive in the Gaza Strip than in the West 
Bank. As can be observed in ﬁgure 6.36, below, 67% of the West Bank respondents said that they were
satisﬁed with the food assistance compared to 74% of the Gaza Strip respondents. As for Jerusalem, the
small number of cases does not warrant any statistical interpretation although it seems unlikely that the 
position of the food beneﬁciaries in this district will be signiﬁcantly different from that of their counterparts
in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Figure 6.36: Level of satisfaction with food assistance (o036foot) according to region of residence (o059)
With respect to the level of satisfaction with the food assistance provided by the various organizations, it is 
apparent that the level of satisfaction is generally positive across the various organizations involved in food 
assistance. As indicated in ﬁgure 6.37, below, about 70% of the food assistance beneﬁciaries are satisﬁed
with the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA, while around 30% are either dissatisﬁed or very dissatisﬁed.
NGOs scored slightly better with approximately 75% of their food assistance beneﬁciaries stating that they
are satisﬁed. The highest level of satisfaction, however, was among the food beneﬁciaries who received
this assistance from the various religious organizations.
 
Figure 6.37: Level of satisfaction with food assistance (o036foot) according to food assistance provider (o036foos)
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6.9 Value of food assistance
In general, the median value of food assistance that was reported by the respondents was around 150 NIS 
(approximately US$ 35). The highest median was reported in the villages where the median value of the 
provided food assistance was 200 NIS (approximately US $47). The lowest , however, was reported in the 
Gaza Strip refugee camps with a reported median value of 130 NIS (US$ 30).
As for the value of food assistance received from the various food providers, respondents receiving food 
assistance from UNRWA reported the lowest value with a median value of 100 NIS (US$ 23). The highest 
value was reported by the respondents who received food assistance from the religious organizations (NIS 
200 which is equivalent to US$ 47). These results are overviewed in ﬁgure 6.38, below.
Figure 6.38: Average value and median of food assistance (o036foov) according to place (place), region (o059), area 
(o060), refugee status (o002), and source of assistance (o036foos)
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6.10 Conclusion
In conclusion, following are the main results:
• There has been a signiﬁcant increase in the percentage of the Palestinians who said that food is
the priority of their household. While in February 2004 16% of the respondents said that food is 
their main priority, the proportion increased to 30% in November 2004.  The importance of food is 
higher among the refugees (35%), in cities (34%), and in Gaza Strip non-camp areas (38%).
• Basic commodities are the most important needed food item for 69% of the respondents, followed 
by baby food. The importance of baby food has increased from 14% in February 2004 to 22% in 
November 2004.
• Food assistance comprises 58% of the primary assistance delivered to the Palestinians between 
May and October 2004. This proportion dropped from 76% in February 2004. The most likely 
reason for this drop was the inability of UNRWA and other food assistance providers to deliver food 
aid in the Gaza Strip during this period as a result of major Israeli operations there.
• About 80% of the Palestinian households rely on their own sources for food (compared to 85% in 
February 2004) and 12% rely on relief assistance (compared to 8% in February 2004) and 8% rely 
on family and friends (compared to 7% in February 2004).
• The proportion of extremely poor households who rely on food assistance is 28%, compared to 9% 
among those who are below the poverty line and 5% among those who live above the poverty line. 
Moreover, more refugees than non-refugees rely on food assistance (respectively 16% and 9%).
• Refugee camps received 26% of the provided food assistance, cities received 51% of the overall 
food assistance and villages received 24%.
• 75% of the provided food assistance reaches those who are below the poverty line. Although the 
remainder is distributed among those classiﬁed as falling above the poverty line, further analysis
reveals that the bulk of those households are close to the poverty line.
• UNRWA is the main provider of food assistance (49%) followed by the Palestinian Authority (16%), 
local NGOs (15%), and trade unions (12%).
• While UNRWA food distribution is concentrated among the refugee population, the non-refugee 
population is catered primarily by the Palestinian Authority and the local NGOs. 
• Most of the food distribution carried out by UNRWA, trade unions, and religious organizations is 
in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority and the local NGOs concentrate their food distribution 
efforts in the West Bank.
• One third of the food distribution drives is done once every six months, and 41% of the respondents 
receive food assistance ﬁve times every six months. The almost monthly distribution of food
assistance is more frequent in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. More than half of the special 
hardship cases receive assistance almost on a monthly basis.
• One fourth of the respondents believe that food assistance primarily targets the needy and 50% 
believe that it targets the needy but often some of those who do not need assistance also receive 
it. Approximately 24% of the respondents think that food distribution is carried out indiscriminately. 
Special hardship cases are slightly more positive about the targeting of food assistance than those 
who are economically better-off.
• About 13% of the respondents believe that food distribution is organized, 59% believe that it is 
somewhat organized, and 28% think that it is badly organized.
• More than 70% of the food assistance beneﬁciaries are satisﬁed with food assistance. The 30%
who are dissatisﬁed attribute their dissatisfaction to the quantity of provided food (33%), the quality
of food (22%), and to the frequency of food assistance (44%).
• The median value of the provided food assistance during the six month period, as stated by the 
beneﬁciaries, is NIS 150 (US$ 35). The value is higher in the villages and cities than in the refugee
camps. 
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Education
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Introduction
In this part of the study, issues related to health and education will be overviewed. In subsequent sections, 
more speciﬁc questions concerning the respondents’ attitudes about health and education will be dealt
with according to the various relevant independent variables at hand.
7.1 Health and education in general 
Before going into depth into issues related to health and education, it is important to brieﬂy evaluate the
importance of the needs of health and education both for the household and for the community.
When the interviewees were asked about the two most important needs of their household,1 both health 
and education keep their rank of importance in comparison with the results in report 7, i.e. health remains 
the third most important need of the household, while education maintains its ﬁfth place in order of
importance. 
Figure 7-1 The two most important needs of your household (o079)
When taking into consideration only the unmet needs of the household,2 the importance of education 
is ranked in fourth place (12%), while health as an unmet need stands in ﬁfth place. These rankings of
health and education suggest that these needs are already quite well catered for as there are other more 
important unmet needs, such as employment, ﬁnancial assistance, and food.
Figure 7-2 Taking into consideration the unmet needs only, which of the following, in your opinion, is the most 
important need of your household? (o180)
When the question to interviewees concerned the two most important needs of their community, health is 
ranked in fourth place and education is ranked in ﬁfth place together with need for housing and re-housing.
 
1 This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 4 of the study.
2 This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 4 of the study.
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In comparison with the survey conducted in February 2004 for report 7, both health and education have 
lost importance as community needs.
Figure 7-3  The two most important needs of the community (o080)
Respondents were also asked to rank the 5 main expense types of the household in order of importance. 
Among the types of expenses were health and education. The results are summarized in table 7.1, below. 
It is clear that food (69%) is by far the ﬁrst main expense type of the household, while education (12%) and
health (8%) come in a distant second and third place. In the second main expense type of the household, 
education (32%) and health (31%) take the lead, while food (20%) comes in third place. Concerning 
the third main expense type of the household, health (33%) continues to be the most important, while 
education takes third place (21%) after the expense of household items (22%). Only in the fourth and ﬁfth
main expense types do the expenses for health and education in the household really diminish. As such, 
it is safe to conclude that the importance of health and education cannot be overestimated as expense 
types in Palestinian households and that assistance towards these two services would greatly impact the 
manner in which household organize their expenses.
Table 7-1 Please rank in order of importance the 5 main expense types your household income is primarily devoted 
to (o194 a, b, c, d, e)
Importance ranking of main expenses (1 to 5) in percent
1st expense 2nd expense 3rd expense 4th expense 5th expense
Food 69% 20% 6% 2% 1%
Education 12% 32% 21% 8% 6%
Health 8% 31% 33% 11% 6%
Rent 3% 3% 3% 5% 2%
Household items 5% 9% 22% 29% 10%
Sustaining the family business 1% 1% 3% 5% 4%
Transportation 0.4% 1% 6% 21% 19%
Buying house, car or business 2% 1% 2% 5% 7%
Clothes 0.2% 1% 3% 13% 39%
Leisure 0.2% 0.1% 1% 1% 6%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
As the construction of the separation wall has become one of the major issues in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conﬂict, interviewees were asked whether or not the wall affected their household in different manners.3 
One of the issues that the interviewees were queried about was whether or not the construction of the 
wall had made access to basic services such as education and health more difﬁcult. As detailed in table
7.2, below, 35% of the respondents stated that the construction of the separation wall had hampered their 
access to basic services such as education and health. In comparison with the results from February 2004 
to the same question, this indicates an increase of 10% of respondents who declared that the construction 
of the wall has affected their ability to access basic services such as health and education.
 
3  Questions related to the separation wall are discussed in more depth in Part 1 of the study.
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Table 7-2 Effect of the construction of the separation wall on access to education or health (o164f)
Effect of the construction of the separation wall on access to education or health
Frequency Valid Percent
It affected 321 35%
It did not affect 610 65%
Total 931 100%
7.2 Health
This section is divided into four main parts: (1) issues pertaining to the need for medical care, (2) restrictions 
on the delivery of medical care, (3) the level of satisfaction with beneﬁted from health services and their
providers, and (4) the provision and source of health coverage. Before entering into these speciﬁc parts,
however, it is good to start off with more general health related issues, such as the main reason for 
choosing a speciﬁc health facility.
In general, the main reason for respondents to choose their health facility is because they are only insured 
to receive services from a speciﬁc facility (51%). The second reason inﬂuencing the choice of the health
facility is because the respondents are not insured and services in a certain facility are either cheaper or 
free (16%), followed by respectively 11% stating that they chose their health facility based on the trust 
in the quality of care and another 11% making their choice based on the distance of the health facility or 
because it is the only one available. The remaining reasons for choosing a health facility, such as drugs 
availability (5%), short waiting time (3%), the humanity of the caretakers (3%) or the physician’s gender 
(1%) do not seem to be such important factors in the decision of choosing one or another health facility.
As overviewed in ﬁgure 7.4, adjacent, the reasons behind Palestinians’ choice of their health facility
vary according to their poverty level and educational level. As can be expected, a higher percentage of 
respondents living in hardship (18%) and below the poverty line (19%) than those with a living standard 
above the poverty line (12%) attach importance to their health facility being free or cheaper than others. 
Conversely, a considerably higher percentage of respondents from households with a monthly income 
above the poverty line (15%) than those from households below the poverty line (10%) or those living in 
hardship (5%) base their choice of the health facility on the trust in the quality of care. The same trend 
is noticeable when examining the question according to educational level. On the one hand, a higher 
percentage of respondents with low (17%) and medium (18%) levels of education than those who obtained 
high education (13%) chose their health facility on the basis of it being free or cheaper. On the other hand, 
a higher percentage of respondents with high levels of education (16%) than those with medium (8%) or 
low (10%) levels of education based their choice on the trust in the quality of care in the health facility.
The reasons behind Palestinians’ choice of their health facility also vary according to the region and 
area in which they reside, and according to their refugee status. Respondents in the Gaza Strip (21%) 
are very much more concerned than their counterparts in the West Bank (12%) and Jerusalem (14%) 
about the health facility being cheaper than others or free of charge. Interestingly, the same is true for 
refugees (19%) as opposed to non-refugees (14%), and for respondents residing in refugee camps (20%) 
in comparison with respondents residing in cities (15%) or villages (14%). Furthermore, the results indicate 
that the distance of the health facility or the fact that it is the only facility available are mostly a concern for 
Gazans (13%), camp residents (16%) and refugees (13%). Similarly, a higher concern can be noticed in 
those subgroups concerning drugs availability in health facilities (Gaza Strip (9%), refugee camp (8%), and 
refugee (7%)). Conversely, a higher percentage of respondents basing their choice of health facility on the 
trust in the quality of care can be found in the West Bank (14%), in cities (15%) and among non-refugees 
(14%). These ﬁndings are overviewed in ﬁgure 7.5, next page.
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One way to learn more about the health status of the population is to try and gauge the percentage of 
people who – in the past six months – needed or were prescribed drugs for chronic or acute problems. 
Furthermore, it is also important to ﬁnd out in how far people who were prescribed drugs for chronic or
acute problems were also provided with the necessary drugs. 
Figure 7-4  The main reason for choosing your health facility (only one answer) (o168v2) in general and according 
to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) 
Figure 7-5 The main reason for choosing your health facility (only one answer) (o168v2) according to region of 
residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and refugee status (o002)
Concerning drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems in the past six months, in general, 
59% of the respondents were not prescribed any drugs for chronic problems, 37% were prescribed 
and provided the necessary drugs for chronic problems, while the remaining 5% were not provided the 
drugs, although the drugs had been prescribed to them. As overviewed in ﬁgure 7.6, next page, the older
generation of respondents (35-49 years and 50+) more so than the younger generation were in need of 
drugs prescriptions for chronic diseases. Logically, the former more so than the latter were also provided 
the necessary medicine for their chronic problems.
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Figure 7-6 Drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems in the past six months (o169) in general and 
according to age (agec)
The results in ﬁgure 7.7, below, suggest that the poorer segments of society most need drugs for chronic
problems. More speciﬁcally, whereas only 53% of the respondents living in hardship stated that they
were not prescribed drugs for chronic problems in the past six months, this was the case for 57% of the 
respondents in household with a monthly income below the poverty line and 62% of the respondents with a 
living standard above the poverty line. Furthermore, the need for drugs treating chronic problems is higher 
in refugee camps than outside those camps both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. The particularly 
low percentage of respondents residing in West Bank refugee camps (43%) speciﬁed that they were not
prescribed drugs, while the highest percentage of respondents that were prescribed drugs for chronic 
problems, but were not provided with it can be found in Gaza Strip refugee camps (10%).
Figure 7-7 Drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems in the past six months (o169) according to place 
of residence (place) and poverty level (poverty3)
Concerning drugs prescription and provision for acute problems in the past six months, in general, 67% 
of the respondents were not prescribed any drugs for acute problems, 28% were prescribed and provided 
the necessary drugs for acute problems, while the remaining 5% were not provided the drugs, although 
the drugs had been prescribed to them. When comparing these results to the results on the prescription 
and provision of drugs for chronic problems, one can deduce that the need for drugs treating chronic 
problems is higher than the need for drugs treating acute problems. As was the case with regard to drugs 
for chronic problems, a higher percentage of the respondents of the older generation (35-49 years and 
50+) than of the younger generation has been in need for drugs treating acute problems in the past six 
months. Furthermore, the results in ﬁgure 7.8, next page, also indicate that the need for drugs treating
acute problems is higher among the poorer sections of society than among the better-off.
The need for drugs treating acute problems in the past six months is lower in the Gaza Strip than in the 
West Bank, and is lowest in Jerusalem. Nonetheless, the lowest percentage of respondents who were not 
prescribed any drugs in the past six months for acute problems reside in West Bank refugee camps (47%). 
As was the case concerning drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems, the highest percentage 
of respondents who were prescribed drugs for acute diseases, but were not provided with it can be found 
in Gaza Strip refugee camps (12%).
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Figure 7-8 Drugs prescription and provision for acute problems in the past six months (o169) in general and 
according to age (agec) and poverty level (poverty3)
Figure 7-9 Drugs prescription and provision for acute problems in the past six months (o169) according to region of 
residence (o059) and place of residence (place)
For the ﬁrst time in this report, interviewees were asked if any of their household members suffer from
mental, physical or visual impairment4 and if so, what the cause of the impairment is. This information 
again provides a pointer about a speciﬁc aspect of health among the Palestinian population.
Figure 7-10 Frequency of impairment (Q105)
 
4 The WHO differentiates between impairment and disability, and they could be described as follows: impairment 
concerns any temporary or permanent loss or abnormality of a body structure or function, whether physiological 
or psychological. An impairment is a disturbance affecting functions that are essentially mental (memory, 
consciousness) or sensory, internal organs (heart, kidney), the head, the trunk or the limbs. Disability is a 
restriction or inability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being, 
mostly resulting from impairment.
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As overviewed in ﬁgure 7.10, previous page, 85% of the household members stated that none of the
members in their household are impaired, 12% speciﬁed that one member in the household is impaired,
3% explained that two members in their household are impaired, while 6 respondents reported that three 
or more household members are impaired. When one only examines the 15% of households that include 
impaired persons, one can see that 76% of the household members have one member impaired, 22% have 
two household members impaired, while 3% have three or more members of their household impaired.
Taking the analysis on impairment a step further by examining the type of the impairment, the results in the 
survey indicate that when all age groups of the impaired are considered, 44% are physically impaired, 42% 
are visually impaired, while 14% suffer from mental impairment. When considering impairment among 
children who are 14 years old or younger, 48% are physically impaired, 27% are visually impaired, while 
25% are mentally impaired.
As for the cause for the impairment, the results differ according to whether one examines all age groups 
or merely the age groups of children who are not older than 14 years of age. As the results in ﬁgure 7.11,
below, illustrate, the percentage of the impaired since birth is higher when one only considers the age 
group of 14 years or younger than when one includes all age groups in the analysis (respectively 76% and 
56%). Conversely, the percentage of the impaired as a result of an accident (respectively 21% and 12%) 
or as a result of the Intifada (respectively 22% and 13%) is higher when one includes all the age groups in 
the analysis than when one considers merely the age group of children aged 14 years or below.
Figure 7-11 Type and reason for impairment in general and for children of 14 years and younger (Q105)
7.2.1 Need for medical care in the past six months
In an attempt to monitor the need for medical care among Palestinians, interviewees were asked from a 
predetermined list what type of medical care they or any of their household members had been in need of 
in the past six months.5  In general, and as overviewed in ﬁgure 7.12, below, in the past six months 62%
 
5  It is worth pointing out that in the February 2004 survey for Report 7, the same question was asked. However, at 
that time the predetermined list included many more types of needed medical care than is the case for the current 
report.
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of the respondents were in need of primary health care, while 46% needed a hospital. Furthermore, 29% 
of the surveyed households were in need of specialized care, while an ambulance was needed in 20% of 
these households. Finally, 14% of the respondents speciﬁed that either they themselves or their household
members had been in need of physical rehabilitation in the past six months and 11% were in need of birth 
care.
Compared to the results on a similar question in the February 2004 survey, the need for hospitalization in 
the past six months has decreased by 9%, the need for an ambulance by 6%, and the need for birth care 
by 17%. Still in comparison to the results in February 2004, the need for specialized care has increased by 
12%, while the need for physical rehabilitation has increased by 7%.
Figure 7-12 Type of medical care needed in the past six months (o102v2)
7.2.2 Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in the past six months
In order to be able to get a better idea about the delivery of medical care, respondents were also asked 
to specify whether or not the delivery of medical care has been restricted in the past six months. In this 
section, the need for such care and the restrictions faced in the reception of such care will be discussed 
separately according to the relevant variables that prove to be signiﬁcant.
Figure 7-13 Restrictions on the delivery of primary health care (curative services) in the past six months (o102nv2) 
in general and according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence (place)
When examining the issue of the delivery of primary health care in the past six months, in general, 40% of 
the respondents stated that they did not face any restrictions, 16% were faced with a delay, while for 6% 
of the respondents the provision of primary health care was denied. As illustrated in ﬁgure 7.13, above,
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the need for primary health care was more than twice as high in the Gaza Strip (21%) than in the West 
Bank (46%) and Jerusalem (53%). Denial of the provision of primary health care happened slightly less 
in the Gaza Strip (5%) than in the West Bank (7%), while it occurred least in Jerusalem (3%). Delays in 
the provision of primary health care, however, occurred considerably more frequently in the Gaza Strip 
(20%) than in the West Bank (15%) and in Jerusalem (11%). A far larger percentage of respondents in the 
Gaza Strip (54%) than in the West Bank (32%) and in Jerusalem (33%) did not face any restrictions in the 
delivery of primary health care. When analyzing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank further according to 
respondents residing in refugee camps or outside those camps, one can notice that the need for primary 
health care is the highest both in the refugee camps in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip in comparison 
with the non-camp residents in those regions.
Similarly as the results above already indicated, the analysis in ﬁgure 7.14, below, shows that the need
for primary health care has been considerably higher among refugees (68%) than among non-refugees 
(57%), and in refugee camps (76%) than in cities (64%) and villages (52%). Also, the results clearly 
indicate that the need for primary health care is signiﬁcantly higher among households that live in hardship
(69%) or those that have an income below the poverty line (67%) than among those with a living standard 
above the poverty line. Lastly, households living in hardship faced most frequently delays in the delivery 
of primary health care (27%).
Figure 7-14 Restrictions on the delivery of primary health care (curative services) in the past six months (o102nv2) 
according to refugee status (o002), area of residence (o060) and poverty level (poverty3)
In general, 54% of the respondents did not need hospitalization in the past six months. Of the 46% who 
did need hospitalization, 28% did not face any restrictions, but 5% were denied hospitalization and 13% 
saw their hospitalization delayed. When examining the need for hospitalization according to region and 
place of residence, the results in ﬁgure 7.15, next page, clearly illustrate that the need for hospitalization is
considerably higher in the Gaza Strip (54%) than in the West Bank (43%) and Jerusalem (36%). Moreover, 
within the Gaza Strip the need for hospitalization in the past six months was far greater in refugee camps 
(65%) than outside those camps (48%).
The results portrayed in ﬁgure 7.16, next page, show that although the need for hospitalization in the past
six months was higher in refugee camps (56%) than in cities (45%) and villages (43%), the delays and 
denials faced in the provision of such services has been quite similar in the three areas under discussion. 
When examining the issue of hospitalization according to poverty level, the results not only indicate that 
the need for hospitalization among the hardship cases is the highest (56%), but also that this subgroup 
of Palestinian society faces most frequently  denials (8%) and delays (18%) in the provision of hospital 
services.
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Figure 7-15 Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102nv2) in general and according to region of 
residence (o059) and place of residence (place)
Figure 7-16 Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102nv2) according area of residence (o060) and 
poverty level (poverty3)
In general, 80% of the interviewees stated that nobody in their household had been in need of an ambulance 
in the past six months. Of the 20% who were in need of an ambulance, 11% faced no restrictions at all, 
while 6% experienced a delayed provision of an ambulance and 3% were denied this service. The need 
for an ambulance was slightly higher in cities (22%) than in villages (19%) and refugee camps (18%). 
The results in ﬁgure 7.17, next page, further indicate that the need for an ambulance was slightly higher
among the respondents older than 35 years than among those younger than this age. The delays and 
denials faced in obtaining an ambulance in the past six months are quite similar across all age groups 
under examination. It is also worth pointing out that no other signiﬁcant relationships were found between
the issue of ambulances and the other various independent variables at hand than those described in the 
ﬁgure below.
Concerning birth care, 89% of the total sample had no such need in the past six months. Of the 11% who 
were in need of such care, 2% were denied the delivery of birth care, 3% faced delays in the delivery of 
such care, while 6% faced no restrictions at all. More speciﬁcally, the only statistically signiﬁcant relationship
that could be established with regard to the issue of birth care was according to the region in which the 
interviewees reside. The results portrayed in ﬁgure 7.18, next page, show that the need for birth care in the
West Bank (22%) and the Gaza Strip (22%) was the same, while it was lowest in Jerusalem (6%).
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Figure 7-17 Restrictions on the provision of an ambulance in the past six months (o102cv2) in general and 
according to area of residence (o060) and age (agec)
Figure 7-18 Restrictions on the delivery of birth care in the past six months (o102iv2) in general and according to 
region of residence (o059)
Moving on to the delivery of specialized care, in general, 71% of the interviewees pointed out that nor they 
nor their household members were in need of such care in the past six months, 4% said that the delivery 
of such care had been denied, 9% speciﬁed that it had been delayed, while 16% stated that the delivery
of specialized care had not been restricted at all. The need for specialized care is highest in the Gaza 
Strip (32%), followed by the West Bank (28%), and only then, Jerusalem (25%). However, the results 
in ﬁgure 7.19, next page, indicate that it was slightly more difﬁcult for Westbankers than for Gazans and
Jerusalemites to receive specialized care without restrictions, denials or delays. When examining the issue 
of specialized care according to area of residence, the results show that the need for specialized care is the 
highest in cities (33%), followed by refugee camps (27%) and then villages (24%). The restrictions, denials 
and delays faced by the residents in these three areas do not show major differences. Lastly, the results in 
the ﬁgure, below, also indicate that the need for specialized care is higher in the 35-49 age category (32%)
and in the 50+ category (38%) than in the 18-24 yrs (26%) and 25-34 yrs (23%) categories.
Finally, concerning physical rehabilitation, the large majority of 86% of the sample stated that they or any 
of their household members had not been in need of such care in the past six months. Of the 14% that 
were in need of physical rehabilitation, 3% saw their need for such care denied, 4% faced a delay in the 
provision of such care, while the remaining 7% were provided with the needed physical rehabilitation 
without restrictions. When examining the issue of physical rehabilitation according to region of residence, 
it appears that the need for physical rehabilitation is the greatest in the Gaza Strip (18%) and the lowest 
in Jerusalem (7%). There are no major differences in the level of difﬁculties faced in receiving physical
rehabilitation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The results in ﬁgure 7.20, next page, further
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indicate that the need for physical rehabilitation in cities (16%) and in refugee camps (17%) is quite similar, 
while the need for such care in villages is signiﬁcantly lower (10%). Again, according to area, there are no
signiﬁcant differences between the denials and delays faced in receiving physical rehabilitation.
Figure 7-19 Restrictions on the delivery of specialized care in the past six months (o102kv2) in general and 
according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and age (agec)
Figure 7-20 Restrictions on the delivery of physical rehabilitation in the past six months (o102lv2) in general and 
according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060)
Figure 7-21 Restrictions on the delivery of physical rehabilitation in the past six months (o102lv2) according to 
poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)
The results in ﬁgure 7.21, above, mainly indicate that - when analyzing the need of physical rehabilitation
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according to the poverty level and the educational level of the interviewees - , a higher percentage of 
respondents living in hardship (17%), the respondents with a household income below the poverty line 
(17%) and the respondents with low levels of education (20%) are in need of physical rehabilitation than 
the interviewees in households with a living standard above the poverty line (11%) and those who enjoyed 
either medium (13%) or high (13%) levels of education. When examining the results in the ﬁgure, below,
no major differences could be established according to poverty level or level of education in the difﬁculties
faced by respondents and/or their household members in obtaining the needed physical rehabilitation
7.2.3 Level of satisfaction with beneﬁted from services in the past six months and their
providers
As the title suggests, this section is concerned about the level of satisfaction with beneﬁted from health
services, while it also tries to gauge who the main providers of these services are. Before going into this 
analysis, however, it is important to overview the percentage of respondents who have beneﬁted in the
past six months from different types of health services.
As summarized in ﬁgure 7.22, below, 49% of the respondents stated that they or their household members
have beneﬁted from hospital services in the past six months, 60% made use of primary health care services,
33% beneﬁted from specialized care, and 24% from ambulances.
Figure 7-22 Percentage of Palestinians who benefited from the following services in the past six months (o126)
Having established the percentage of respondents who beneﬁted from various types of health care in the
past six months, the level of satisfaction with each of these types of health care and the providers of each 
type of health care will be discussed separately and sequentially below.
Hospital services
Starting off with the level of satisfaction among beneﬁciaries with hospital services, the results in table 7.3,
below, indicate that 78% of the respondents were satisﬁed, while 22% were dissatisﬁed. Compared to the
results on this question in the survey conducted in February 2004 for the 7th report, there is a noticeable 
increase of 7% of the respondents who are satisﬁed with such services. It is also worth noting that no
statistically signiﬁcant differences were found when cross-tabulating the issue of satisfaction with hospital
services with any of the independent variables at hand.
Table 7-3 Level of satisfaction with benefited from hospital services in the past six months (o126a) in general
Satisfaction with beneﬁted from hospital services
Frequency Valid percent
Satisﬁed 566 78%
Dissatisﬁed 136 22%
Total 709 100%
As for the providers of hospital services, in general, 62% of the respondents stated that this service had 
been provided to them by the Palestinian Authority, 15% referred to UNRWA as their main provider, while 
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8% speciﬁed that local NGOs were the providers of their hospital services. An overview that includes the
other providers of such services is provided in ﬁgure 7.23, below. Although throughout the Palestinian
occupied Territories the PA is the main provider of hospital services, the extent of its predominance in 
this ﬁeld varies considerably according to the different variables. According to place of residence, for
example, it is clear from the results in ﬁgure 7.23 that UNRWA takes up a far larger share in West Bank
and Gaza camps (respectively 40% and 36%) than elsewhere. Furthermore, in Jerusalem, only 36% of 
the respondents said that the PA provided them with hospital services, while 19% referred to the Israeli 
health services as their provider. Also interesting concerning hospital services in Jerusalem is that local 
NGOs (11%), private institutions (10%) and Arab governments (11%) seem to be far more frequently used 
than in other parts of the oPt. In fact, with regard to hospital services, the latter is exclusively mentioned 
by Jerusalemite respondents.
Figure 7-23 Providers (Q111) of hospital services in the past six months (o126as) in general and according to place 
of residence (place)
Given the abundance of information and differences according to the various independent variables 
concerning the providers of each type of health service, under each ﬁgure a short summary will be provided
of the remaining main ﬁndings that are statistically valid, but are not described in the ﬁgures. Concerning
the providers of hospital services, the main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows:
 According to region of residence (West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza Strip) (o059)
The Palestinian Authority is mentioned as a source for hospital services by a higher percentage of 
Palestinians in the West Bank (72%) than in the Gaza Strip (57%). Conversely, a far higher percentage of 
respondents in the Gaza Strip (28%) than in the West Bank (5%) refer to UNRWA as the source of their 
hospital services. In fact, the reliance on UNRWA for such services is even higher in Jerusalem (11%) than 
in the West Bank (5%). The results further indicate that the reliance on local NGOs for hospital services 
stands at about 8% in each of the three regions.
 Area of residence (city, village, camp) (o060)
The Palestinian Authority is more often cited as a provider of hospital services in villages (75%) than in 
cities (58%) and in refugee camps (54%). In those camps, of course, UNRWA (38%) is mentioned by a 
higher percentage of respondents than in cities (14%) or villages (1%). International organizations do not 
provide any hospital services in refugee camps and seem to concentrate their activities in villages (7%) 
and cities (5%).
 Refugee status (refugee, non-refugee) (o002)
As can be expected, the Palestinian Authority is more prominent as a provider of hospital services to non-
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refugees (72%) than to refugees (52%), while UNRWA’s provision of hospital services is nearly exclusively 
focused on the refugee population (31% refugees vs. 2% non-refugees).
 Poverty level (above poverty line, below poverty line, hardship cases) (poverty3)
The data reveal that the Palestinian Authority is most frequently a provider of hospital services to 
respondents with a living standard below the poverty line (67%). The provision of hospital services by the 
Palestinian Authority to the remaining sectors according to poverty level seems to be quite evenly spread 
(hardship cases 61% and those above poverty line 60%). The poorer sections of Palestinian society rely 
more on UNRWA as a provider of hospital services (hardship cases 23% and those below the poverty line 
18%) than Palestinians with a living standard above the poverty line (7%). The Israeli health services are 
exclusively used as a provider of hospital services by respondents in the sample that have a household 
income above the poverty line (5%), while, in addition, private institutions are nearly exclusively relied 
upon by this segment of society (7% vs. 1% respectively among hardship cases and those below the 
poverty line).
Primary health care
The second type of health care respondents were 
queried about concerns primary health care. As 
illustrated in ﬁgure 7.24, below, in general 81% of
the respondents who beneﬁted from primary health
care are satisﬁed, while 19% are dissatisﬁed. When
examining the level of satisfaction with primary 
health care services according to refugee status, a 
noticeable higher percentage of refugees (84%) than 
non-refugees (78%) are satisﬁed with those services.
Lastly, no statistically signiﬁcant relationships could
be established between the levels of satisfaction with 
beneﬁted from primary health care in the past six
months and any of the other independents variables 
at hand. 
Figure 7-25 Providers (Q113) of primary health care in the past six months (o126gs) in general and according to 
place of residence (place)
Concerning the providers of primary health care in the past six months, in general the Palestinian Authority 
is the main provider with 49%, while UNRWA comes second with 29%. As indicated by the results in ﬁgure
7.25, above, the PA is the largest provider of primary health care outside refugee camps both in the West 
Figure 7-24 Level of satisfaction with benefited from 
primary health care in the past six months (o126g) in 
general and according to refugee status (o002)
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Bank (66%) and the Gaza Strip (47%). The role of the PA inside camps both in the West Bank (17%) and 
the Gaza Strip (34%) in providing primary health care is far smaller and is largely taken over by UNRWA 
(respectively 83% and 63%). It is also worth pointing out that UNRWA’s role in primary health care outside 
camps in the Gaza Strip is relatively large (40%). This could be explained by the large number of refugees 
in the Gaza Strip who do no longer reside in camps, but still beneﬁt from UNRWA services. In Jerusalem,
the picture is more evenly split between various providers of primary health care with UNRWA taking up a 
22% share, the Israeli health services 19%, the Palestinian Authority 15%, and both the local NGOs and the 
Arab governments respectively providing primary health care to 14% of the Jerusalemite beneﬁciaries.
Regarding the providers of primary health care, the main ﬁndings in addition to the ones described in ﬁgure
7.25 can be summarized as follows:
 Region of residence (o059)
A far larger percentage of respondents in the West Bank (62%) than in the Gaza Strip (42%) and Jerusalem 
(15%) referred to the Palestinian Authority as their source of primary health care. Conversely, UNRWA 
seems to provide most primary health care in the Gaza Strip (48%), while the beneﬁciaries of primary
health care provided by local NGOs are the lowest in this region (5%).
 Area of residence (o060)
A considerably higher percentage of villagers (66%) than respondents residing in cities (48%) and camp 
dwellers (30%) reported that the Palestinian Authority is their source of primary health care. Expectably, a 
far higher percentage of camp residents (65%) than those residing in cities (26%) and villages (6%) referred 
to UNRWA as their source of primary health care. Also, international organizations and local NGOs seem 
to provide more primary health care in villages (respectively 7% and 10%) than in cities (respectively 4% 
and 8%) and refugee camps (respectively 1% and 3%).
 Refugee status (o002)
Predictably, the Palestinian Authority is clearly the main provider of primary health care to non-refugees 
(69% vs. 29% refugees) and, conversely, UNRWA is the main provider of primary health care to the 
refugee population (56% vs. 3% non-refugee).
 Poverty level (poverty3)
When examining the source of primary health care according to poverty, it is clear that UNRWA provides 
more to those living in hardship (35%) and below the poverty line (36%) than to those with a family income 
above the poverty line (18%). The provision of primary health care by the Palestinian Authority is more 
evenly spread over the poverty levels with 51% of those living in hardship, 52% of those below the poverty 
line and 47% of those above the poverty line referring to the Palestinian Authority as their source of primary 
health care.
 Age (agec)
With regard to the relationship between the provision of primary health care and the age of the beneﬁciaries,
it is interesting to concentrate on the age group that is 50 years old or older. While the Palestinian Authority 
clearly caters most for this age group (60%), the results indicate that international organizations, UNRWA 
and Arab governments concentrate the provision of their services least on the 50-plussers.
Specialized care
Regarding the level of satisfaction with beneﬁted from specialized care services, in general, 77% of the
respondents are satisﬁed with the provision of those services, while 23% are dissatisﬁed. The results in
ﬁgure 7.26, below, also clearly indicate that satisfaction with specialized care services is considerably
lower in the West Bank (71%) than in the Gaza Strip (80%) and Jerusalem (82%). Furthermore, the level of 
satisfaction with specialized care services is far greater among refugees (85%) than among non-refugees 
(69%). 
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As for the providers of specialized care in the past 
six months, in general, the four main providers of 
such care are (1) the Palestinian Authority (42%), 
UNRWA (16%), local NGOs (13%), and private 
sources (12%). It is interesting to note in ﬁgure 7.27,
below, that – unlike with any of the types of health 
services discussed above – the PA is also the main 
provider of specialized care in the Gaza Strip refugee 
camps (39%). In fact, with regard to specialized 
care in the Gaza Strip, UNRWA seems to provide 
slightly more such care outside the refugee camps 
(23%) than inside the camps (20%). Furthermore, 
Islamic organizations and international organizations 
concentrate their provision of specialized care mainly 
on non-camp residents, both in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. In Jerusalem, the delivery of specialized 
care is divided quite evenly between three main 
providers, whereby the Israeli health services take 
care of 18% of the beneﬁciaries, and so do the
Palestinian Authority (18%) and UNRWA (18%). 
Figure 7-27 Providers (Q115) of specialized care in the past six months (o126is) in general and according to place of 
residence (place)
Concerning the providers of specialized care, the main ﬁndings in addition to the ones described in ﬁgure
7.27, above, can be summed up as follows:
 Region of residence (o059)
A slightly higher percentage of respondents in the West Bank (48%) than in the Gaza Strip (41%) mentioned 
that the Palestinian Authority is their source of specialized care. The opposite is the case concerning 
UNRWA, with more than double the percentage in the Gaza Strip (22%) than in the West Bank (10%) 
mentioning UNRWA as their provider of specialized care.
 Area of residence (o060)
The provision of specialized care by the Palestinian Authority is highest in villages (50%), followed by 
cities (41%) and refugee camps (33%). UNRWA is the main provider of specialized care in refugee camps 
(33%), but was also referred to as a source in cities (16%) and – to a lesser extent - in villages (4%). The 
local NGOs seem to slightly more focus their provision of specialized care on refugee camps (16%) and 
Figure 7-26 Level of satisfaction with benefited from 
specialized care in the past six months (o126i) in 
general and according to region of residence (o059) and 
refugee status (o002)
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villages (15%) than on cities (12%), while international organizations focus their efforts in providing such 
care mostly on cities (7%) and villages (6%).
 Refugee status (o002)
When examining the source of specialized care according to refugee status, it is clear that a higher 
percentage of non-refugees (54%) than refugees (29%) report that the Palestinian Authority is their 
provider of specialized care. As for UNRWA, 31% of refugees speciﬁed it as their source of specialized
care compared to 2% of non-refugees. The provision of specialized care by international organizations, 
local NGOs and private sources seems to be quite evenly spread between refugees and non-refugees.
 Poverty level (poverty3)
The Palestinian Authority as a provider of specialized care is mentioned by a considerably higher percentage 
of beneﬁciaries with a family income below the poverty line (50%) and those living in hardship (44%) than
by beneﬁciaries of such care with a living standard above the poverty line (35%). UNRWA’s focus with
specialized care is deﬁnitely more on the hardship cases (26%) and Palestinians with a family income
that falls below the poverty line (18%) than on those above the poverty line (8%). A higher percentage of 
beneﬁciaries of specialized care above the poverty line than those below the poverty line or those living in
hardship were provided with such care by local NGOs and private sources.
 Education (educ)
When examining the provision of specialized care according to the educational level of the beneﬁciaries,
it is clear that the Palestinian Authority (47%), UNRWA (21%) and the Israeli health services (8%) cater 
considerably more for the low educated than for the medium or highly educated. Conversely, Islamic 
organizations (5%), international organizations (6%), and local NGOs (16%) seem to cater more for the 
higher educated. Interestingly, with respect to specialized care from private institutions, the results indicate 
that their provision of such care to the low educated (13%) and the highly educated (14%) is about even.
Ambulance transportation
Lastly, beneﬁciaries of ambulance services in the past
six months were asked about their satisfaction with 
those services. In general, 79% of the respondents 
are satisﬁed with those services, while the remaining
21% are dissatisﬁed. More speciﬁcally and according
to area of residence, the highest percentage of 
satisfaction with ambulance services can be found 
in villages (85%), followed by beneﬁciaries residing
in cities (79%), while the lowest percentage of 
satisfaction is among refugee camp residents 
(67%). 
Concerning the providers of ambulance services 
in the past six months, in general, 36% have been 
provided by the Palestinian Authority. The other main 
providers of such services include the international 
organizations (30%), local NGOs (14%), and 
UNRWA (12%). When analyzing this question 
according to place of residence, it becomes apparent 
that the Palestinian Authority is the main provider 
of ambulance services in both the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, and both inside and outside refugee 
camps. UNRWA barely provides ambulance services 
Figure 7-28 Level of satisfaction with benefited from 
ambulance transportation in the past six months (o126j) 
in general and according to area of residence (o060)
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to non-camp residents in the West Bank (3%)6, while in the Gaza Strip its share in the provision of 
ambulances is larger outside camps (21%) than within the camps (17%).
Figure 7-29 Providers (Q117) of ambulance transportation (o126js) in general and according to place of residence 
(place)
Finally, concerning the providers of ambulance services, the main ﬁndings in addition to the ones described
in ﬁgure 7.29, above can be summarized as follows:
 Region of residence (o059)
A higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (48%) than in the West Bank (32%) stated that 
the Palestinian Authority was the source of their ambulance service. The same is valid for ambulance 
services provided by UNRWA (Gaza Strip 20% vs. West Bank 3%). Ambulance services by international 
organizations were more concentrated in the West Bank (37%) than in the Gaza Strip (20%). The same is 
true for ambulance services provided by local NGOs (West Bank 29% vs. Gaza Strip 7%).
 Area of residence (o060)
While the provision of ambulance services by the Palestinian Authority seem to be quite evenly spread 
over cities (37%), villages (34%) and refugee camps (38%), the remaining main providers of such services 
seem to have a speciﬁc focus. More speciﬁcally, international organizations provided far more ambulance
services in villages (44%) than in cities (21%) and in refugee camps (24%). Local NGOs concentrated their 
ambulance provision more in cities (18%) than in villages (9%) or in refugee camps (9%), while UNRWA, 
of course, focused mainly on refugee camps (29%), followed by cities (11%) and villages (2%).
 Refugee status (o002)
The Palestinian Authority in the past six months provided a higher percentage of refugee respondents 
(40%) than non-refugee respondents (33%) with ambulances. Ambulance services provided by UNRWA 
were also referred to by a far higher percentage of refugees (21%) than non-refugees (4%). Provision of 
ambulance services by international organizations and local NGOs provide the opposite picture as a far 
higher percentage of non-refugee respondents (respectively 37% and 19%) than refugee respondents 
(respectively 18% and 8%) referred to these organizations with regard to such services.
 Poverty level (poverty3)
When examining the provision of ambulances in the past six months according to the poverty level, it 
appears that the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA catered more for the respondents living in hardship 
 
6 It is worth noting that UNRWA West Bank is endowed with only four ambulances.
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(respectively 40% and 23%) and below the poverty line (respectively 47% and 9%) than for those with 
a household income above the poverty line (respectively 27% and 7%). The opposite is the case for 
the provision of ambulances by international organizations, local NGOs, and Islamic organizations as 
they were all referred to by a signiﬁcantly higher percentage of respondents with a living standard above
the poverty line than by respondents with a household income below the poverty line or those living in 
hardship.
 Age (agec)
A statistically signiﬁcant relation appeared in the results between the provision of ambulances and the age
of the respondents as a considerably higher percentage of the 50-plussers than their younger colleagues 
mentioned the Palestinian Authority and local NGOs as the providers of ambulances. On the opposite, a 
signiﬁcantly lower percentage of respondents above the age of 50 than the younger respondents referred
to international organizations and UNRWA as the providers of their ambulances.
7.2.4 Health coverage7  
As health coverage forms an important aspect of health and the provision of its services, interviewees 
were asked whether or not they receive any assistance in covering their medical expenses. As indicated 
in ﬁgure 7.30, below, 26% of the respondents still cover their medical sources from their own sources.
When the respondents do receive assistance in covering their medical expenses, the main providers are 
the government health insurance with 40% and UNRWA with 17%.8 Another 8% cover their medical bills 
through private health insurance and 4% have their health coverage provided by charitable organizations. 
The remaining 5% of the respondents did not specify who provided them with health insurance, but did say 
that they delayed the payment of the fees. In comparison with the results on the same question in February 
2004, health coverage by government insurance decreased by 3% and so did UNRWA’s health coverage, 
private health insurance increased by 1%, while coverage by charitable organizations increased by 2%. 
The percentage of the respondents covering medical expenses from their own pocket has decreased by 
5% since the September 2003 report and has remained the same since the February 2004 survey. Lastly, 
the percentage of respondents specifying that they had delayed the payment of the fees has increased by 
3% since February 2004.
The results in ﬁgure 7.30, next page, also illustrate that the sources of health coverage vary considerably
according to the area of residence of the respondents. Government health insurance is the main provider 
of health coverage in cities (46%) and villages (39%), but is largely superceded by UNRWA in refugee 
camps, where it only provides to 23% of the residents. Expectedly, UNRWA provides assistance through 
health insurance mostly in camps (56%) and not so often in cities (14%) and villages (3%). Respondents 
in villages seem to receive the least assistance in covering their medical expenses as – in comparison 
with respondents in cities (25%) and refugee camps (13%) – they far more frequently cover medical bills 
from their own sources (34%). Also, a considerably higher percentage of villagers (10%) than residents 
in cities (3%) and refugee camps (2%) declared that they had delayed the payment of their fees. Finally, 
coverage by private insurance is seen most frequently in villages (11%), followed by cities (7%) and then 
refugee camps (6%).
 
7 It should be noted that in the analysis regarding health coverage, respondents in Jerusalem are excluded. 
Jerusalemites are entitled to Israeli government health coverage and as such their inclusion into the analysis would 
provide inaccurate results about Palestinians covered by Palestinian government health insurance.
8 It is worth nothing that UNRWA does not offer its own health insurance scheme, although the Agency (partially) 
covers hospitalization costs and also some medication charges.
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Figure 7-30 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) in general and according to area of residence (o060) (excluding 
Jerusalem respondents)
Sources of health coverage also signiﬁcantly differ according to the region and place of residence of the
respondents. The results in ﬁgure 7.31, below, indicate that although the percentage of the respondents
stating that they are covered by government health insurance does not differ much between the West 
Bank (41%) and the Gaza Strip (38%), the percentage of respondents specifying that their medical bills 
are covered by UNRWA is far lower in the West Bank (6%) than in the Gaza Strip (33%). In fact, the 
higher percentage of refugees among the total Gaza Strip population as compared to the West Bank 
could explain this ﬁnding. Supporting this argument, the results indicate that UNRWA only covers a small
percentage of medical bills in the West Bank outside camps, whilst it still provides assistance through 
health insurance to 22% of the respondents residing outside camps in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, the 
percentage of respondents covering medical expenses from their own pocket is more than twice as high 
in the West Bank (34%) than in the Gaza Strip (15%). When taking the analysis slightly further according 
to place of residence, it appears that the highest percentage of respondents that do cover their medical 
expenses from their own sources can be found in the West Bank outside camps (35%). The highest 
percentage of respondents that delayed the payment of their fees is also residing in the West Bank outside 
camps (7%).
Figure 7-31 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence 
(place)
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Health coverage and income
The source of health coverage among Palestinians does not only vary depending on where they live in 
the occupied Palestinian territory, it also differs according to the income level of the household. As the 
results in table 7.4, below, indicate coverage by government health insurance seems to be quite evenly 
spread over the households with an income level between NIS 500 to NIS 5000, while a signiﬁcantly
lower percentage of households with an income level above NIS 5000 (23%) and an income level of 
less than NIS 500 (30%) are covered by government health insurance. Furthermore, the results show 
that more low income households than high income households cover their medical bills through using 
UNRWA services. More speciﬁcally, whereas 32% of the households with a monthly income level of less
than NIS 500 cover their health expenses through UNRWA, only 4% of the households with an income 
level over NIS 5000 do so. Generally, households with a higher monthly income seem to be covered more 
frequently by private health insurance than households with a lower income level. Moreover, the former 
cover medical expenses from their own sources more often than the latter. Still, it is worth pointing out 
that 19% of households with a monthly income level of less than NIS 500 cover their medical bills from 
their own pocket. This is an increase of 5% since the February 2004 survey. Lastly, it is again the most 
vulnerable group of respondents with a monthly income level of less than NIS 500 that most frequently 
resorts to delaying to payment of fees (9%).
Table 7-4 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) according to household income level (excluding Jerusalem 
respondents)9
Household income in NIS
O
ver 5000
3000-4999
2000-2999
1500-1999
500-1499
Less than 500
Total
Government health 
insurance
6
23%
52
36%
99
46%
108
41%
167
42%
39
30%
471
40%
UNRWA 1
4%
9
6%
29
13%
40
15%
81
21%
42
32%
202
17%
Private health insurance 8
31%
20
14%
14
7%
19
7%
24
6%
6
5%
91
8%
Charities 1
1%
5
2%
11
4%
20
5%
7
5%
44
4%
Cover own medical 
expenses
11
42%
57
40%
62
29%
69
26%
80
20%
24
19%
303
26%
Payment delayed 5
4%
7
3%
16
6%
22
6%
12
9%
62
5%
Total 26
100%
144
100%
216
100%
263
100%
394
100%
130
100%
1173
100%
Health coverage and poverty
As was discussed earlier, the government (40%) and UNRWA (17%) are the main sources of health 
coverage. When examining the beneﬁciaries according to the variable of poverty, one notices that both
 
9 It is worth noting that although the results in table 7.3 show a statistically signiﬁcant relation between the sources
of health coverage and the monthly household income level of the respondents, the numbers for some of the 
categories under examination are rather small. Therefore, some caution when interpreting the results in table 7.3 is 
advisable.
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government and UNRWA provide more health coverage to Palestinians with a household income that 
falls below the poverty line (respectively 63% and 80%). However, there are quite a few alarming ﬁndings
that stand out in ﬁgure 7.32, below. Firstly, 51% of households below the poverty line cover their medical
expenses from their own pocket. Furthermore, 51% of the households below the poverty line cover their 
medical expenses through private health insurance. Lastly, while 75% of the respondents from households 
with a monthly income below the poverty line declared that they had delayed paying their fees, this is also 
the case for 25% of the respondents from households with a living standard above the poverty line. This is 
an increase of 18% since the February 2004 survey and indicates that an increasing number of Palestinians 
with a household income level above the poverty line began to resort to the coping mechanism of delaying 
the payment of bills or fees.
Figure 7-32 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) according to poverty level (poverty3) (excluding Jerusalem)
When examining the source of health coverage for the respondents living in hardship, it is clear that the 
government health insurance is the main provider (36%), followed by 25% who cover their medical bills 
through using UNRWA services. In this report, the percentage of respondents living in hardship who cover 
their own medical expenses has again slightly risen by 2% since the last report, and now stands at 19%. 
Also, the percentage of respondents living in hardship mentioning that they delayed payment of their 
medical fees has increased from 5% in the February 2004 survey to 8% in the survey conducted for the 
current report.
Figure 7-33 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) for hardship cases (excluding Jerusalem)
7.3 Education
As was the case in the section of health, it is valuable to ﬁrst ﬁnd out the general level of satisfaction with
beneﬁted from education services and schools in the past six months, and also to ﬁnd out more concretely
who were the main providers of such services.
The results pointed out that 50% of the total sample of interviewees beneﬁted from school services in the
Health and Education 171
past six months. As overviewed in ﬁgure 7.34, below, the large majority of 85% of the beneﬁciaries are
satisﬁed with the education services provided to their households in the past six months. However, the
level of satisfaction is considerably greater in the West Bank (88%) and in Jerusalem (84%) than in the 
Gaza Strip (74%). Although not illustrated in the ﬁgure, below, it is worth noting that the level of satisfaction
with beneﬁted from education services in the past six months was signiﬁcantly higher among female
respondents (88%) than among their male counterparts (82%).
Figure 7-34 Level of satisfaction with benefited from education services in the past six months (o126k) in general 
and according to region of residence (o059)
As for the providers of education, in general, the Palestinian Authority (50%) and UNRWA (34%) are 
the main providers of such services. The provision of schools by Islamic (4%) or international (2%) 
organizations, local NGOs (4%), Arab governments (3%) or organizations (1%), and private institutions 
(1%) are minimal and do not exceed 4% respectively. When analyzing the provision of schools according to 
place of residence, one can clearly notice that whereas the PA is the main provider outside refugee camps 
both in the West Bank (78%) and in the Gaza Strip (47%), UNRWA is the main provider inside camps both 
in the West Bank (81%) and in the Gaza Strip (77%).10 Surprisingly different from the results in the survey 
of February 2004, is the relatively high percentage in Jerusalem of UNRWA (31%), Islamic organizations 
(21%) and Arab governments (15%) as providers of education and the relatively low percentage of the 
PA as a provider of education in Jerusalem compared to the results in February 2004. These results are 
detailed in ﬁgure 7.35, below.
Figure 7-35 Providers of education services in the past six months (o126ks) in general and according to place of 
residence (place)
In addition to the information in ﬁgure 7.35, above, there are more signiﬁcant differences according to
several independent variables with regard to the issue of the providers of education. They are brieﬂy
overviewed below.
 
10 For the purpose of information, it is worth mentioning that there is an agreement in place between the PA and 
UNRWA, according to which UNRWA will enroll non-refugee students (preferably girls) in UNRWA schools if: (a) 
there is no PA school in the surrounding 3 km, or (b) they reside in a frontier village, or (c) they reside in Shu’fat 
camp and meet certain conditions.
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 Region of residence (o059)
A far higher percentage of Westbankers (72%) than Gazans (37%) and Jerusalemites (15%) identiﬁed the
Palestinian Authority as their provider of education. In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA was the most frequently 
mentioned source of education (53%), compared to 9% in the West Bank. The provision of education 
services by international organizations and local NGOs is quite evenly divided between the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip.
 Area of residence (o060)
A considerably higher percentage of villagers (87%) than respondents residing in cities (49%) or camp 
dwellers (14%) stated that the Palestinian Authority provides them with education. UNRWA, of course, 
is the main provider of education in the refugee camps (79%), but was also mentioned by 29% of the 
respondents in cities and barely 1% of the respondents in villages.
 Refugee status (o002)
The Palestinian Authority provides education to 81% of the non-refugees and 21% of the refugees, 
while UNRWA mainly provides these services to refugees (65%) and to only 1% of the non-refugee 
respondents.
 Poverty level (poverty3)
The Palestinian Authority’s education services seem to be quite equally provided to Palestinians across 
the poverty levels, with 47% of the hardship cases, 53% of the respondents with a family income below the 
poverty line and 48% of those above the poverty line having beneﬁted from these services in the past six
months. The poorer sections of society (41% hardship cases, 38% below the poverty line) more so than 
those Palestinians with a household monthly income level above the poverty line (22%) seem to beneﬁt
from schooling provided by UNRWA. Those respondents with a living standard above the poverty line 
rely more for education on Islamic organizations (8%), local NGOs (7%), and international organizations 
(4%).
7.3.1 The overall situation
Figure 7-36 Educational attainment (both o056 and educ) in general
As illustrated in ﬁgure 7.36, above, 4% of the respondents said that they are illiterate, 8% stated that
they only went to elementary school, and 17% speciﬁed that they only went to preparatory school. About
33% of the respondents ﬁnished secondary school, while a relatively high percentage either attained
some level of college education (25%) or college and above (13%). For the purposes of analysis in this 
study, the various levels of education were categorized into three categories: low education (illiterate and 
elementary), medium education (preparatory and secondary), and high education (some college, and 
college and above). When the various levels of educational attainment are grouped in such a manner, one 
can see that 11% of the total sample of interviewees are low educated, 50% are medium educated and 
39% are highly educated.
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When examining the educational attainment among Palestinians according to gender, one can see that 
a higher percentage of women than men are low (15% vs. 9%) or medium (52% vs. 48%) educated, 
while a higher percentage of men than women obtained high education (43% vs. 34%). These results are 
overviewed in ﬁgure 7.37, below.
Figure 7-37 Educational attainment (educ) according to gender
7.3.2 Educational attainment according to place of residence 
Educational attainment also differs signiﬁcantly according to the region, place and area of residence of the
interviewees. First, according to region of residence, in the sample the lowest level of education can be 
found in Jerusalem, followed by the West Bank, while the highest level of education is in the Gaza Strip. 
Indeed, whereas 16% of the Jerusalemites are low educated, this is the case for 12% in the West Bank 
and only 9% in the Gaza Strip. Conversely, while only 26% of Jerusalemites and 37% of the respondents 
in the West Bank obtained high educational levels, this is the case for 45% of the Gaza Strip respondents. 
Secondly, when taking the analysis a step further into place of residence, it appears that the highest 
percentage of low educated respondents reside in West Bank refugee camps (23%), while the lowest 
percentage of low educated and the highest percentage of respondents with high levels of education 
reside in the Gaza Strip, both inside (respectively 9% low and 47% high) and outside refugee camps 
(respectively 8% low and 45% high). Thirdly, the analysis according to area of residence reveals that the 
lowest level of education can be found in the refugee camps, followed by villages, while the highest level 
of education can be found in cities. The results on educational attainment according to region, place and 
area of residence are detailed in ﬁgure 7.38, below.
Figure 7-38 Educational attainment (Educ) according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place) and 
area of residence (o060)
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7.3.3 Education and place of work 
There seems to be a correlation between the level of educational attainment and the place of work of the 
respondents. As illustrated in ﬁgure 7.39, below, a considerably higher percentage of medium educated
respondents than high educated respondents rely on the Israeli labor market and, as such, are employed 
in Israel proper or in settlements. The highest percentage of low educated seem to work either in Israel 
proper or in Jerusalem, while the high educated more so than the low and medium educated seem to rely 
on the Palestinian labor market in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.
Figure 7-39 Educational attainment (educ) according to place of work (o011v2) of those who are employed and 
unemployed
7.3.4 Education and income 
There is a clear statistical signiﬁcance between the level of education and income as a considerably
higher percentage of respondents with a high level of education (59%) than those with medium (35%) or 
low (38%) levels of education enjoy a living standard above the poverty line. Logically, this implies that the 
majority of 63% of the low educated respondents and 65% of the medium educated respondents come 
from a household with a monthly income that falls below the poverty line, whereas this is the case for ‘only’ 
41% of the high educated respondents. The overall results are overviewed in table 7.5, below.
Table 7-5 Educational attainment (Educ) according to poverty level (poverty3)
Poverty level
Above poverty line Below poverty line Total
Low 38% 63% 100%
Medium 35% 65% 100%
High 59% 41% 100%
Total 45% 55% 100%
There is also a very strong correlation between the level of education of Palestinians and their ability to 
maintain jobs, or – in case of job loss – to change employment. The results in table 7.6, below, indicate 
that a far higher percentage of high educated than low or medium educated managed to retain their 
employment. More speciﬁcally, whereas in the past six months 89% of the high educated remained in the
same job, this was the case for 57% of the medium educated and only 50% of the low educated. Also, 
whereas a mere 5% of the high educated lost their employment in the past six months, this was the case 
for 24% of the medium educated and 28% of the low educated respondents. In comparison with the results 
in report 7, it is worth noting that there is a considerable increase in the ability of both low and medium 
educated respondents to change their employment after having lost their job in the past six months. 
Indeed, in the survey of February 2004, a mere 8% of the low educated and 12% of the medium educated 
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managed to change their employment after having lost their job, while this is the case now for 22% of the 
low educated and 19% of the medium educated.
Table 7-6 Educational attainment (Educ) and change in the employment situation (o012v2)
Change in employment situation in the past six months
No Changed Lost job Total
Low 50% 22% 28% 100%
Medium 57% 19% 24% 100%
High 89% 7% 5% 100%
Total 71% 13% 16% 100%
7.4 Conclusion
The main ﬁndings concerning health and education can be summarized as follows:
• Health and education have kept the same importance since February 2004 as household needs, 
but have lost importance as community needs. Compared to other types of unmet household 
needs, health and education are not high on the priority list, which might suggest that these needs 
are already quite well catered for. However, when one looks at the households’ ﬁve main expense
types, it is hard not to overestimate the importance of health and education as expense types in 
Palestinian households.
• The main three factors inﬂuencing Palestinians’ choice of a health facility are (1) because they are
only insured to receive services from a speciﬁc facility (51%), (2) because they are not insured and
services in a certain facility are either cheaper or free (16%), and (3) because they trust the quality 
of care in the health facility of their choice (11%). The lowest percentage of Palestinians choosing 
their health facility based on the ﬁrst reason can be found in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps,
among refugees, among those with a monthly household income that falls below the poverty line, 
and among the high educated.
• Concerning drugs prescription and provision for both chronic and acute problems in the past six 
months, the results indicate that the need for drugs treating chronic diseases is higher than the need 
for drugs treating acute problems. The need for drugs treating both chronic and acute problems 
is most pressing among the older generation, among the poorer segments of society, and within 
the refugee camps both in the Gaza Strip and – especially - in the West Bank.  In the sample, 
the highest percentage of respondents that were prescribed drugs in the past six months for both 
chronic and acute problems, but were not provided with it can be found in the Gaza Strip refugee 
camps.
• In 85% of the Palestinian households nobody is impaired. In the 15% of households that include 
impaired persons, 76% have one person impaired, 22% have two persons impaired, while 3% have 
three or more impaired household members. When considering the type of impairment in all age 
groups, 44% are physically impaired, 42% are visually impaired, and 14% are mentally impaired. 
When considering impairment among children of 14 years or younger, 48% are physically impaired, 
27% are visually impaired, and 25% are mentally impaired. As for the cause of impairment in 
all age groups, 56% are impaired since birth, 21% are impaired from an accident, and 22% are 
impaired as a result of the Intifada. When looking at the cause of impairment in the age group of 
children aged 14 years or younger, 76% have been impaired since birth, 12% are impaired through 
an accident, and 13% are impaired as a result of the Intifada.
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• Concerning the need for any of the six types of medical care in the past six months under review 
in this report, and compared to results on a similar question in the February 2004 survey, the need 
for hospitalization, the need for an ambulance and the need for birth care have all considerably 
decreased. The need for specialized care and physical rehabilitation has increased since February 
2004. With the exception of the need for ambulances, all different types of needs under study have 
been highest in the Gaza Strip. Except for the need of birth care, all different types of needs for 
medical care have been lowest in villages. Overall, no real patterns could be established about the 
restrictions, denials or delays faced in the provision of the six types of medical care being more 
prevalent in one or other subgroup of Palestinian society.
• Concerning the level of satisfaction among beneﬁciaries with four different types of health services,
78% were satisﬁed with hospital services, 81% were satisﬁed with primary health care, 77% were
satisﬁed with the specialized care, while 79% were satisﬁed with the ambulance services. The
level of satisfaction by beneﬁciaries with those four health services has increased in comparison
to the results on a similar question in the February 2004 survey. Regarding the providers of these 
four different types of health services, in general, the results indicated that the PA and – to a 
lesser extent – UNRWA, are the main providers, with the exception of ambulance services where 
UNRWA’s place is preceded by international organizations and local NGOs.
• Governmental health coverage and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main providers of 
assistance through covering Palestinians‘ medical expenses. The analysis further indicates that a 
higher percentage of households in the West Bank – particularly those residing outside camps and 
in villages in that region – than those in the Gaza Strip cover their medical expenses from their own 
resources or even resort to delaying the payment of their fees.
• Concerning education, 85% of the beneﬁciaries are satisﬁed with their education services.
The PA and UNRWA are the main providers of such services, with the PA focusing its attention 
mostly on the non-refugee population outside camps and UNRWA mainly targeting the refugee 
population whether inside or outside camps. Furthermore, the largest portion of Palestinians with 
high educational levels can be found in cities and in the Gaza Strip. The low and the medium 
educated tend to rely more on the Israeli labor market, while the high educated rely more on the 
Palestinian labor market. Moreover, the low and medium educated are far less able to maintain 
their employment than the high educated. Still, in comparison to the results in Report Seven, there 
is a considerable increase in the ability of both low and medium educated respondents to change 
their employment after having lost their job. Finally, the results indicated that the low and medium 
educated are more likely than the high educated to belong to households with an income level that 
falls below the poverty line. 
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8.1 Impact of the Intifada on women
Part 8 of the study is focusing on issues pertaining to women and children.
In the ﬁrst section on women, all issues where cross-tabulation with the independent variable of gender
shows a statistically signiﬁcant difference will be discussed. In addition and more concretely, the main
focus in this section lies on the employment situation of women.
In the section pertaining to the impact of the Intifada on children, several main issues will be addressed 
such as child labor and children’s contribution to domestic activities, the two most important needs of 
children, children and education, and children and their diet.
8.1.1 In general
As has been the case in previous report, speciﬁc
issues discussed elsewhere in the report are not 
examined according to the independent variable of 
gender as, usually, opinions between male and female 
respondents do not differ in a signiﬁcant manner. As
such, they are overviewed in this section. However, 
important differences in opinion according to gender 
with regard to both employment and children will be 
discussed in the appropriate sections of this chapter. 
First, however, it was thought worthwhile to include 
some general information about women in the 
household structure. As overviewed in ﬁgure 8.1,
adjacent, on average, Palestinian households 
count 1.7 women over the age of 18. Translated 
into percentages, this implies that only 1% of the 
households included in the sample have no women 
over the age of 18 years, 51% of the households have 
only one woman older than 18 years, 31% have two 
women, 12% count three women, 4% count four women, while only 1% of the households in the sample 
count more than four women older than 18.
Moving on to the overview of issues where gender makes an important difference in the opinions of 
respondents, it is clear that female and male respondents attach varying degrees of importance to the 
unmet needs of the household. Whereas 34% of the male respondents believe that employment is the most 
important unmet need in the household, this is the case for 29% of the female respondents. Furthermore, 
the results detailed in ﬁgure 8.2, below, show that food, health and ﬁnancial assistance are important
unmet needs for a higher percentage of female respondents than their male counterparts.
Figure 8-2: Most important unmet household needs (o180) according to gender (o061)
Figure 8-1: Number of women living in the household
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Another difference in opinion between male and female respondents concerns their evaluation of received 
assistance, whereby a higher percentage of female interviewees than male interviewees evaluated the 
received assistance positively. These results are detailed in ﬁgure 8.3, below.
Figure 8-3: General level of satisfaction with received assistance (o037) by gender (o061)
Gender was also a relevant variable with regard to the issue of the reception of personal employment 
assistance, and even concerning the speciﬁc types of employment assistance that respondents personally
beneﬁted from such as short-term jobs and unemployment funds.As illustrated in ﬁgure 8.4, below, whereas
of the male respondents, 23% personally received employment assistance, 11% personally received 
short-term jobs, and 15% personally received unemployment funds, among the female respondents the 
percentages that beneﬁted from such types of assistance are far lower at respectively 13%, 6% and 7%.
Figure 8-4: Reception of personal employment assistance (o024), short-term job assistance (o024b) and 
unemployment funds (o024c) according to gender (o061)
Also concerning the most important source of information, men and women’s opinions differ signiﬁcantly.
The results overviewed in ﬁgure 8.5, below, a higher percentage of female respondents than male
respondents rely on local media (Palestinian TV and radio) and their friends and relatives as the most 
important sources of information. Conversely, a higher percentage of male than female respondents stated 
that their most important source is the al-Jazeera satellite TV station, or al-Quds newspaper, or political/
religious factions. About the same level of importance was attached by male and female interviewees to 
the remaining sources of information.
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Figure 8-5: Most important sources of information (o136v3a) according to gender (o061)
1.1.2 Women and employment
Although issues related to employment and the labor market have been discussed in detail in Part Three 
of the report, it is valuable to take a closer look at some of these issues from a gender perspective. This 
is the main aim of this section.
Women and employment in general
The results in this section provide a general overview of women’s share in employment and their contribution 
to domestic chores. The results will clearly indicate that most women’s occupation is to be a mother and 
housewife, but it still remains interesting to also have a closer look at the minority of women who are 
involved in the labor market.
Respondents were asked whether the main breadwinner in the household is male or female or whether 
both males and females in the household are signiﬁcantly contributing to the household.1 In general, a 
large majority of 87% of the respondents stated that the male is the main breadwinner, 6% said that the 
female is the main breadwinner, while 7% of the respondents speciﬁed that both contribute signiﬁcantly
to the household. When looking at the issue of the main breadwinner according to different independent 
variables at hand, signiﬁcant differences in the answers appear according to area of residence, poverty
and educational level, and age. As overviewed in ﬁgure 8.6, below, the highest percentage of households
where the man is the main breadwinner can be found in villages (92%), among the poorer segments 
of society, among the medium educated (93%), and among the youngest age group of 18-24 years 
(93%). Furthermore, the results indicate that the percentage of households where the woman is the 
main breadwinner is about the same in cities (7%) and in refugee camps (7%), while the percentage of 
households with a female main breadwinner is the highest among those with a monthly income above the 
poverty line (8%), among the low educated (13%), and among those who are 50 years or older (15%). 
The percentage of respondents who speciﬁed that both men and women contribute signiﬁcantly to the
household is the highest in cities (10%), among the relatively better-off (12%), among the high educated 
(14%), and among those who fall in the age group of 25-49 years of age. 
1 It is important to note that the option of both females and males contributing signiﬁcantly to the household was not
read by the interviewer to the interviewee. As such, the interviewer only ticked this option in the questionnaire when 
respondents speciﬁcally stated that both males and females contribute signiﬁcantly to the household.
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Figure 8-6: The main breadwinner in the household (o196) according to area of residence (o060), poverty level 
(poverty3), educational level (educ), and age (agec)
When analyzing women’s share in domestic and economic work, it is clear, in general, that only a minority 
of 10% of the women in the household are not at all involved in domestic work (10%), while the large 
majority (83%) or not at all involved in economic activities. The results in ﬁgure 8.7, below, indicate that
the share of women involved in domestic work is quite equally divided between those who work between 
1-19 hours per week (29%), those who work between 20-39 hours per week (31%), and those who work 
40 hours and more per week in the house (30%). As for women’s economic activity, the lowest percentage 
(4%) concerns the women who work 40 hours or more per week.
The respondents were asked to specify for each woman in the household whether or not they are involved 
in either domestic or economic activities, and, if so, for how many hours per week. These detailed results 
are also displayed in ﬁgure 8.7, below. In general, it is worthwhile noting that the older women in the
household (woman #1) are least frequently involved in domestic work, while they are most frequently 
involved in economic activity. On the opposite, it is the younger female household members (woman #5 
and woman #6) who take more often care of the domestic work and least often are involved in economic 
activities.
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Figure 8-7: Women domestic and economic work 
Type of employment and place of work according to gender
Generally, it is clear that women can be found more in certain types of employment and less in other types. 
As illustrated in ﬁgure 8.8, below, in the Palestinian labor market, women are seen more often than men
in the role of employees (59% vs. 30%) and professionals (6% vs. 4%). Men are more often employed 
as skilled (33% vs. 14%) or unskilled workers (12% vs. 7%) or technicians (9% vs. 6%) than their female 
counterparts. Also in this sample, a higher percentage of employed males than employed females are self-
employed (12% vs. 6%)
Figure 8-8: Occupation (o009) according to gender (o061)
Women & Children 183
Also, when examining type of employment from the perspective of the type of employer, there are clear 
differences according to gender. The government (33% vs. 21%), international agencies (7% vs. 3%), 
international NGOs (3% vs. 2%) and local NGOs (4% vs. 3%) are more frequently the employers of 
female employees than male employees. Furthermore, in this sample, a higher percentage of males than 
females are employed in the private sector (34% vs. 31%), in agricultural petty trade (6% vs. 3%), and in 
manufacture petty trade (11%vs. 6%), while also a considerably higher percentage of males (22%) than 
females (13%) are self-employed.
Figure 8-9: Type of employer (or last type) (o063v2) according to gender (o061)
For the ﬁrst time in this report, employed respondents were asked how they heard about their current
employment. The results in ﬁgure 8.10, below, show that about the same percentage of males and females
(about 25%) heard about their employment from the newspaper or the radio, while the highest percentage 
of male (48%) and female (55%) respondents heard about their current employment from relatives and 
friends. Furthermore, a considerably higher percentage of female (8%) than male (2%) respondents heard 
about their current employment through PA ministries, while a far higher percentage of male (24%) than 
female (9%) interviewees speciﬁed that they are employed in the family business.
Figure 8-10: How did you hear about current employment?, according to gender (o061)
When looking at the total sample, the employment situation also signiﬁcantly differs according to gender.
As the results in ﬁgure 8.11, below, overview, a higher percentage of male respondents than female
respondents are not employed (19% vs. 6%), while 61% of the female interviewees are housewives. 
When examining the employed, it is clear that a higher percentage of the male respondents than female 
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respondents are full-time employed (37% vs. 15%), part-time employed (12% vs. 6%) or employed for a 
few hours a day (18% vs. 4%). In the sample, about an equal percentage of male and female interviewees 
are students (9% vs. 8%).
Figure 8-11: Employment situation (o008v2) according to gender (o061)
When examining the issue of the main place of work of the employed interviewees according to gender, 
one can notice that a signiﬁcantly higher percentage of males than females work in Israel proper (16% vs.
7%), while a higher percentage of female than male employed interviewees work in the West Bank (52% 
vs. 46%) and in the Gaza Strip (32% vs. 29%). These results could suggest that working women more 
so than working men have their place of work closer to where they reside. These results are portrayed in 
ﬁgure 8.12, below.
Figure 8-12: Main place of work (or last place) (o011v2) according to gender (o061)
Also, it appears that when women are employed their job matches their technical or academic training 
more so than is the case with employed men. Indeed, the results in ﬁgure 8.13, below, indicate that 64%
of the female respondents afﬁrmed that their current job fully matches their technical or academic training,
while only 53% of the male respondents felt that this is the case for them. Furthermore, whereas 21% 
of the male interviewees speciﬁed that their current job does not at all match their training, only 14% of
women were of this opinion concerning their job.
Figure 8-13: Job matches technical or academic training (o245) according to gender (o061)
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Loss of employment according to gender
Loss of employment, and the manner or the effort Palestinians invest in trying to ﬁnd another job, clearly
varies according to gender. When interviewees were asked whether or not their employment situation 
had changed in the past six months, a higher percentage of female respondents than male respondents 
(79% vs. 68%) managed to maintain their job. Furthermore, as overviewed in ﬁgure 8.14, below, a
higher percentage of male respondents (19%) than female respondents (7%) has lost their job, while the 
percentage of male and female respondents who managed to change their employment in the past six 
months is quite similar (13% vs. 14%).
Figure 8-14: Change in employment situation in the past six months (o012v2) according to gender (o061)
Among the unemployed respondents, men clearly tried much harder than their female counterparts to ﬁnd
different employment. As illustrated in ﬁgure 8.15, below, of the male unemployed 75% tried very hard to
ﬁnd another job, while only 13% did not try at all to seek alternative employment. In comparison, only 34%
of the female unemployed tried a lot to ﬁnd work and 53% did not try at all to ﬁnd employment.
Figure 8-15: Attempts to find a job (o014) according to gender (o061)
As the results in table 8.1, below, indicate, the reasons for not searching for alternative employment vary 
considerably according to gender. The main reasons for men not to search for another job include: (1) 
ﬁnancial conditions of the job (37%), (2) lack of job opportunities (24%), and studying (16%). The reasons
for women not to look for another job are totally different, with a majority of 57% of the female respondents 
arguing that they want to devote more time for home commitments and children. Interesting in this sample 
is that an as high percentage of female respondents as male respondents cite that they did not really 
search for employment because they want to devote time for studying (16%).
Table 8-1: Main reason for not trying or not trying very hard to find a job (o140) according to gender (o061)
Reasons for not searching for another job Gender Total
Male Female
1. Devote time for studying 16% 16% 16%
2. Devote time for home commitments/kids 7% 57% 33%
3. Old age 1% 0% 1%
4. Because of sickness 5% 0% 2%
5. Lack of job opportunities 24% 8% 16%
6. Because of ﬁnancial conditions 37% 13% 25%
7. I am waiting to travel abroad 7% 1% 4%
8. Personal reasons 1% 6% 4%
9. No one helped me to get a job 1% 0% 1%
Total (n=173) 100% 100% 100%
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8.2 Impact of the Intifada on children
This section on children will be devoted to several 
aspects related to children, including child labor, 
children’s two most important needs, education, 
and children’s diet. First, however, it was thought 
worthwhile to include some general information about 
children in the household structure. As overviewed 
in ﬁgure 8.16, adjacent, on average, Palestinian
households count 2.64 children below the age of 18. 
Translated into percentages, this implies that 19% 
of the households included in the sample have no 
children below the age of 18, 10% of the households 
have only one child younger than 18 years, 19% have 
two children, 20% count three children, 14% count 
four children, 10% have ﬁve children, 4% have six
children, while 3% of the households in the sample 
have seven or more children below the age of 18. 
Simpliﬁed, these percentages indicate that 68% of
the households  do not have more than three children 
below the age of eighteen.
1.1.1 Children and employment
The results in this section provide a general overview of children’s share in employment and their contribution 
to domestic chores. 
When analyzing children’s share in domestic and economic work, it is clear, in general, that only a minority 
of 14% of the children below the age of 18 in the household are involved in domestic work, while an even 
lower percentage of 3% are involved in economic activities. Indeed, with regard to children’s domestic work, 
the results in ﬁgure 8.17, below, indicate that 86% of the children below the age of 18 in the household
do not get involved in domestic chores. Of the remainder, 11% work between 1 to 19 hours per week at 
home, while 3% work between 20 to 39 hours per week in the house. With regard to children’s economic 
activities, 97% of the children below the age of 18 in the household are not engaged in any economic 
activity. Of the remainder, 2% are economically active between 1 and 19 hours per week, while 1% is 
involved in economic activity between 20 and 39 hours per week. 
Figure 8-17: Number of hours children below the age of 18 are involved in domestic work and in economic activity, 
in general
Figure 8-16: Number of children below the age of 
eighteen living in the household
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DOMESTIC WORK
The respondents were asked to specify for each child in the household whether or not they are involved 
in either domestic or economic activities, and, if so, for how many hours per week. The detailed results 
pertaining to children’s domestic activities are displayed in ﬁgure 8.18, below. In general, the results illustrate
that the older the children are, the more they do domestic chores in the household. On the opposite, the 
younger children in the household are performing less domestic chores than their older brothers or sisters. 
It is, however, worthwhile noting that although the analysis concerns children below the age of 18, the 
median age of the children is important to keep in mind. More speciﬁcally, the median age of child #1 in the
household is 13 years, the median of child #2 in the household is 10 years, while the median age of child 
#3 in the household is only 7 years.
Figure 8-18: Child domestic work
When one examines the issue of domestic work of children below the age of 18 for the three oldest 
children in the household according to gender, one can see that the girls in the household much more than 
the boys get involved in domestic chores. The results in ﬁgure 8.19, below, illustrate that 89% of the oldest
boys compared to 47% of the oldest girls in the household do no domestic chores whatsoever. Still looking 
at the oldest child, 37% of the girls compared to only 11% of the boys help between 1 to 19 hours a week 
in domestic work, while 14% of the girls and none of the boys work between 20 to 39 hours a week in 
domestic chores. The same trends are noticeable when examining domestic work of the second and third 
oldest child in the household according to gender. They are overviewed in the ﬁgure, below.
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Figure 8-19: Domestic work of children below the age of 18 according to gender
The respondents were also asked to specify for each child in the household whether or not they are 
involved in economic activities, and, if so, for how many hours per week. The detailed results pertaining to 
children’s economic activities are displayed in ﬁgure 8.20, below. In general, the results illustrate that the
older the children are, the more they get involved in economic work. On the opposite, the younger children 
in the household are less often doing any economic activity than their older brothers or sisters. Again, it is 
worth remembering that although the analysis concerns children below the age of 18, the median age of 
the children is important to keep in mind. More speciﬁcally, the median age of child #1 in the household
is 13 years, the median of child #2 in the household is 10 years, while the median age of child #3 in the 
household is only 7 years.
Figure 8-20: Child economic work
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Furthermore, when one looks at the issue of children’s’ involvement into economic activity according to 
gender, it is quite unexpected to see that the oldest girls (6%) in the household slightly more so than the 
oldest boys (5%) are involved in economic activity. This is no longer the case when one focuses on the 
second oldest child in the household, where a higher percentage of boys (5%) than girls (2) are involved 
in economic activity.
The interviewees were also asked about their various strategies used in order to be able to cope with 
the hardship.2 In answering this question, the respondents were given the opportunity to specify from a 
predetermined list which coping strategies they had used. In this list, there was one question asking the 
interviewees whether or not they had sent more household members below the age of 18 into the labor 
market.
In general, 6% of the respondents stated that they had sent more household members below the age of 
18 into the labor market as a method to deal with the hardship. It is worth remembering here, that this 
percentage has dropped signiﬁcantly over the past 18 months as in September 2003 this percentage still
stood at 16% and in February 2004 the percentage still reached 10%.
As illustrated in ﬁgure 8.21, below, there are clear differences in the percentage of respondents that opted
for sending children below the age of 18 into the labor market as a coping strategy according to their region 
and place of residence, and their poverty level. According to region, the percentage of households sending 
children below the age of 18 into the labor market is highest in the Gaza Strip (8%), followed by the those 
in the West Bank (5%), while this coping mechanism is least frequently used in households in Jerusalem 
(1%). Furthermore, within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a higher percentage of households residing 
in refugee camps than those residing outside camps have opted to send children below the age of 18 into 
the labor market as a strategy to cope with the hardship. Finally, the reliance on the strategy of sending 
children below the age of 18 to work expands with an increase in poverty. More concretely, whereas 3% 
of households with a family income above the poverty line sent children below the age of 18 into the labor 
market as a coping strategy, this percentage doubles to 6% among households with a living standard 
below the poverty line and swells to 12% among households living in hardship.
Figure 8-21: Children below the age of 18 in the labor market as a coping strategy (o131f) in general, according to 
region of residence (o059), place of residence (place), and poverty level (poverty3)
2 Coping strategies of Palestinian households were discussed in more detail in Part Two of this report.
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8.2.2 Children and needs
Since the outbreak of the Intifada over four years ago, the Perception reports have been monitoring the 
most important needs of children in the household. For the current report, parents were not only asked 
to specify from a predetermined list of needs what their children’s ﬁrst most important need is, but they
also had to spell out their children’s second most important need. As such, the analysis, below, will study 
both the results of the two most important needs of children together and will also consider the ﬁrst most
important need separately.
When the two most important needs of children in the household are examined together, attending school 
regularly (67%) is by far the most frequently cited need, followed by the need for safe opportunities to 
play (53%) and the need for psychological support for the children (40%). In comparison, the need for 
unrestricted access to medical care (18%) and the need for children to eat better (12%) or more (9%) than 
before the Intifada seem relatively less relevant to parents.
When one looks at the ﬁrst and second most important need separately, the results in ﬁgure 8.22, below,
clearly illustrate that the need for children to attend school regularly is by far more frequently mentioned as 
a ﬁrst need (52%) than as a second need (15%) for children. The opposite is true for the need of children
to have safe opportunities to play, to get psychological support, and to get unrestricted access to medical 
services. They are all more frequently mentioned by parents as a second most important need than as a 
ﬁrst most important need.
Figure 8-22: The two most important needs of the children in the household (o105v3a, o105v3b) in general
When analyzing the two most important needs of children together according to the region in which the 
parents of those children reside, one can see that the need for children to attend school regularly is 
important to a higher percentage of parents in the West Bank (73%) and Jerusalem (74%) than it is to 
parents in the Gaza Strip (58%), while the importance of the need for children to have safe opportunities 
to play is more important in the Gaza Strip (60%) than it is in the West Bank (49%) and Jerusalem (51%). 
The importance of the needs for children to receive psychological support and to eat better than before the 
Intifada is markedly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and Jerusalem, while the importance 
attached by parents to the need of their children to get unrestricted access to medical care is the lowest 
in the Gaza Strip.
When examining the ﬁrst important need of children separately, the results indicate the same trends as 
when one examines the two most important needs together. Still, it is worth noting that the importance 
attached to children receiving psychological support as a ﬁrst most important need is signiﬁcantly higher
in the Gaza Strip (17%) than in the West Bank (8%) and Jerusalem (5%). These results are overviewed in 
ﬁgure 8.23, below.
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Figure 8-23: The two most important needs of the children in the household (o105v3a, o105v3b) according to region 
of residence (o059)
When analyzing the two most important needs of children in the household together according to the area 
of residence in which the respondents parents reside, the results in ﬁgure 8.24, below, indicate that the
need for children to attend school regularly, the need for children to have safe opportunities to play, and the 
need for children to have unrestricted access to medical services are more of concern to parents in villages 
than to parents in cities and refugee camps. The lowest percentage of parents attaching importance to 
the need for their children to receive psychological support can be found in refugee camps, while in these 
camps one can detect the highest of parents giving high importance to their children eating better than 
before the Intifada.
The importance attached to various needs of children whether as a ﬁrst most important need or a second
most important need, are overviewed in detail and separately in the ﬁgure below.
Figure 8-24: The two most important needs of the children in the household (o105v3a, o105v3b) according to area 
of residence (o060)
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As no additional questions were asked about children and their need for psychological support in this report, 
it was thought useful to single out this need and have a closer look. In general, 11% of the respondent 
parents still consider psychological support to be the ﬁrst most important need of their children.As illustrated
in ﬁgure 8.25, below, the extent of this perceived need differs signiﬁcantly according to the region and area
of residence of the respondents. A far higher percentage of parents in the Gaza Strip (17%) than parents 
in the West Bank (8%) and Jerusalem (5%) speciﬁed that psychological support is the ﬁrst most important
need for their children. Also, a higher percentage of parents in cities (14%) and refugee camps (11%) than 
in villages (8%) consider that psychological support is the ﬁrst most important need of their children.
Figure 8-25: The first most important need (o105v3a), in general and according to region (o059) and area of 
residence (o060)
8.2.3 Children and education
Although this section traditionally deals with the children’s ability or inability to reach school and their 
presence in or absence from school, this time it also includes children’s activities during the summer 
holidays as this report also covers the period of June, July and August 2004.
In broad terms, 81% of the respondent parents 
stated that their children played in the neighborhood, 
49% reported that their children attended summer 
camp, 21% said that they attended clubs, while 
20% conveyed that their children attended remedial 
classes. As further illustrated in ﬁgure 8.26, below,
6% of the parents said that their children had 
been working during the holidays, while a mere 
5% of the children seems to have traveled abroad. 
Compared to the results on the same question in 
report 6 of October 2003, 20% more parents in the 
survey conducted for the current report stated that 
their children played in the neighborhood during 
the summer, while the percentage of parents who 
speciﬁed that their children have worked during the
holidays has halved since October 2003.
When examining the various listed activities of children during the summer holidays according to different 
relevant variables, many interesting ﬁndings and differences appear. For the purpose of clarity, each of the
listed activities will hereunder be discussed separately according to the different variables that by cross-
tabulation have proved to be statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 8-26: Children’s activities during the summer 
vacation of 2004 (o086a until o086f), in general
Women & Children 193
Concerning children playing in the neighborhood, there are signiﬁcant differences when examining the
answers according to the region of residence of the respondents, and the poverty and educational level of 
the respondent parents. As illustrated in ﬁgure 8.27, below, about the same percentage of children in the
West Bank (82%) and the Gaza Strip (83%) played in the neighborhood last summer, while this was least 
the case in Jerusalem (66%). Furthermore, a considerably higher percentage of children in households 
facing hardship played in the neighborhood last summer (90%) than children in households below the 
poverty line (83%) and above the poverty line (72%). The occurrence of children mainly playing in the 
neighborhood appears higher in households where the respondent has a low level of education (86%) than 
in households where the respondent has a medium (83%) or high level (77%) of education.
Figure 8-27: Children playing in the neighborhood during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086a) according to region 
of residence (o059), poverty level (poverty) and educational level (educ)
Attendance of summer camps is clearly highest in the Gaza Strip (55%) and is at about the same level in 
Jerusalem (46%) as it is in the West Bank (44%). Furthermore, a higher percentage of parents with a high 
level of education (56%) than parents with a medium (45%) or low (39%) level of education reported that 
their children had attended summer camp during the summer holidays.
Figure 8-28: Children attending summer camp during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086b) according to region of 
residence (o059) and educational level (educ)
With regard to children going to clubs during the summer vacation of 2004, the percentage is the lowest in 
the Gaza Strip (14%), in the refugee camps (13%), among refugees (15%), among the poorest (12%) and 
amongst the lowest educated (11%). The results are overviewed in the ﬁgure, below.
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Figure 8-29: Children going to clubs during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086c) according to region of residence 
(o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)
Concerning children attending remedial classes during the summer vacation of 2004, the lowest percentage 
of children attending such classes can be found in Jerusalem (9%). When analyzing this issue according 
to place of residence, the results show that attendance of remedial classes is lower in the Gaza Strip than 
it is in the West Bank, and within those regions, attendance by children of remedial classes is lower inside 
camps than outside camps. Also, the results in ﬁgure 8.30, below, illustrate that a higher percentage of
respondent parents how are relatively better-off and have a higher level of education than parents how are 
poorer and are less educated have sent their children to remedial classes in the last summer holidays.
Figure 8-30: Children attending remedial classes during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086d) according to region of 
residence (o059), place of residence (place), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)
As for children working during the summer of 2004, there are visible differences according to the region of 
residence of the respondents. As the results in table 8.2, below, indicate, about the same percentage of 
parents in the West Bank (6%) and the Gaza Strip (7%) stated that their children had been working during 
the summer vacation of 2004, while none of the parents residing in Jerusalem said that this had been the 
case.
Table 8-2: Children working during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086e) according to region of residence (o059)
Region of residence Children working during summer vacation
No Yes Total
West Bank 94% 6% 100%
Jerusalem 100% 0% 100%
Gaza Strip 93% 7% 100%
Total 94% 6% 100%
Lastly, concerning children traveling abroad during the summer vacation of 2004, not unexpectedly the 
results show that the percentage of children traveling abroad during that period is highest in households 
who can afford it (9%) and among the respondent parents with a high level of education (9%). These 
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results are overviewed in the ﬁgure 8-31, below.
Figure 8-31: Children attending remedial classes during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086f) according to poverty 
level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)
Moving on from the summer holidays to the beginning of the school year, interviewees with school-age 
children were asked how often in the past six months their children had been unable to attend school or 
were late to school due to curfews and closures. In general, 71% of the respondents replied that it in past 
six months their children had never or almost never been unable to attend school or arrived late as a result 
of closures or curfews. Of the remainder of the respondents, 24% said that their children were unable to 
go to school or arrived late less than ten times a month, while 5% stated that this happened ten times or 
more a month in the past six months. 
Figure 8-32: Frequency in the past six months of the inability to attend school or late arrivals due to curfews/
closures (o113b), in general and according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place), area of 
residence (o060), and poverty level (poverty3)
As overviewed in ﬁgure 8.32, above, the inability to attend school or late arrival at school due to curfews
or closures varies considerably according to the respondents’ region, place and area of residence, and 
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the poverty level of the household. Concretely, a markedly higher percentage of respondents in Jerusalem 
(93%) than in the West Bank (69%) and the Gaza Strip (67%) said that their children were never or 
almost never unable to reach school or late at school as a result of curfews or closures. More speciﬁcally,
the results indicate that the main places were parents faced trouble sending their children to school are 
the refugee camps, both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, it is in the villages (83%) 
that the highest percent of respondents relaying that their children were never or almost never unable to 
attend school or arrived late due to curfews or closures can be found. Lastly, a distinctly higher percentage 
of parent respondents in households with a living standard above the poverty line (82%) than those in 
households with a monthly income below the poverty line (70%) or those facing extreme poverty (57%) 
explained that their children were never or almost never unable to attend school or arrived late due to 
curfews or closures. In short, these results seem to indicate that the main trouble spots for attending 
school in the past six months are in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in particular in the refugee camps 
in those regions and among the poor.
For the ﬁrst time in this report, parents were also asked whether or not their children in the past six
months had been absent from school for more than two weeks for other reasons than illness or Israeli 
measures.3 In general, 14% of the respondent parents replied that this had been the case. However, the 
results in ﬁgure 8.33, below, clearly show that the issue of children being absent from school for over two
weeks since the beginning of the school year for other reasons than illness or Israeli measures is most 
prevalent in the Gaza Strip (19%), in refugee camps (28%), among refugees (19%), and among those 
facing hardship (22%). 
Figure 8-33: Children in the household absent from school for more than two weeks since the beginning of 
the school year for reasons other than illness or Israeli measures (o192), in general and according to region of 
residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3)
3 It is worth mentioning here that in October 2004 over 4,000 UNRWA employees in the West Bank and in the 
northern Gaza Strip launched a strike in a dispute over the increase of salaries. This strike might have had an 
impact on the absenteeism of children attending UNRWA schools.
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8.2.4  Children and their diet
Another ﬁrst-timer in this report is that parents were asked some questions about the eating and drinking
habits of their children. More speciﬁcally, respondents were asked how many meals a day the children
in the household take, and, also what the two main drinking water sources are for the children in the 
household who are aged 14 or less.
Concerning the number of meals a day, on average children have 3.12 meals a day (median =3.00). 
Although these results do not point to the quality of those meals a day, it is possible to deduce from these 
results that, in general, children in the occupied Palestinian territories are not underfed. The results are 
overviewed in table 8.3, below.
Table 8-3: Number of meals a day for children in the household (o253), in general
Number of meals a day for children in the household
N 1090
Mean 3.12
Median 3.00
Moving on to the two main drinking water sources for children aged 14 or younger, when one looks only at 
the ﬁrst main drinking water source, it is clear that the ﬁrst three sources of drinking water are quite evenly
used as 20% of the respondents explained that their children drink mainly water from a public tap, 19% 
of the respondents said that the ﬁrst main drinking water source of their children is a protected well, while
18% stated that the main drinking water consists of piped water. However, when one merely considers the 
second main drinking water source of children of 14 years or less in the household, it is by and large piped 
water (65%). These results are overviewed in ﬁgure 8.34, below.
Figure 8-34: The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. 
(o193b, o193a), in general
Below, there are three tables with results that indicate several differences in the two main drinking water 
sources of children aged 14 or less in the household depending on the region and area of residence of 
the respondents and varying according to the refugee status of the respondents. The tables provide an in 
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depth view of the various differences, while the text merely refers to some main ﬁndings.
When examining the two main drinking water sources for children aged 14 years or less according to 
region, one can see from the results in table 8.4, below, that Westbankers far more than Jerusalemites and 
Gazans rely on protected wells and tanker trucks as their main drinking water sources. Respondents in the 
Gaza Strip far more than their colleagues in the West Bank and in Jerusalem speciﬁed vendor-provided
water as the main drinking water source of their children. The reliance on bottled water as a main drinking 
source for children aged 14 or less in the household is higher in Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip than it is 
in the West Bank.
Table 8-4: The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, 
o193a) according to region of residence (o059)
The two main drinking water sources for children (<15 yrs.)
Region of residence
Source of drinking water West Bank Jerusalem Gaza Strip
1st & 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Piped water 11% 74% 39% 67% 21% 53%
Public tap 25% 8% 21% 24% 15% 8%
Borehole or pump 5% 2% 7% 0% 2% 1%
Protected well 30% 13% 9% 1% 7% 1%
Protected spring or rain water 4% 1% 4% 0% 1% 1%
Vendor-provided water 2% 0% 0% 0% 33% 29%
Bottled water 7% 1% 20% 7% 15% 5%
Tanker trucks 16% 1% 1% 0% 6% 3%
Unprotected wells/springs 1% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
When looking at the two main drinking water sources for children aged 14 years or less according to area 
of residence, the results in table 8.5, below, show that respondents in villages considerably more than 
respondents in cities and camps rely on protected wells, boreholes or pumps, tanker trucks, and even 
protected rain or spring water as drinking water sources. Bottled water is more frequently used as a main 
drinking water source for children aged 14 or less in cities and camps than in villages.
Table 8-5: The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, 
o193a) according to area of residence (o060)
The two main drinking water sources for children (<15 yrs.)
Region of residence
Source of drinking water City Village Camp
1st & 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Piped water 20% 61% 13% 73% 19% 65%
Public tap 18% 12% 23% 8% 24% 8%
Borehole or pump 2% 2% 8% 2% 3% 1%
Protected well 17% 5% 27% 15% 7% 1%
Protected spring or rain water 1% 1% 6% 1% 1% 0%
Vendor-provided water 19% 15% 2% 1% 22% 20%
Bottled water 13% 5% 6% 2% 16% 2%
Tanker trucks 10% 1% 14% 1% 7% 4%
Unprotected wells/springs 1% 0% 3% 0% 2% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Finally, when considering the two main drinking water sources for children aged 14 years or less according 
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to the refugee status of the respondents, the results in table 8.6, below, indicate that refugees considerably 
more than non-refugees rely on vendor-provided water as their main water source. On the opposite, 
non-refugees more than refugees speciﬁed protected wells, bottled water and tanker trucks as the main
sources of drinking water for the children aged 14 or less in the household.
Table 8-6: The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, 
o193a) according to refugee status (o002)
The two main drinking water sources for children (<15 yrs.)
Region of residence
Source of drinking water Refugee Non-refugee
1st & 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Piped water 19% 61% 16% 69%
Public tap 19% 9% 22% 10%
Borehole or pump 3% 1% 4% 2%
Protected well 11% 3% 24% 10%
Protected spring or rain water 2% 1% 3% 1%
Vendor-provided water 21% 20% 9% 5%
Bottled water 5% 4% 9% 3%
Tanker trucks 9% 2% 12% 1%
Unprotected wells/springs 1% 0% 2% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
8.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, when examining speciﬁc issues related to women and children, a number of interesting
ﬁndings can be identiﬁed. These results are summarized in the bullets below.
• The average number of women over the age of eighteen in the Palestinian households is 1.7 
(median=1)
• In the majority of the households, the man is the main breadwinner. However, it is interesting to 
note that the highest percentage of households where the woman is the main breadwinner or 
where both males and females contribute signiﬁcantly to the household can be found among those
with a monthly household income above the poverty line.
• A large majority of 83% of women in the household are not at all involved in economic activities, 
while a minority of 10% of women in the household are not at all involved in domestic work. The 
older women in the household are least frequently involved in domestic work, while they are most 
frequently involved in economic activities. On the opposite, the younger female household members 
take most often care of the domestic work and are least often involved in economic activities.
• There are far less women than men in the labor market. However, women in the labor market less 
frequently than their male counterparts lost their jobs. Furthermore, when women are employed, 
their job matches their technical or academic training more so than is the case with employed 
men. When asked how they heard about their current employment, the main source of information 
seems to come from relatives and friends, followed by the newspaper and radio. Four times more 
employed men than women heard about their current employment through PA ministries. Lastly, 
once unemployed, women clearly tried less hard than men to ﬁnd alternative employment.
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• The average number of children below the age of eighteen in the Palestinian household is 2.64. 
Put differently, 68% of the households do not count more than three children below the age of 
eighteen.
• A minority of 14% of the children below the age of eighteen are involved in domestic chores, while 
an even lower percentage of 3% are involved in economic activities. The older the children are, the 
more they do domestic chores in the house and the more they get involved in economic activities. 
Girls below the age of eighteen far more than boys below the age of eighteen do domestic chores, 
while a comparison between the oldest girls and oldest boys in the households shows that about 
the same percentage of these boys and girls are involved in economic activities.
• The need for children to attend school regularly is by far the priority for the majority of parents. The 
importance of the needs for children to receive psychological support and to eat better than before 
the Intifada is markedly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
• During the summer vacation of 2004, 81% of the children played in the neighborhood, 49% 
attended summer camp, 21% attended clubs, 20% attended remedial classes, 6% were working 
and 5% traveled abroad. Since the summer vacation of 2003, 20% more children played in the 
neighborhood during the summer of 2004 and the percentage of children who have worked during 
the holidays has halved.
• About 71% of the school-going children in the past six months have never or almost never been 
unable to attend school or arrived late due to curfews or closures. This percentage has remained 
stable since the February 2004 survey. However, child attendance of school due to closures or 
curfews was most problematic in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, particularly in the refugee 
camps and among the poor. Moreover, 14% of the children have been absent from school for more 
than two weeks in the past six months for other reasons than illness or Israeli measures. This was 
mostly the case in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among refugees, and among those facing 
hardship.
• The median number of meals a day for children in the Palestinian household is 3.00.
• When considering the ﬁrst main drinking water sources for children aged 14 or younger, the ﬁrst
three drinking water sources are quite evenly divided between the reliance on the (1) public tap, (2) 
a protected well, and (3) piped water. When one merely considers the second main drinking water 
source of children of 14 years or less it is by far piped water.
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Introduction
Part nine of the report investigates the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees in the occupied 
Palestinian territory (oPt) and the impact of international aid on their livelihoods.
The chapter is divided into three sections.
• The ﬁrst section establishes a demographic proﬁle of the refugee population residing in the oPt
based on the survey’s refugee sample.
• The second section sets out to establish a basic socio-economic proﬁle of the refugees with regard
to poverty and income levels, employment, needs and unmet needs.
• The third section focuses both on the Palestinians’ perceptions of the socio-economic assistance 
programs undertaken on behalf of the refugees and on the future of such assistance. 
The main explanatory variable utilized in this part of the report is the “refugee status” independent variable 
(o002). However, when relevant, the “camp resident” variable will also be used, either vis-à-vis inhabitants 
of other areas of residence (i.e. villages and cities, including non-camp refugees) or other places of 
residence (i.e. non-camp dwellers, including non-camp refugees). Independent variables related to age, 
gender, education and poverty are excluded from this analysis as they are dealt with in other parts of the 
report, although poverty will be used as an important dependent variable in the second section of the 
chapter. Also generally excluded is Jerusalem as a place of residence.  
9.1 Demographic proﬁle of the Palestinian refugees
9.1.1  Distribution of refugees per region
Refugees constitute 43.4% of the survey’s population 
sample, i.e. 639 out of 1474 respondents.1 This 
corresponds to the PA’s estimates of the percentage 
of refugees within the oPt’s total population, i.e. 
42.6%. (Ministry of Health; July 2004: 3) Of the total 
refugee sample, 45%, i.e. 288 refugees, live in the 
West Bank and Jerusalem regions, while 55%, i.e. 
351 refugees, live in the Gaza Strip.2 
The refugees in the West Bank and Jerusalem 
constitute 30.7% of the total population -25.2% in the 
West Bank and 53.3% in Jerusalem - which is close 
to the ﬁgure of 29.4% obtained by the Palestinian
ofﬁcial institutions. The same goes for the Gaza
sample that is composed of 65.5% of refugees, a 
percentage similar to the Palestinian ofﬁcial ﬁgures.
(Ministry of Health, July 2004)
Figure 9.1. Distribution of refugees (o002) according to 
region (o059)
 
1 Previous reports have shown that nearly all refugees (around 97%) were registered with UNRWA.
2 This is in line with UNRWA’s ﬁgures. According to the Agency, out of 1,614,201 Palestine refugees registered
in the oPt (including Jerusalem), 41.9% are West Bankers (including Jerusalemites) and 58.1% are Gazans. 
(UNRWA, 30 June 2004). 
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Figure 9. 2. Percentage of refugees (o002) according to region of residence (o059)
9.1.2 Refugees inside camps versus refugees outside camps 
Similar to previous refugee samples (see Palestinian 
Public Perceptions, Report VII:232), about half of the 
refugee respondents reside in cities, while more than 
1/3rd live in refugee camps and less than 1/5th reside 
in villages. 
In the sample of the survey conducted for this report, 
24% of the West Bank refugees and 47% of the 
Gaza refugees live in camps, which is generally in 
line with UNRWA statistics.3 Conversely, camps are 
mostly inhabited, but not exclusively, by refugees, 
with a high 100% in the West Bank and a low 95.3% 
in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, although a majority 
of refugees in the oPt live outside the camps, they 
remain an important component of the analysis as 
“refugee pockets”.4 
Figure 9.4. Percentages of refugees (o002) according to place of residence (place)
Figure 9.3.: Distribution of refugees (o002) according to 
area of residence (o060) 
 
3 According to UNRWA, 26% of its registered refugees in the West Bank and 49% of its registered refugees in the 
Gaza Strip are camp refugees. (UNRWA, August 2004)
4 The majority of the refugees included in the sample of the survey conducted for this report can be found in Gaza 
outside camps (29%), followed by the Gaza camps (26%), the West Bank outside camps (23%), Jerusalem (15%), 
and ﬁnally the West Bank camps (7%).
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9.2 Socio-economic conditions of the refugees: reality and perceptions 
This section aims at determining the refugees’ socio-economic characteristics, as compared to the non-
refugees and the oPt population at large. Analysis is mainly based on data related to three interrelated 
themes:
 Evolution of poverty status in terms of secured household income.
 Employment status of the refugees. 
 Evolution of needs and unmet needs at the household level.
9.2.1 Refugees and poverty: overview
Poverty analysis is conducted at two levels: the general “refugee status level” (i.e. refugees vs. non-
refugees) and the refugee camp level (i.e. camp residents vs. non-camp residents –including refugees- 
in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank). As we will see below, the November 2004 ﬁndings witness
relatively positive trends among refugees and refugee camps residents, except in the West Bank camps.
The refugee status perspective
One of the most striking ﬁndings of the survey is that the poverty status (as deﬁned in strictly monetary
terms) is no longer a differentiating criterion between the refugees and the non-refugees. In the previous 
report dated August 2004, it was already noticeable that the poverty gap between refugees and non-
refugees, a constant feature of the Perception surveys since their inception in early 2001, had dwindled 
dramatically. (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 234) This drive towards socio-economic 
uniformity between the two population categories, which stems from a continuous improvement of 
the refugees’ socio-economic status and, simultaneously, a slight decrease in the non-refugees’ living 
standards, was conﬁrmed during the period under scrutiny for the current report.
The results of the survey indicate that, in line with the overall oPt population, 55% of the refugees are 
below the poverty line (8% less than in July 2003 and 5% less than in February 2004), of which 22% are 
hardship cases (8% less than in July 2003 and 2% less than in February 2004). 
These ﬁgures indicate less poverty for refugees than those obtained in the February 2004 survey, when
60%, i.e. 5 percent more, were considered to be below the poverty line and hardship cases. (Palestinian 
Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 233) The poverty ﬁgures for the non-refugees are slightly worse
than in February 2004, as percentages of those non-refugees below the poverty line climbed from 53% to 
55%.5 
Figure 9.5. Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 - November 2004 
 
5 The trend is similar to the one outlined in the seventh report that had already noticed a decrease in the poverty 
ﬁgures (below the poverty line and hardship cases) for refugees from 66% in July 2003 to 60% in February 2004.
Simultaneously, the non-refugee poverty ﬁgures had increased from 51% to 53%. (Palestinian Public Perceptions
VII, August 2004: 234) 
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The refugee camps perspective
From a geographical perspective, refugee camps still emerge, as already noticed in previous surveys, 
as the main “poverty pockets”, with signiﬁcantly higher percentages of residents below the poverty line
and those living in hardship (65% and 38%, respectively), than in cities (53% and 20% respectively) and 
villages (53% and 21% respectively). 
In retrospect, however, one can notice that between February and November 2004 the overall socio-
economic status of camp refugees has improved signiﬁcantly with a 6% to 8% decrease in the percentages
of them belonging to households with an average monthly income below the poverty line (including the 
hardship cases).6 This relative improvement can be explained by the situation in the Gaza Strip, where 
poverty ﬁgures have somewhat returned to “normal” after the sharp economic deterioration during the July
2003-February 2004 period. However, this should not be interpreted as actual long-term improvement of 
living conditions at a time when the security situation and working conditions were becoming increasingly 
precarious (see Part One, section 1.1). Rather, it may reﬂect the expansion of employment assistance
programs (mostly short-term jibs, see below sections 9.2.3 and 9.3.2), see further informalization of the 
labor market. Whatever its causes, this trend prevailed over the deterioration of the socio-economic status 
that affected the West Bank camp residents7 and which may be due chieﬂy to the increased mobility
restrictions in the West Bank and the Jerusalem regions, including the expansion of the Wall in those 
regions during the period under scrutiny (see Part One, Figure 1.12). 
In retrospect, these ﬁndings emerge as a striking reversal of situation as compared with the February 2004
survey that witnessed an increase in the poverty levels in the Gaza camps and a decrease in those of the 
West Bank. (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 234-5)
Figure 9.6. Poverty status (poverty3) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004 
9.2.2 Income and purchasing power
The trend towards uniformity between refugees and non-refugees with regard to socio-economic status 
during the period under study may be inferred from the evolution of family incomes. On the one hand, 
 
6 While the situation in the cities is stable, the villages saw during the same period of time a signiﬁcant increase in
the percentage of hardship cases that jumped from 15% to 21%. 
7 Poverty levels outside camps remained relatively stable during the period under survey, with a percentage of 
people below the poverty line (including hardship cases) stable at 54% in the West Bank and increasing by 4%, 
from 67% to 71% in the Gaza Strip. 
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the “family income” variable is no more a distinctive pattern for refugee status, that is, the percentage of 
refugee families earning low incomes below 2,000 NIS (60%), medium incomes between 2,000 and 3,500 
NIS (25%) and higher incomes above 3,500 NIS (15%) are similar to the percentages of the overall oPt 
population. On the other hand, comparison between these ﬁgures and those obtained in the February
2004 survey indicate a relative increase in the refugees’ family incomes since then. Indeed, whereas 
the percentage of refugees with lower family incomes remained stable, it increased from 57% to 60% 
among non-refugees. Likewise, among the higher family incomes the refugees were more represented in 
November 2004 (15%) than in February 2004 (9%), while the non-refugees saw their percentages in that 
salary bracket dwindle from by 3% during the same period of time. These ﬁndings are overviewed in ﬁgure
9.7, below.
Figure 9.7. Family income (o057v3) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004
Conﬁrming the comparative improvement of the refugees’ living conditions since February 2004, is the
ﬁnding that many more refugees admitted that their income was about the same (+6%) or higher than
needed (+6%), while the percentage of refugees who thought their income was less than needed decreased 
by 12%. During the same period, the non-refugees’ perceptions of their purchasing power remained similar 
to the ones in the February 2004 survey. These results are detailed in the ﬁgure below.
Figure 9.8. Household income close to needs (o041) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 
2004
The improvement in the refugees’ perception of their living conditions is warranted by other variables, such 
ﬁnancial sustainability (o044). Comparison between the February 2004 and November 2004 data indicate
that the percentage of refugees admitting that they were desperate or could barely manage receded from 
56% to 50%, with half of them feeling able to keep up ﬁnancially during the coming period or indeﬁnitely8. In 
contrast, fewer non-refugees considered themselves able to keep up indeﬁnitely in November 2004 than in
February 2004 (from 40% to 34% respectively), resulting in refugees and non-refugees being on par with 
regard to their assessment of their ability to keep up ﬁnancially in the coming period.
 
8 The positive trend amongst refugees with regard to ﬁnancial sustainability is at odds with the situation in the
refugee camps. In these areas, the percentage of camp residents admitting that they were desperate or could 
barely manage increased: from 54% to 63% in the West Bank and from 60% to 64% in Gaza (o044xplace).
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9.2.3  Employment status
Another striking ﬁnding of this survey is the change
in the refugees’ employment structure and the latter’s 
impact on poverty levels.
Employment structure
Surprisingly, and in contrast with the ﬁndings in
the previous Perceptions surveys, the employment 
situation of the labor force did not emerge in this 
survey as a distinctive pattern between refugees 
and non-refugees. While the August 2004 report had 
highlighted a sharp improvement in the refugees’ 
employment status with a signiﬁcant increase in the
percentage of full-time employed and a decrease 
in the number of unemployed (Palestinian Public 
Perceptions VII, August 2004: 235), the present 
survey indicates more employment precariousness 
among refugees: fewer refugees have full-time jobs (minus 10%) and more have part-time jobs and work 
a few hours a day (plus 9%). Moreover, unemployment remained relatively stable amongst refugees, 
whereas it decreased amongst non-refugees. These trends led to a situation whereby refugees lost their 
edge vis-à-vis non-refugees with regard to their employment status. 
The shift towards employment precariousness was, geographically speaking, especially marked in the 
West Bank refugee camps. The percentage of people with full-time jobs declined by 10% (from 54% to 
44%) during the period under scrutiny, while the percentage of part-time workers or those working a few 
hours a day doubled from 17% to 34%. Nevertheless, the number of unemployed declined from 30% to 
27%.9 
Figure 9.10. Type of employer (o063v2) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004
Conﬁrming this shift, the percentage of refugees whose salaries were earned from long-term jobs declined
from 59% in February 2004 to 48% in November 2004, whereas the percentage of non-refugees in the 
Figure 9.9. Employment situation of the labor force 
(o008r) according to refugee status (o002), February 
- November 2004 
 
9 This trend is also clearly noticeable in the West Bank outside camps and to a lesser extent in the Gaza camps 
where slightly fewer people held full-time jobs (from 45% to 44% between February and November 2004) and were 
unemployed (from 24% to 21%) and where more people held part-time jobs (from 30% to 35%). 
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same situation increased from 46% to 48%. Simultaneously and as illustrated in ﬁgure 9.10, below, during
the same period far fewer refugees were to be found in the sectors offering long-term contracts such as the 
government (-10%) and more in the private sector (+14%) and petty industrial or agricultural trades (+8%). 
The same shift from public to private sector also occurred amongst non-refugees, but to a lesser extent.
It is in mainly in the West Bank that private sector seemed to encroach on the government sector, including 
in camps where the percentage of those employed in public institutions decreased by 6% (from 20% to 
14%), while the percentage of those employed in private sector grew by 33% (3% to 36%).10  In the Gaza 
Strip, the same phenomenon occurred, but in the camps only: the percentage of camp dwellers engaged in 
the government sector decreased by 3% (from 27% to 24%), whereas those engaged in the private sector 
increased by 16% (from 17% to 33%).
Employment and poverty levels
Overall, it has to be stated that, in view of the poverty ﬁgures outlined above (indicating less poverty among
refugees), employment status was not the most inﬂuential factor in inﬂuencing poverty status. Actually, the
percentage of refugees stating that job losses had a bearing on income increased by only 4% between 
February and November 2004 (from 34% to 38%), whereas it increased by 15% among non-refugees 
during the same period (from 25% to 40%, respectively). This may have to do with the comparatively 
higher level of assistance, particularly in the employment sector, received by the refugees as compared 
to non-refugees. In this regard, it is worth noting UNRWA’s recent enhanced efforts to stimulate the job 
market through the direct hiring of employees on a short-term contract in connection with its regular and 
emergency programs (e.g. teachers in its schools, engineers on project sites, clerical ofﬁces in ﬁeld and
headquarters ofﬁces, etc.) and the indirect hiring of manpower involved in the development of the Agency’s
facilities (construction of additional classrooms, new libraries, rehabilitation of pathways, etc.).11 (UNRWA, 
June 2004:4-5)
9.11. Household employment assistance, general and specific (o026a, b, c), according to refugee status (o002)
9.2.3  Household needs and unmet needs
Employment was considered by refugees and non-refugees alike as the main household need. This 
ﬁnding does not come as a surprise given the deterioration of the employment crisis in the oPt since
 
10 Outside camps, the percentage of governmental workers declined by 9%, while the percentage of those in the 
private sector increased by 13%. This balancing trend between public and private sector is in line with the World 
Bank assessment of the economic situation in the West Bank, which was marked by relatively stable employment 
ﬁgures “because of a large increase in part-time jobs, full-time jobs declined by almost 17,000 in the ﬁrst half of
2004”. (World Bank, 2004) 
11 Between January and June 2004, UNRWA offered about 12,000 temporary employment contracts, 78% of them 
in the Gaza Strip. (UNRWA, June 2004: 4) The importance of such efforts on the refugee population is discussed 
below, see section 9.3.3, footnote 15.
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early 2004. According to the World Bank, during the ﬁrst half of this year, the Palestinian economy lost
more than 22,000 jobs. Moreover, in its second quarter, PCBS reported the lowest number ever of 
Palestinians working in Israel, a mere 186. (World Bank, 2004) However, probably on account of the 
higher percentage of employment assistance schemes beneﬁciaries among the refugees since early 2004
(see ﬁgure 9.11), refugees were fewer to consider employment a “ﬁrst most household important need”
in November 2004 than in February 2004, contrary to the non-refugees, who were much more numerous 
to consider employment a ﬁrst most important need. The same trend emerged with regard to need for
ﬁnancial assistance that appeared to be less of a matter of concern for refugees in November 2004 than
in February 2004, contrary to non-refugees. Conversely, need for food12 is the only item that has increased 
as a household need – and dramatically so - for refugees during the period under scrutiny, which may be 
explained by an overall decrease in the food assistance levels during this period (see below section 9.3).13 
These ﬁndings are overviewed in ﬁgure 9.12, below.
Figure 9.12. First most important household need (o079av3) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 
– November 2004
From a geographical perspective, one ﬁnds that West Bank refugee camps sometimes differ from the
“refugee trend”. This is the case of need for employment that did not subside as a “ﬁrst most important
need” during the period under scrutiny, stabilizing at 42% (while it decreased in the Gaza camps from 
46% to 40%). Furthermore, fewer West Bank camp dwellers stressed the importance of medication (from 
15% in February 2004 to 10% in November 2004), whereas opinions remained about the same in Gaza 
camps (at 9-10%). Also, the need for education did not decline in the West Bank camps, stabilizing at 8%, 
whereas it declined in the Gaza camps (in line with the “refugee trend”) from 6% to 1% during the same 
period of time.
“Unmet needs” is a variable that differs from the “most important needs” variable in that, contrary to the 
latter, it refers to needs that are not necessarily seen as vital for the individual or the household, but which 
are nonetheless considered as not adequately catered for by the main services providers. It is therefore 
no surprise that ﬁnancial assistance, which sets the burden directly on services providers, emerges as the
main unmet need for refugees. Furthermore, ﬁnancial assistance has never been considered a priority
 
12 Food assistance is discussed in detail in Part Six of this report.
13 Perceptions of refugees about their community needs also emphasize the fact that although employment is 
still considered paramount among refugees (and non-refugees), it was less the case in November 2004 than in 
February 2004 (from 63% to 57%, respectively), while need for employment at a communal level remained stable 
at about 60%. For both categories, food gained importance as a most important community need, the percentage 
of refugees referring to it in these terms increasing from 15% to 21%. 
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report VIII210
for assistance providers who prefer to focus on other basic – and/or more developmental - services, such 
as employment, food, education, and medication. It is also no surprise, given the employment assistance 
ﬁgures displayed above in ﬁgure 9.11, that employment emerges more as an unmet need amongst non-
refugees than amongst refugees. Statements about food may also be explained by trends related to the 
levels of assistance, and particularly emergency assistance, a topic that will be tackled below in section 
9.3.2.
Figure 9.13. Most important unmet needs (o180) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 
2004 
A close look at the data from a geographical perspective shows that the situation in the refugee camps 
was, roughly speaking, in keeping with the one among refugees. Thus, “ﬁnancial assistance” also emerged
as the most important unmet need during the February-November 2004 period in the refugee camps of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (from 21% to 25% in the former and 22% to 32% in the latter), while 
employment’s importance as an unmet need dwindled from 31% to 21% in the West Bank camps and 
from 35% to 32% in the Gaza camps. Differences between the refugees’ situation at large and that of 
refugee camp dwellers occurred chieﬂy for unmet needs, such as food assistance, of which importance
increased only in the West Bank camps, from 2% to 16% (and in all places of residence outside camps), 
but decreased in the Gaza camps from 8% to 5%.
9.3  Socio-economic assistance and refugee status
Since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, assistance has become a regular feature in the 
lives of the Palestinians, refugees and non-refugees alike. Only 12% of both categories declared that 
assistance was not important to the household’s livelihood or that they could manage anyway, whereas 
twice as many of them admitted that they could not manage without it or only with great difﬁculties. This
section is divided in ﬁve subsections:
 Coverage of assistance provided to refugees and general relevance of coverage according to 
beneﬁciaries.
 Contents of assistance.
 Sources of assistance.
 Satisfaction with assistance.
 Palestinians’ opinions with regard to the participation of the oPt camp refugees in future municipal 
elections. 
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9.3.1  Socio-economic assistance coverage 
As has been the case since the outbreak of the Intifada 
in September 2000, the refugees have been the 
main recipients of assistance during the period under 
scrutiny. Nearly 60% of them received some kind of 
assistance versus one third for the non-refugees, 
a gap that may be explained by the prevalence of 
UNRWA’s assistance programs amongst refugees14 
During this period, both refugees and non-refugees 
saw their percentage of assistance recipients increase 
(plus 3% for refugees and 5% for non-refugees); but 
for each category the level of assistance remained 
lower than the average of assistance received since 
September 2000. These results are overviewed in 
the adjacent ﬁgure.
In terms of places of residence, the increase in assistance beneﬁted mostly the West Bank refugee camps,
which had seen their level of assistance decrease dramatically in previous periods. Still, as illustrated in 
ﬁgure 9.15, below, levels of assistance in West Bank refugee camps remain lower than they were in July
2003. Conversely, Gaza camps received less assistance than was the case in the past, a trend that stems 
from the problems UNRWA faced in distributing emergency assistance during the period under survey due 
to funding shortfalls and closures imposed by the Israeli authorities (see chapter 1, section 1.2.1.1). This 
trend may also reﬂect the re-targeting of assistance according to changes in the socio-economic conditions
per place of residence. Indeed, the increase in the level of assistance in West Bank camps corresponds 
to an increase in poverty in these places of residence, whereas the decrease in levels of assistance in 
the Gaza camps correspond to a relative improvement of the socio-economic situation in these places of 
residence (see ﬁgure 9.6 above).
Figure 9.15. Assistance received (o035) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004 
Figure 9.14. Assistance received (o035, o037) according 
to refugee status (o002)
 
14 UNRWA’s latest deﬁnition of the “Palestine refugee” (1993) stipulates that “Palestine refugee shall mean any
person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost 
both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conﬂict”. Refugees within this deﬁnition and their direct
descendants are eligible for Agency regular services (source: Consolidated Registration Instructions (Effective 
January 1993). In the oPt, over 1.5 million refugees are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), accounting for more than 40% of the total population of 
these areas. Since May 1950 UNRWA has provided basic services in the ﬁelds of education, primary health care,
housing, and relief/social services. UNRWA is the only agency to have worked for such a long time in the exclusive 
service of one particular category of refugees. Emergency services are granted to the refugees who satisfy 
UNRWA criteria on low economic conditions during times of conﬂict..
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In spite of their being on par with non-refugees with 
regard to poverty incidence (see ﬁgure 9.5 above)
and more covered by assistance programs, refugees 
were more numerous in their belief that they needed 
much more assistance than they actually received. 
These results are detailed in ﬁgure 9.16, adjacent.
The refugees’ comparatively unsatisfactory stance 
may partly reﬂect the often-referred to “dependency
syndrome”, whereby refugees will keep voicing 
demands for more assistance, whatever the level 
of assistance. The same negative statements 
about the irrelevance of assistance were aired in 
the camps. Aside from the “dependency factor”, 
other factors inherent to the camps’ situation such 
as the substandard environmental and housing 
conditions continue to elicit feelings of dissatisfaction 
and frustration, whatever the appropriateness and 
relevance of assistance and its targeting.
Figure 9.17. Assistance according to needs (o038) according to place of residence (place)
9.3.2  Contents of most important socio-economic assistance 
Food was, as usual, referred to by the oPt population as the ﬁrst and second most important source of 
assistance item received during the period under survey; but this was more the case among the refugees 
who were 43% to highlight the importance of food assistance versus 23% of the non-refugees. However, 
compared to the situation in February 2004, food was slightly less highlighted by refugees as an important 
assistance item, the bulk of food assistance having targeted chieﬂy the (impoverished) West Bank camps
(from 38% in February 2004 to 56% in November 2004), while other more refugee-inhabited places of 
residence, where poverty happens to have receded during the period under survey, were less serviced: 
this is the case in the Gaza camps, where the percentage of respondents referring to food assistance as 
the ﬁrst and second most important received item dwindled from 62% to 49% during the same period.
Otherwise, most other signiﬁcant assistance items, be it emergency employment assistance, medication
or ﬁnancial assistance, saw their importance increased in the eyes of the refugee respondents during
the February-November 2004 period.15 The results in ﬁgure 9.18 below also indicate that assistance has
focused, as has usually been the case since the start of the Intifada, on food distribution, which is a proof 
Figure 9.16. Assistance according to needs (o038) 
according to refugee status (o002)
 
15 These increases also occurred in the Gaza and West Bank camps where, for instance, ﬁnancial assistance
increased respectively from 12% to 24% and from 6% to 8% during that period.
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of appropriate targeting on behalf of the service providers, starting with UNRWA. Indeed, although - as 
seen in Figure 9.12 above - refugees continued to consider employment as the main household need, the 
percentage of them stating so declined from 45% to 42%, whereas the percentage of refugees identifying 
food as their main household need increased by 21%. 
Figure 9.18. Most important items received (o036) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 
2004
However, the slight decline in the importance ascribed to food assistance received from February to 
November 2004 may have accounted for the increase in refugees deﬁning food as an unmet need.
Conversely, increases in the importance of employment assistance may explain the decrease in the 
percentage of refugees considering employment an unmet need (see above in section 9.2.3). However, 
the signiﬁcant increase in the importance of ﬁnancial assistance from 11% to 16% during the February-
November 2004 period (as indicated in ﬁgure 9.18) did not prevent more refugees from considering that
type of assistance as their main unmet need during the same period, with an increase from 23% to 30% 
(see ﬁgure 9.13 above).
9.3.3  Source of most important socio-economic assistance 
Despite the many sensitive, extra-humanitarian problems it had to face during the period under survey, the 
refugee respondents continued to consider UNRWA as the prime source of the most important received 
services.16 Even more, its prevalence as a provider of such services was enhanced during the period 
under scrutiny. 
 
16 Besides the mobility restrictions suffered by UNRWA staff members (including the Agency’s Commissioner-
General: see chapter I, section 1.2.1.1), UNRWA was accused by Israeli authorities of directly assisting Palestinian 
militants by allowing the latter to use the Agency’s facilities and means of transportation. UNRWA managed to 
rebuff Israel’s accusations, especially with regard to the alleged use by Palestinian militants of its ambulances 
to transport Qassam rockets in the Gaza Strip (October 2004). In addition, in October 2004 over 4,000 UNRWA 
employees in the West Bank (but also UNRWA staff members in the Northern Gaza Strip) launched a strike in a 
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Figure 9.19. Source of first and second most important received services (o036) according to refugee status (o002), 
February 2004 - November 2004
Compared to the situation in the July 2003-February 2004 period, which saw the role of UNRWA decrease 
and that of the Palestinian Authorities increase as providers of the most important services amongst 
refugees (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII: 248, 249), the present period under survey witnessed a re-
focusing of UNRWA on the refugees. The PA as well as Palestinian trade unions maintain their position 
amongst refugees, but concentrated their assistance efforts more on non-refugees. UNRWA’s enhanced 
role among refugees is particularly obvious with regard to food assistance, as the percentage of refugees 
considering the Agency the primary provider of food assistance jumped from 34% to 57% during the period 
under study. The same trend is also noticeable with regard to ﬁnancial assistance, medication and, to a
lesser extent, employment, the percentage of refugees ascribing to UNRWA the prime role in distributing 
these items rising from 12% to 26%, 44% to 57% and 41% to 43%, respectively.17 Conﬁrming the ﬁnding
that employment in governmental institutions has dwindled amongst refugees (see above in section 9.2.3), 
the percentage of refugees referring to the PA as the provider of employment dropped from 44% to 17%.
Figure 9.20. Source of most important received services (o036) according to place of residence (place), February 
2004 – November 2004 
 
17 The apparent gap between UNRWA’s increased efforts to promote employment (see above section 9.2.3.) and 
that of the minor importance ascribed to it by the refugees may be due to the fact that most of these jobs offered 
are short-time jobs, whereas refugees are looking for long-term contracts. 
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From a geographical perspective, UNRWA’s enhanced role among refugees concerned mainly the West 
Bank camps, which indicates accurate socio-economic targeting on behalf of UNRWA, since the inhabitants 
of these camps have become comparatively more impoverished during the period under survey. In general, 
Palestinian providers of assistance primarily targeted Gaza refugee camps, which have traditionally been 
the main poverty pockets in the oPt. 
 9.3.4  Satisfaction about assistance in general
A majority of refugees and non-refugees alike (56%) expressed general satisfaction with the received 
assistance, which is less than during the previous period under survey (61%). What differentiates refugees 
and non-refugees is the reason for dissatisfaction with the received assistance. Whereas refugees insisted 
mostly on frequency of assistance, non-refugees expressed more concern about the quantity of the 
distributed assistance. Furthermore, quality problems as a reason for dissatisfaction seem to be far more 
prevalent amongst refugees than non-refugees. These ﬁndings are overviewed in the ﬁgure below.
Figure 9.21. Reason for dissatisfaction with assistance in general (o123) according to refugee status (o002)
9.3.5  Camp refugees and municipal elections
The participation of camp refugees in municipal elections is a relevant issue when gauging the future of 
the camps and the role UNRWA may be called upon to play in these areas. This issue was hotly debated 
among various Palestinian constituencies in the mid-late 1990’s, as it touched on the controversial issue 
of refugee re-settlement and the preservation of the camps as symbols of the refugees’ humanitarian and 
political rights at stake. A consensus ﬁnally emerged that camp refugees were, as a matter of principle, not
to take part in any forthcoming municipal elections. Camps were to be regarded as one social and political 
unit where refugee committees would be elected, mainly in order to assist UNRWA. In the Gaza Strip, 
however, given the fact that the vast majority of the population is of refugee status, and because many 
camps had already been integrated by the Israeli occupation authorities in the municipalities, refugees 
would be allowed to participate in such elections. This section aims to gauge what the Palestinians’ current 
opinions on this issue are after ﬁve years of Intifada.
The present survey found that 60% of the oPt population (refugees and non-refugees alike) believe that 
camp inhabitants should participate in forthcoming municipal elections, while 21% think that separate 
elections should be held at the camp level and only 18% that camp inhabitants should not engage in 
any kind of local elections. However, since opinions on this topic have traditionally differed between 
Westbankers and Gazans, more relevant analysis may be made using a geographical perspective. In 
this respect, one clearly sees that in the Gaza Strip (be it inside or outside camps), in Jerusalem and in 
the West Bank outside camps, a large majority of the population favors the idea of the participation of the 
camp dwellers in the municipal elections, which testiﬁes to the latter’s integration within the oPt society.
Only in the West Bank camps, known to be the main strongholds of the refusal to compromise on the 
principle of non-participation, does one ﬁnd a majority of the population endorsing separate elections for
the camps.18
 
18 Camp services committees already exist, but their members are appointed by the PLO/PA.
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report VIII216
Figure 9.22. Camp refugees and municipal elections (o263) according to place of residence (place) 
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9.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, the analysis on speciﬁc issues related to refugees and UNRWA have allowed for the
identiﬁcation of a number of interesting ﬁndings. These results are summarized in the bullets below.
• Refugees constitute 43.4% of the survey’s population sample. Refugees in the West Bank and 
Jerusalem constitute 30.7% of the total population - 25.2% in the West Bank and 53.3% in 
Jerusalem - and 65.5% in the Gaza Strip. Although only 38% of the refugees live in camps, the 
latter are mostly inhabited by refugees, with a high 100% in the West Bank and a low 95.3% in the 
Gaza Strip.
• One of the most striking ﬁndings of the survey is that poverty status is no longer a differentiating
criterion between refugees and non-refugees (regardless of place of residence). In line with the 
overall oPt population, 55% of the refugees have a monthly household income that falls below 
the poverty line (8% less than in July 2003 and 5% less than in February 2004), of which 22% are 
hardship cases (8% less than in July 2003 and 2% less than in February 2004). 
• Refugee camps, which are predominantly –but not wholly- inhabited by refugees, still emerge as 
the main “poverty pockets”, with signiﬁcantly higher percentages of households that fall below
the poverty line and live in hardship. Overall, the poverty levels in the camps declined during the 
period under survey, despite a deterioration of the situation in the West Bank camps due chieﬂy
to the increased mobility restrictions and the Jerusalem regions, including the expansion of the 
Wall during the period under scrutiny. But improvement of the living conditions in the Gaza camps 
proved more substantial than the West Bank deterioration.
• In comparison to the February 2004 survey, in the current survey refugees are more represented 
among the higher family income bracket and many more refugees admitted that their income was 
about the same or higher than needed, while the percentage of refugees who thought that their 
income was less than needed decreased signiﬁcantly. The non-refugees’ perceptions of their
purchasing power remained quite similar to what they were during the previous February 2004 
survey.
• Surprisingly, the present survey indicates more employment precariousness amongst refugees, 
with a lower percentage of them in full-time jobs and more of them having part-time jobs and 
working a few hours a day. This trend was offset by the comparatively higher level of employment 
assistance enjoyed by the refugees as compared to non-refugees.
• Employment continued to be the main refugee household need, but its importance as such 
decreased during the period under survey, together with most other traditional household needs, 
except for food. For refugees, food was also, with ﬁnancial assistance, among the main unmet
needs.
• Although refugees and camp refugee dwellers received more assistance than non-refugees 
and Palestinians living outside camps, respectively, they were more numerous to consider 
institutionalized assistance as insufﬁcient to cover existing needs. A majority of refugees, however,
expressed satisfaction with assistance schemes, while the main reasons for concern relate to the 
frequency of relief distribution and its quality. The quantity of assistance is more of a matter of 
concern among non-refugees.
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• During the period under study in this report, food was considered by the refugees (and non-refugees, 
but to a lesser extent) as the most important received assistance item, especially in the West 
Bank camps. Except for employment assistance, refugees tended to ascribe more importance to 
assistance items than non-refugees. During the period under examination, the increase in non-
refugees relaying that they rely on employment assistance was more dramatic than the increase of 
refugees adopting the same stance.
• Despite the many sensitive, extra-humanitarian problems UNRWA had to face during the period 
under study, refugee respondents continued to consider it as the prime source of their most 
important received services. Moreover, UNRWA’s prevalence as a provider of such services was 
enhanced during the period under scrutiny. 
• Of the total oPt population, 60% (refugees and non-refugees alike) believed that camp inhabitants 
should participate in forthcoming municipal elections, while 21% think that separate elections 
should be held at camp level and only 18% ascertained that camp inhabitants should not engage 
in any kind of local ezlections. The West Bank camps dwellers were the only population category 
promoting in majority separate elections at the camp level.
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Introduction
This chapter examines the Palestinian perceptions about a number of political issues pertaining to political 
trust, attitudes towards the Intifada, the peace process, the media, and the public view about corruption in 
the Palestinian Authority.
As mentioned earlier in this report, the data was collected during the period when Arafat was ﬂown to
France for treatment in late October 2004. It was also a period of heavy Israeli incursions in the Gaza 
Strip. 
10.1 The situation in general
10.1.1  Feelings about personal security
As was discussed in chapter one, the majority of Palestinians feel insecure about the general situation. 
As indicated in ﬁgure 10.1, below, the feeling of insecurity differs primarily according to three independent
variables, namely the poverty condition, region and area of residence. While 78% of respondents that are 
regarded as above the poverty line declared that they feel generally insecure, the percentage reached 
88% among those whose economic condition is extremely difﬁcult.
The feeling of insecurity is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. While the percentage is 87% in 
the former, the rate drops to 82% in the later. The sense of insecurity is lowest in Jerusalem with only 70% 
of respondents stating that they are insecure.
Not surprisingly, the feeling of insecurity is higher among refugee camp residents than among city or 
village dwellers with 91% of the former saying that they feel insecure compared to 82% in cities and 77% 
in villages. This feeling of insecurity could be contributed to the relatively more difﬁcult conditions in camps
as well as to the more frequent Israeli incursions there. 
Figure 10-1: General feeling of security (o118)
10.1.2  The economic situation
The feeling of insecurity is not unrelated to the hard economic conditions of the Palestinian people as well 
as to the difﬁcult political reality that they are confronted with. As was discussed in chapter two, earlier,
Politics & Government 221
55% of the Palestinians have a living standard the poverty line.  As can be determined from ﬁgure 10.2,
below, 41% of those designated as below the poverty line live in fact under extreme poverty conditions.
 
Figure 10-2: The poverty situation (poverty3)
Of course, the difﬁcult economic conditions are strongly linked to the labor market situation. Only 44% of
the Palestinians participating in the labor market have full-time employment (see ﬁgure 10.3, below). The
remainder is distributed between those who are employed part-time (15%), employed for few hours a day 
(20%), and who are unemployed (21%). It is important to note here that the labor market ﬁgures exclude
the women who identify themselves as housewives.
Figure 10-3: The labor market situation (o008r)
10.2 The political situation
The following information covers the period at the time when President Arafat fell ill and was ﬂown to
France for treatment. While it is too early to judge now, the elections for a new president, the renewal 
of the Palestinian-Israeli direct negotiations, and the renewed American commitment to the resolution of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict might have brought some changes in the Palestinian attitude towards the
political conditions they live under. However, it is unlikely that any change in Palestinian political attitudes 
would be so signiﬁcant as to render the following discussion irrelevant. On the contrary, one could argue
that Palestinian political attitudes will not change signiﬁcantly before tangible and concrete measures are
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made that will (1) improve living conditions and (2) release them, at least partially, from the strong grip of 
the Israeli occupation. 
In the following pages an attempt will be made to analyze and examine Palestinian attitudes towards 
three major political issues that are fundamental for the Palestinian political future, political stability 
and Palestinian integration in the regional and international political system. These issues are (1) the 
way Palestinians perceive their political movements and factions, (2) their attitudes towards political 
reconciliation with Israel, and (3) their attitudes towards reform of the Palestinian Authority and the shape 
of a future Palestinian state. 
10.2.1 Trust in the Palestinian political factions and parties
One can argue that support for the Palestinian political factions is more related to the Arab-Israeli conﬂict
and less so to the efﬁciency of the Palestinian Authority, and even less so to the support out of political
conservatism. 
If the support for a certain political faction would be based on religious fundamentalism or support for 
radical ideologies, then two things would certainly be observed: ﬁrst, support for an Islamic system of
government, and second refusal to accept any resolution with, or acceptance of, Israel. However, in the 
survey conducted in February 2004, only a small percentage (7%) of respondents mentioned that they 
would like Palestine to follow an Islamic system of government. A large percentage mentioned Western 
political systems as their preference.  As indicated in ﬁgure 10.4, below, 31% stated that that they would
like Palestine to emulate a Western model. Only 7% speciﬁed that they would like an Islamic system
of government and 44% stated that Arab governments follow their preferred model of government. It is 
important to note here that preference for a Western style system of government is higher among those 
who have a living standard above the poverty line, are more educated, and who are fully employed.
Figure 10-4: The system of government Palestinians would like Palestine to be modeled after (February 2004)
An examination of the Palestinian trust of the Palestinian political movements will highlight Palestinian 
political preferences and the underlying reasons for these preferences: i.e. whether they are ideological or 
in response to speciﬁc socio-economic or political realities such as the Israeli occupation, mismanagement
or incompetence of the ruling political system, or the deteriorating living conditions.
As it has been in the recent years, the largest sector of the Palestinian society remains detached from most 
of the Palestinian political or religious organizations and movements. As illustrated in ﬁgure 10.5, below, 34%
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of the respondents said that they do not trust any political or religious factions. Whereas 28% mentioned 
Fateh as the organization they trust most, 24% mentioned Hamas, and 5% mentioned the Islamic Jihad. 
The Palestinian secularist organizations that are on the left of the political spectrum are very weak with only 
3% of the respondents, for example, mentioning the PFLP as the organization they trust most. Accordingly, 
when a classiﬁcation is made between the secularist and the religious organizations, (excluding those who
do not trust any factions or organizations) it appears that the trust in Islamic organizations equals that of 
the secularist organizations. These ﬁndings are also overviewed in the ﬁgure 10.5, below.
Figure 10-5: Factional trust (o133)
Further analysis of the data reveals that the trust in political factions is related to a number of variables, 
most interesting of which are the economic conditions of the respondents and where they live. Concerning 
the poverty, there is a clear correlation and signiﬁcance between the level of poverty and trust in the political
movements. As illustrated in ﬁgure 10.6, below, the extremely poor Palestinians seem to have more trust in
the religious factions than those who are economically better-off. While 59% of the respondents who live 
in abject poverty trust religious parties and factions, the percentage is 47% among those living below the 
poverty line (but not in extreme poverty) and 48% among those with a living standard above the poverty 
line.  In fact, when compared to the results of the February 2004 survey, more respondents classiﬁed
as hardship cases trust Hamas now than Fateh. Whereas in February 2004 26% of the hardship cases 
trusted Fateh and 20% of trusted Hamas, the results reveal that in October 2004, 25% of them trust Hamas 
and only 22% trust Fateh.
The lack of trust in the secularist factions by the 
extremely poor could be explained by the employment 
situation. As indicated in table 10.1, below, support for 
the secularists is higher among the fully employed. 
Whereas 52% of the trust in the secularist factions 
is derived from those who are fully employed, 59% 
of the trust for the religious factions comes from 
the respondents who are unemployed or under-
employed. 
Figure 10-6: Trust in political factions (o133) according 
to the poverty level (poverty3)
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Table 10-1: Trust in political factions according to the employment situation
 Factional trust Total
 Secularist factions Religious factions
Employment 
of the labor 
market
 
 
 
Full -time 52% 41% 47%
Part-time 13% 15% 14%
Employed for a few 
hours/day 17% 26% 21%
Unemployed 17% 18% 18%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Trust in political factions also differs according to the area in which Palestinians reside. Clearly, as indicated 
in ﬁgure 10.7, below, the trust in secularist factions is stronger in villages than in refugee camps and
cities.  In fact, it is only in villages that secularists enjoy much more trust than the religious factions. 
Whereas the percentage of villagers trusting the religious factions is 43%, trust in secularist factions 14% 
higher. Conversely, the religious factions enjoy stronger trust than the secularists both in cities and refugee 
camps.
Figure 10-7: Trust in political factions according to area of residence (o060)
The strong trust in secularist factions in villages may provide an explanation as to why the secularists 
enjoy stronger trust in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.  Whereas the support for the 
religious factions in the West Bank is 46%, trust in them is 55% in the Gaza Strip and 53% in Jerusalem. 
These results are detailed in ﬁgure 10.8, below.
Figure 10-8: Trust in political factions according to region of residence (o059)
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Table 10.2, below, provides a more detailed assessment of the political and religious trust according to 
the various governorates in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Of the ten West Bank districts, support for 
religious factions is stronger than the support for secularists in Nablus, Qaliqilia, Ramallah, and Hebron 
districts. The situation is different for the other six West Bank districts where trust in the secularist factions 
is stronger. Only one district in the Gaza Strip, the District of Rafah, has better showing for the secularists 
than the religious factions, the remainder of the Gaza districts all showed stronger trust in religious factions 
than in secularist factions. 
Table 10-2: Trust in political factions according to governorate
Factional trust
 Secularist factions Religious factions
 Jenin District 73% 27%
 Tubas District 86% 14%
 Nablus District 44% 56%
 Salﬁt District 71% 29%
 Qalqilya District 37% 63%
 Tulkarem District 54% 46%
 Ramallah District 41% 59%
 Jerusalem District 47% 53%
 Jericho District 67% 33%
 Bethlehem District 68% 33%
 Hebron District 46% 54%
 North Gaza District 44% 56%
 Gaza City 40% 60%
Rafah District 65% 35%
 Deir al- Balah District 43% 57%
 Khan Younis District 45% 55%
Total 50% 50%
10.2.2 Palestinian attitudes towards the Intifada
The attitude over the Palestinian-Israeli occupation is clearly an important factor in determining Palestinian 
political preferences. Since the religious groups constitute the real opposition to the current peace initiatives, 
it is safe to expect that a sizable proportion of the Palestinian population opt for the religious groups on 
political grounds and not on religious grounds.
In November 2004, the respondents were asked about peace with Israel. This section will examine 
Palestinian attitudes towards the peace process and will show how Palestinians differ on the issue of a 
peaceful resolution with Israel, what they expect from their leadership, and what guidelines they draw for 
their leadership with respect to the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict. This assessment
of Palestinian attitudes towards the peace process will be provided according to a set of variables at hand 
that. However, before doing so, an examination of Palestinian attitudes towards the Intifada could help to 
better understand the Palestinian context 
Since the Intifada started in September 2000, a large number of Palestinians have lost their lives, and 
hundreds of thousands have lost their livelihood. As was discussed in the ﬁrst and second parts of this
report, unemployment increased and restrictions on movement have intensiﬁed to a level that rendered
economic activities more difﬁcult.
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While the Intifada broke out in response to the 
lack of progress in the peace process and while it 
intensiﬁed in the aftermath of the election of a right-
wing Israeli government, all indications show that the 
Palestinian political and economic conditions have 
worsened ever since.  As can be noticed in ﬁgure
10.9, adjacent, 84% of the Palestinians think that 
the general situation has worsened. Only 2% said 
that the situation has improved wince the outbreak 
of the Intifada, while 14% believe that not much has 
changed.
10.2.3 According to residence
The frustration about the general situation is evident 
in all areas although, as illustrated in ﬁgure 10.10,
below, only 1% of Gaza respondents said that the 
situation has improved since the beginning of the 
Intifada, compared to 3% in the West Bank. The 
Jerusalem respondents did not see any improvement 
in the general situations. Only 8% stated that the 
situation has remained the same and 92% of them 
felt that the situation has deteriorated as compared 
to 83% in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Figure 10-10: Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the Intifada (q146) according to district and 
region of residence (O059)
Figure 10-9: Feelings about the general situation in the 
aftermath of the Intifada 
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10.2.4 According to level of education
When examining the attitudes towards the Intifada, the low educated respondents seemed more disturbed 
about it. As indicated in ﬁgure 10.11, below, 91% of the lower educated respondents, compared to 82% of
the medium educated and 86% of the highly educated, said that the general situation has worsened in the 
aftermath of the Intifada. 
10-11: Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the Intifada (q146) according to education (educ)
10.2.5 According to trust in political and religious institutions 
When examining Palestinian attitudes towards the Intifada according to their trust in one or another political 
or religious faction, it is perhaps surprising that Palestinians trusting religious organizations view the situation 
following the outbreak of the Intifada more negatively than those trusting the secularist organizations. 
Figure 10-12: Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the Intifada (q146) according to trust in 
political factions (o133)
Concretely, as illustrated above in ﬁgure 10.12, whereas 87% of those trusting Hamas said that the situation
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has worsened in the aftermath of the Intifada, the percentage among those trusting Fateh is 74%. This 
being the case, it is safe to argue that the feeling of frustration with the situation following the Intifada does 
not necessarily imply frustration with the Intifada per se because it is the religious groups, in particular, that 
insist on the continuation and intensiﬁcation of the Intifada, while at the same time showing a higher level 
of frustration with its consequences.  
10.3 Perceptions about peace
The above analysis shows that the Palestinian population in all its social, economic, and political sectors 
believes that the situation in the past four years has worsened.  This may not be an expression of opposition 
to the Intifada, but rather a frustration with the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. In the aftermath of the Oslo process, support for peace with Israel was very strong among 
the Palestinian population. This support, however, dwindled gradually as a result of the lack of progress 
in the peace talks. Settlements continued to expand, restrictions on the movement of the Palestinian 
population and the Palestinian products did not ease, and the number of Palestinian casualties continued 
to rise. While the Intifada was an expression of unhappiness with the political development, it could be 
argued that it was not properly utilized or that it shifted from originally less violent resistance to a more 
violent one. 
This section will provide an assessment of Palestinian 
attitudes towards peace with Israel in order to shed 
the light on the vision of the Palestinian public towards 
the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict.
As can be seen from ﬁgure 10.13, adjacent, 55% of
the Palestinian public support a peace agreement 
with Israel and 45% oppose it. While the current 
support for a peace agreement with Israel is lower 
than the ﬁgures prior to the Intifada, it is important 
to stress that a large percentage of the Palestinian 
public do not trust and do not believe that a peace 
agreement can be reached with the current Israeli 
government. The current temporary ‘ceaseﬁre’ that
was brokered in February 2005 and the release of 
some Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons could 
help in improving the level of support for peace with 
Israel.
10.3.1 According to residence
Although the majority of Palestinians support a peace 
agreement with Israel, this level of support varies from 
one area to another.  As indicated in ﬁgure 10.14,
adjacent, the level of support for a peace agreement 
with Israel is stronger in the West Bank than it is in the 
Gaza Strip with 55% supporting peace in the former 
and 48% supporting it in the latter. 
Figure 10-13:  Attitudes about a peace settlement with 
Israel in general (o266)
Figure 10-14: Attitudes towards a peace settlement 
(o266) with Israel according to region of residence 
(o059)
Politics & Government 229
The stronger support for a peace agreement with 
Israel in the West Bank can be largely attributed to 
the strong support for peace in villages which are 
mostly concentrated in the West Bank. As indicated 
in ﬁgure 10.15, adjacent, 66% of village respondents
support a peace agreement with Israel compared to 
49% of the city respondents and 55% of the refugee 
camp respondents. 
When the data were analyzed according to the districts 
in the oPt, strong support for peace was evident in 
the northern and middle districts of the West Bank, 
while support was far lower in the southern districts. 
This was particularly the case in the Hebron district where support for peace did not exceed 34%.  As 
for the Gaza districts, the level of support for a peace settlement is almost the same in the northern and 
southern districts. These ﬁndings are overviewed in ﬁgure 10.16, below.
Figure 10-16: Attitudes towards a peace settlement (o266) with Israel according to district
Although the support for peace is stronger in the West 
Bank, careful examination of the data reveals that the 
West Bank camps are less likely to support a peace 
agreement with Israel than their counterparts in the 
Gaza Strip. As illustrated in ﬁgure 10.17, adjacent,
only 42% of West Bank camp dwellers stated that they 
support a peace agreement with Israel compared to 
57% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.  Conversely, 
however, support for peace is stronger in West 
Bank non-camp areas than in the Gaza Strip non-
camp areas. Again, the strong support for a peace 
agreement in the villages explains this tendency.
10-15: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel 
(o266) according to area of residence (o060)
Figure 10-17: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with 
Israel (o266) according to place of residence (place)
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10.3.2 According to age, educational level, gender, and refugee status
When examining the level of support for a peace agreement with Israel among the various age groups, it is 
found that the older generation is much more in support of a peace agreement than the younger generation. 
As indicated in ﬁgure 10.18, below, 64% of those over the age of 50 support a peace agreement with Israel
compared to 52% among those between the ages of 18 and 24. 
It is also interesting to note that the level of support for a peace agreement with Israel decreases with 
an increase in the level of education of the respondents. As indicated in ﬁgure 10.17, below, 66% of the
lower educated respondents support a peace agreement compared to a mere 49% of the higher educated 
respondents. Women are also more likely than men to support a peace agreement. Whereas 52% of men 
support a peace agreement with Israel, the percentage is 58% among women.
When examining the level of support for a peace agreement according to the refugee status of the 
respondents, it is clear that Palestinians of a refugee origin are slightly less enthusiastic about a peace 
agreement with Israel than the non-refugee Palestinians. Although, still, the majority (53%) of the Palestinian 
refugees supports a peace agreement, the percentage is lower than among non-refugees where 57% 
support a peace agreement. 
Figure 10-18: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel according to (agec), educational level, gender (o061), 
and refugee status (o002)
10.3.3 According to the poverty level
The correlation between the poverty level and the level of support for a peace agreement is very evident. As 
indicated in ﬁgure 10.19, below, there is a much stronger support among the respondents from households
with a monthly income above the poverty line than among respondents from households that are below 
the poverty line. Whereas 60% of the former are keen on a peace agreement with Israel, the percentage 
drops to 51% among the latter.
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The importance of the economic situation of the 
respondents on the level of support for a peace 
agreement becomes even more striking when one 
looks at this issue according to the household income 
level of the interviewees. As indicated in table 10.3, 
below, 79% of the respondents whose household 
income is relatively high support a peace agreement, 
while this is the case for 60% of respondents from the 
households earning less than 500 NIS (approximately 
US $ 115)
.
 
Table 10-3: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel according to household income
 Attitudes about a peace settlement with Israel Total
 Support a peace 
settlement with Israel
Oppose a peace 
settlement with Israel
 
 Over 5000 NIS 79% 21% 100%
 3000-4999 NIS 58% 42% 100%
 2000-2999 NIS 51% 49% 100%
 2500-1999 NIS 51% 49% 100%
 500-1499 NIS 53% 47% 100%
 Less than 500 NIS 60% 40% 100%
Total 55% 45% 100%
                         Sig. ***
10.3.4 According to trust in political and religious 
organizations
Trust in political factions is also a strong indicator when 
analyzing the level of support for negotiating a peace 
agreement with Israel. Not surprisingly, the support for 
such an agreement comes primarily from organizations 
that carry a secularist ideology. As can be determined 
from ﬁgure 10.20, adjacent, the large majority of the
respondents trusting Fateh support a peace agreement 
with Israel compared to only 35% of those trusting 
Hamas, and 29% of those trusting Islamic Jihad. Perhaps 
unexpectedly, 69% of those trusting the secularist Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) also support 
a peace agreement with Israel, despite its traditionally 
hard position vis-à-vis the negotiations with Israel. Also 
interesting to note is that 58% of those who said that they 
do not trust any political or religious organization are in 
favor of a peace agreement with Israel, thus making this 
very large segment of the Palestinian population more 
in line with the position of those trusting the secularist 
groups.
10-19: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel 
(o266) according to the poverty level (poverty 3)
Figure 10-20: Attitudes towards a peace settlement 
with I   v           srael (o266) according to factional 
trust (o133)
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Thus, when grouping attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel according to secularist versus religious 
organizations, it becomes clear that support for a peace agreement with Israel is far more evident among 
those favoring the secularist organizations, as compared to those trusting the religious organizations. 
Still, it is worth noting that 35% of the respondents trusting the religious organizations do support a peace 
agreement, an issue that begs the questions as to whether the people trusting these organizations do so 
because of ideological tendencies or because of their lack of faith in the organizations that are linked to the 
Palestinian Authority whom they may consider as corrupt, inefﬁcient, or incapable of solving their problems
such as their economy and security.
10.4 The red lines
It is clear that support for a peace agreement with Israel is strong among the Palestinian population even 
though the time the survey was carried could not be characterized as a period of calm and stability. On 
the contrary, the survey was conducted during a period in which Palestinian positions were hardened with 
respect to a peace settlement with Israel.
The support for a peace agreement with Israel seems to be based on speciﬁcexpectations that thePalestinian
population have from such an agreement.  It is certainly not unconditional. As will be discussed in the next 
pages, the Palestinian population believes that there are certain priorities and speciﬁc prerequisites that
they identify with. 
When respondents were asked about what the 
Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for 
a viable Palestinian state, only 1% of the respondents 
said that the Palestinian leadership should relinquish 
parts of East Jerusalem in return for a viable 
Palestinian state, 3% believe it is acceptable for 
the Palestinian leadership to sacriﬁce the right of
return and 5% of the respondents were willing to 
compromise on anything that will lead to a Palestinian 
state. As illustrated in ﬁgure 10.21, adjacent, 86% of
the respondents stated that they should not relinquish 
any of the Palestinian rights. 
While the vast majority of the Palestinians feel that the 
Palestinian leadership should not relinquish anything 
in return for a viable Palestinian state, there are some 
differences among the respondents depending on 
residence, location, area and place of residence, the 
refugee status, the poverty level, and the trust in the 
political factions. On his issue, no relationship exists 
according to the age, gender, or educational level of 
the interviewees.
10.4.1 According to residence
Rather unexpectedly, the respondents from the middle and southern districts in the Gaza Strip are the 
least adamant with respect to the compromises that the Palestinian leadership should make in return for 
a Palestinian state. As elaborated in ﬁgure 10.22, below, 79% of the respondents form the middle and
southern districts of the Gaza Strip stated that the Palestinian leadership should not relinquish anything, 
Figure 10-21:  Attitudes about what the Palestinian 
leadership should relinquish in return for a viable 
Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 
(o274)
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compared to 89% of the respondents in the Northern Gaza districts. Still, it remains evident that like the 
other districts, the vast majority of the respondents in those areas still feel that their leadership should not 
give away part of Jerusalem.  
Figure 10-22: Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian 
state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to district
The relative ﬂexibility of the respondents living in Gaza Strip refugee camps is also quite surprising. When
compared, for example, to the West Bank refugee camps, more respondents from Gaza Strip refugee 
camps agree that some compromises have to be made with regard to Jerusalem, areas in the West Bank, 
control over borders.  As indicated in ﬁgure 10.23, below, the percentage of respondents in the Gaza
Strip camps is only the same as those in the West Bank refugee camps when it concerns the issue of the 
refugee right of return.
Figure 10-23: Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian 
state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to place of residence (place)
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Despite the differences between the West Bank and refugee camp respondents with regard to what the 
Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a state, refugee camp respondents seem to be the 
most ﬂexible when compared to respondents residing in cities or villages. This is rather evident with respect
to giving away parts of the West Bank to Israel in return for a state. While 5% of refugee camp respondents 
think that it is acceptable for the leadership to give away parts of the West Bank, the percentage is only 1% 
among village respondents who obviously attach a great value to land. More generally, whereas 17% of 
the respondents in refugee camps accept that the leadership can compromise on some of the Palestinian 
rights, the percentage is 14% among city and village dwellers. These ﬁndings are detailed in ﬁgure 10.24,
below. 
Figure 10-24: Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian 
State in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) by area of residence (o060)
When examining the different perception on this issue according to the region of residence, the results 
show no evident differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respondents, except on the issue 
regarding relinquishing parts of the West Bank. As can be observed from ﬁgure 10.25, below, only 3%
of West Bank respondents feel that it is worth giving up on 5 to 10% of the West Bank for a Palestinian 
state, the percentage is 5% among the Gaza Strip respondents. Again, the issue of the right of return is as 
important to West Bank respondents as it is to Gaza Strip respondents and this despite the signiﬁcantly
higher proportion of refugees in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. 
Figure 10-25: Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian 
state in the land occupied (o274) by Israel in 1967 by region (o059)
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The consensus on the importance of the issue of right of return seems to be independent of the refugee 
status of the respondents. Although one might expect that the refugees will be more likely than non-refugees 
to insist on the right of return, the results show that refugees and non-refugees alike attach importance to 
this issue. As the refugee, only 3% of non-refugee respondents said that the Palestinian leadership can 
relinquish the right of return for the sake of a Palestinian state. These results are overviewed in ﬁgure
10.26, below.
Figure 10-26: Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian 
state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to refugee status (o002)
10.4.2 According to the poverty level
Although it has been established earlier in this chapter that support for a peace agreement is stronger 
among the respondents that are economically better-off, this subgroups has the strictest stance when it 
comes to giving away parts of the Palestinian rights. As can be seen in ﬁgure 10.27, below, the respondents
that live in abject poverty, more than those who are ﬁnancially better-off, tend to be prepared to relinquish
some Palestinian rights. Even so, despite their miserable conditions, 79% of the respondents who are 
classiﬁed as hardship cases believe that a Palestinian state should not be at the expense of giving away
any of the Palestinian rights.
Figure 10-27: Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian 
state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to the poverty level (poverty 3)
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10.4.3 According to trust in political and religious organizations
When examining the perceptions oft the Palestinian public with regard to the compromises their leadership 
could potentially make in return for a Palestinian state according to trust in political or religious factions, 
the differences between respondents trusting the different Palestinian factions are not that remarkable. 
This is particularly important because it clearly shows that the support which Fateh sympathizers give to 
the Palestinian Authority is not unconditional and could if their leadership embarks on policies that do not 
reﬂect the aspirations of the Palestinian people. The detailed ﬁndings on this issue according to trust in the
various Palestinian factions are overviewed in the ﬁgure, below.
Figure 10-28:  Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian 
state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to factional trust (o133)
10.5 Perceptions about reform and corruption in the PA
The previous analysis indicates to what the Palestinians, in all their different classiﬁcations, expect from
the Palestinian Authority with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict. The analysis showed that support
for a peace agreement does not necessarily imply a willingness on the part of the Palestinians to give away 
to give away what they believe is their right.
The current section will concentrate on the expectations of Palestinians regarding some important 
Palestinian internal politics, such as priorities and expectations on issues pertaining to human rights, 
democracy, corruption, and reform.
When the issue of corruption is raised, a high percentage of Palestinians thinks that there is corruption in 
the Palestinian Authority. What is not clear, however, is to what extent corruption is spread in the various 
Palestinian institutions.
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In examining this issue, two questions were added in the survey conducted for this report. One question 
pertains to whether the Palestinian public knows about the recent reforms that targeted the ﬁnancial structure
of the Palestinian Authority, and the second attempts to see whether a major indicator of corruption, namely 
bribe giving, is a reality or simply a perception that is not necessarily based on the actual situation. 
It is a well-known fact that major work has been done to improve the ﬁnancial accountability of the Palestinian
Authority. The Palestinian Ministry of Finance has taken a major role in controlling the ﬁnancial resources
of the Palestinian Authority and its institutions, especially after the appointment of Dr. Salam Fayyad as 
the Minister of Finance more than 18 months ago. All indications have shown that the Palestinian Authority 
has, indeed, moved positively in managing its ﬁnances. Despite this progress, the Palestinian perceptions
continue to be rather pessimistic about the attempts of reform within the Palestinian public institutions as 
well about the corruption within the Palestinian Authority. As indicated in ﬁgure 10.29, below, 25% of the
Palestinians never heard about any reform in the Palestinian Authority and 61% believe that these reforms 
are not real and are reforms only in name. Only 15% of the respondents said that the current reform 
efforts were genuine.  Moreover, 49% of the respondents strongly believe that there is corruption in the 
Palestinian Authority and 36% said that they only heard about corruption from friends and relatives.
Figure 10-29: Knowledge about reform (o176v2) and corruption in the Palestinian Authority, in general 
The strong attitude Palestinians have towards reform and corruption in the Palestinian Authority may be 
justiﬁable, but it may also be exaggerated. When respondents were asked about whether they themselves
or any of the members of their household offered any bribe for a Palestinian ofﬁcial in return for a service,
90% answered that they never did, 8% said that they did indeed offer a bribe to a Palestinian ofﬁcial but
only on rare occasion and 3% said that a bribe was offered frequently. These results are illustrated in ﬁgure
10.30, below. 
However, when the respondents were asked whether or not they have heard about anyone ever offering 
a bribe to a Palestinian ofﬁcial in return for a service, only 49% said that they did not hear about such
activities, while 51% replied that they have heard about others offering bribes to Palestinian ofﬁcials.
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The above analysis clearly shows that there is a strong 
perception among the Palestinian public that corruption 
is widespread, when it could be argued that this is not 
necessarily the case. 
There is no doubt that the need to reform and monitor 
the performance of the Palestinian Authority and the 
Palestinian public institutions is important and vital as it 
is the case in all countries around the world. However, 
focusing on corruption as an issue that is endemic in 
Palestinian society could produce negative results as 
it could lead to both a lack of trust in the duly elected 
Palestinian leadership and a disproportionate distrust 
of the political institutions. This lack of trust could 
unnecessarily shift the emphasis from what are the real 
and needed priorities and could retard any attempts 
and efforts that aim at bringing peace and stability in 
the region. 
Thus, when the Palestinians were asked in the February 20041 about their main concerns with regard 
to the Palestinian Authority, corruption (nepotism, lack of transparency, and corruption in general) came 
out as the main issue of concern, more so than inefﬁciency and mismanagement, human rights and
democracy, and much more so than the inability to deal with illegal weapons or security.   However, as 
illustrated in ﬁgure 10.31, below, when the word ‘corruption’ was excluded from the question2, the concerns 
of the Palestinian public shifted away from corruption as the main concern with respect to the Palestinian 
Authority to issues such as mismanagement, unauthorized weapons, and internal security problems. 
Accordingly, it is of utmost importance to accurately understand both what corruption entails and to what 
extent it is a problem in the Palestinian Authority. 
Figure 10-31: Issues Palestinians are more concerned about: comparison between Feb 2004 and Oct 2004 (o178v2, 
o178v2a)
Figure 10-30: The level of bribe-offering to Palestinian 
officials: differences between reality and perceptions 
in general (o259)
 
1 This 7th survey on Palestinian public perceptions was conducted in February 2004.
2 In the November 2004 Survey carried out for the current perceptions report, the same question was asked as in 
the February 2004 survey, but without providing the respondent the option to answer ‘corruption in general’.
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Lastly, the fact that only 3% of the respondents considered lack of democracy and only 4% considered 
lack of respect for human rights as main issues of concern within the Palestinian Authority could lead one 
to conclude that the Palestinian public does not ﬁnd the Palestinian Authority to be as authoritarian or
disrespectful of human rights as depicted by some critics. 
10.6 Attitudes towards the most trusted source of information
Normally, information about politics is acquired from a number of sources. In some areas, these sources 
are limited and/or restricted, in others; they are more relaxed and diverse.  In the following pages, the most 
trusted sources of information will be examined in order to better understand how the Palestinian public 
establishes its attitudes and perceptions about various political issues.
As elaborated in ﬁgure 10.32, below, 39% of the Palestinian public trust the Palestinian sources of
information (Palestinian Radio, Palestinian TV, and the Palestinian newspapers). However, Al-Jazeera 
TV is the single most trusted source of information with 29% of the respondents citing the Qatar-based 
satellite news channel. Only 5% trust the Palestinian religious or political factions, and 12% cited Al-Manar 
satellite TV station as their most trusted source of information. 
10-32: Most trusted source of information to the Palestinian public (o136v3a)
Although Al-Jazeera continues to be the most trusted source of information, the survey reveals that the 
trust in Al-Jazeera dropped from 37% in February 2004 to 29% in October 2004. The same is also reﬂected
on the trust for Al-Manar TV where the percentage dropped from 17% in February 2004 to 12% in October 
2004. Conversely, trust in the Palestinian media increased from 24% to 39% during the same period.
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10.6.1 According to education
An analysis of the most trusted source of information according to education reveals that higher educated 
respondents are less likely to rely on Palestinian radio than medium and lower educated respondents. 
Whereas only 9% of higher educated respondents said that they trust Palestinian radio, the percentage 
is higher among the lower (18%) and medium (16%) educated respondents. Conversely, higher educated 
respondents rely more on the political and religious factions and Al-Jazeera TV station for their information 
than lower and medium educated respondents. As presented in table 10.4, below, 17% of the lower 
educated respondents trust family and friends for their information, compared to only 4% of the medium 
educated and 2% of the higher educated.
Table 10-4: Most trusted source of information (o136v3a) according to the educational level (educ) 
Educational level Total
Low Medium High  
Palestinian Radio 18% 16%  →9% 14%
Palestinian TV 16% 16% 9% 13%
al-Quds newspaper 7% 8% →13% 10%
al-Ayyam newspaper 2% 2% 2%
al-Hayat al Jadida newspaper 0% 1% 0%
The mosque/ the religious leaders 1% 3% 5% 3%
Political or religious faction 2% 3%  →8% 5%
Friends and relatives →17% 4% 2% 5%
al-Jazeera 21% 28% 32% 29%
al-Arabyyiah 6% 3% 3% 3%
Abu Dhabi 4% 4% 4% 4%
al-Manar 7% 12% 12% 12%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
                    Sig.000
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10.6.2 According to the poverty level
Trust in sources of information is also related to the poverty level of respondents. As illustrated in ﬁgure
10.33, below, Palestinians whose income falls below the poverty line are more likely to trust Palestinian 
radio and Palestinian TV than those who are more economically advantaged. Whereas 20% of the 
hardship cases and 16% of those below the poverty line trust Palestinian radio most, the percentage 
is only 9% among the respondents whose economic situation is above the poverty line. However, twice 
as many respondents of the latter trust the Al-Quds newspaper than respondents that are economically 
less advantaged. Trust in the Arabic satellite channels (such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabyyiah, and Al-Manar) 
are more or less equally divided between the respondents from all economic levels. These results are 
overviewed in ﬁgure 10.33, below.
10-33: Most trusted source of information (o136v3a) according to the poverty level (poverty 3)
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10.6.3 According to trust in political and religious factions
Although there is a statistical signiﬁcance between the most trusted source of information and the faction
most trusted by the Palestinian respondents, it is noticeable that the differences are not as remarkable as 
one would expect given the supposedly ideological differences between the various political and religious 
factions and organizations. For example, one would expect respondents trusting Hamas to trust the mosque 
or the religious leaders more than they would trust, for example the Palestinian radio, which is a semi-
government entity. As table 10.5 below reveals, 17% of respondents trusting Hamas trust the Palestinian 
radio, compared to 15% of the respondents trusting Fateh. Furthermore, although more of the respondents 
trusting Hamas and Islamic Jihad trust the mosques and the religious leaders than respondents trusting 
the secularist organizations, the percentage is only 6% for Hamas, and 5% for Islamic Jihad. 
Table 10-5: Most trusted source of information (o136v3a) according to the faction most trusted
Faction most trusted
 Fateh Hamas Islamic Jihad PFLP
Other 
secularist 
factions
Other
Islamic
factions
Do not 
trust any 
faction
Total
 Palestinian Radio 15% 17% 11% 13% 4% 12% 13% 14%
 Palestinian TV 17% 13% 15% 5% 18% 19% 10% 13 %
 al-Quds newspaper 12% 6% 11% 13% 4% 4% 12% 10%
 al-Ayyam newspaper 2% 2% 4% 1% 2%
 al-Hayat al Jadida newspaper 0% 0% 3% 7% 2% 0% 1%
 The mosque/ the religious leaders 2% 6% 5% 8% 3% 34%
 Political or religious faction 6% 8% 8% 15% 11% 8% 1% 5%
 Friends and relatives 2% 3% 1% 4% 10% 5%
 al-Jazeera 27% 26% 23% 41% 39% 37% 30% 28%
 al-Arabyyiah 3% 2% 1% 3% 5% 3%
 Abu Dhabi 4% 3% 5% 4% 2% 4% 4%
 al-Manar 11% 15% 20% 8% 7% 10% 10% 12%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Clearly, the sources of information that the Palestinian public trusts are diverse. This diversity is attributed 
to the availability of TV stations and satellite channels3 as well as to the relative ﬂexibility of the Palestinian
laws with regard to the dissemination of information: the Palestinian Press Law does not call for censorship 
and private TV and radio stations are allowed to operate.   
The abundance of information sources and the ability of the Palestinian public to choose which medium 
of information to trust in the formation of their attitudes and beliefs about politics in general have been 
instrumental in preventing one or few sources of information that are ideologically motivated to monopolize 
what information should be ﬁltered to the Palestinian public. The inability of such sources to manipulate
Palestinian public opinion is demonstrated, as discussed above, by the large number of sources of 
information that go beyond political afﬁliation, or educational level, or economic condition. While this might
be considered trivial, it is worth noting that this environment is rather unique in the Middle East where 
sources of information are often censored and restricted.
3 According to this study, 69% of the respondents said that their households possess satellite dishes.
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10.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, the most striking ﬁndings of this report are summed up below:
• The majority of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not feel generally secure. 
This feeling of insecurity is highest among the extremely poor (88%), among the residents of the 
Gaza Strip (87%), and among the refugee camp residents (91%).
• Many Palestinians are distrustful of the existing political or religious factions. As for those who do 
trust the existing ones, the percentage in general terms is evenly split between the secularists and 
the religious factions. The highest level of support for the secularist factions can be found in the 
West Bank, particularly in its villages. Support for religious groups is high among the Palestinians 
living in extreme poverty and those who are not fully employed. Accordingly, it is safe to argue 
that the socio-economic condition of the population has a major inﬂuence on their preference for
various political or religious factions.
• The majority of the Palestinian public (84%) believes that life in general became much worse 
since the outbreak of the Intifada. This feeling is stronger in the central West Bank (90%) and in 
the northern Gaza Strip districts (90%). The feelings about life since the Intifada are more intense 
among those trusting the religious political factions than among those trusting the secularist political 
factions. 
• Support for a peace agreement with Israel is reﬂected in the views of the majority of the respondents
with 55% stating that they support a peace settlement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
Support is stronger in villages (66%) than in cities where only 49% of the city respondents said that 
they support a peace settlement with Israel.  As for refugee camps, 55% of the respondents there 
stated their support for a peace agreement with Israel. Moreover, the highest support for a peace 
agreement can be found among the older respondents, the less educated, the non-refugees, the 
female respondents, and among the respondents whose economic condition is above the poverty 
line. When examining the support for a peace agreement with Israel according the political or 
religious afﬁliation, a clear difference can be found. While 72% of the ‘secularists’ support a peace
agreement with Israel, the percentage is only 35% among the respondents trusting the religious 
factions.
• Although the majority of the respondents support a peace agreement with Israel, still 87% of them 
believe that the Palestinian leadership should not relinquish any of the Palestinian rights such 
as Jerusalem, right of return, or any land in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. This percentage is 
high irrespective of place of residence, socio-economic condition, political afﬁliation, or educational
background.
• There seems to be a misconception about the level of corruption in the Palestinian Authority. 
Although, for example, the majority of Palestinians think that there is a great deal of bribery given 
for Palestinian ofﬁcials in return for a service, the actual situation seems to be quite contrary to this.
When the respondents were asked whether they or any of their household members were given a 
bribe for a Palestinian ofﬁcial in return for a service, over 90% said no and only 3% said that they
have been given bribes regularly.
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• The majority of the Palestinian public is not very concerned about democracy and human rights. 
Only 7% of the respondents said that the issues of democracy and human rights are the main 
concern they have with respect to the Palestinian Authority. The main concern respondents have 
about the Palestinian Authority is the lack of resources and the inability to deal with internal security 
matters. These issues become less important when the respondents were provided the opportunity 
to give an opinion about corruption where, corruption then becomes the main issue of concern 
although the results indicated that the issue of corruption seems to be more of a perception than 
actual practice.
• The most trusted source of information is Al-Jazeera satellite channel. However, the Palestinian 
radio and TV and the Palestinian newspapers combined become more important as the source of 
information most trusted by the Palestinian public. In addition, support for Al-Jazeera dropped from 
37% in February 2004 to 29% in October 2005.
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Annex II: English Questionnaire
Questionnaire for the 8th report (Final)  
PPP studies 
Instructions
Answer questions as they relate to you. For most answers, check the boxes most applicable to you or fill in the 
blanks. 
Security 
1. In general, do you feel secure?  
1. ��I feel secure (Skip to Q. 3)
2. ��I do not feel secure 
9. ��DK/NA 
2. Why do you feel insecure?  
1. (Select only one.)
1. ���Because of internal security problems 
2. ���Because of Israeli incursions 
3. ���Because there are no signs for socio-economic improvements 
4. ���Other_________ 
9. ���DK/NA 
3. How did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months?  
(Select all that apply.) 
1. Inability to market products to areas 1. Yes 2. No 
2. Difficulties in buying raw materials or products 1. Yes 2. No 
3. Problems pertaining to reaching the place of work 1. Yes 2. No 
4. Inability to pay bank loans 1. Yes 2. No 
5. My/family business  went bankrupt in the past six months 1. Yes 2. No 
6. Inability to work because of curfew 1. Yes 2. No 
7. Damage to agricultural lands 1. Yes 2. No 
Household structure 
4. How many adults of 18 years or more (including yourself) live in this household?  
(Provide one response only.)
_______________________ 
5. How many of these adults are women?  
(Provide one response only.) 
________________________
6. The main breadwinner in this household is:  
1. Male
2. ��Female 
3. Both contribute significantly to the household (DO NOT READ, ONLY IF SPECIFIED BY 
RESPONDENT)
9. ��DK/NA 
7. How many of these adults are employed?  
____________
Questionnaire for the 8th report (Final)  
PPP studies 
Instructions
Answer questions as they relate to you. For most answers, check the boxes most applicable to you or fill in the 
blanks. 
Security 
1. In general, do you feel secure?  
1. ��I feel secure (Skip to Q. 3)
2. ��I do not feel secure 
9. ��DK/NA 
2. Why do you feel insecure?  
1. (Select only one.)
1. ���Because of internal security problems 
2. ���Because of Israeli incursions 
3. ���Because there are no signs for socio-economic improvements 
4. ���Other_________ 
9. ���DK/NA 
3. How did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months?  
(Select all that apply.) 
1. Inability to market products to areas 1. Yes 2. No 
2. Difficulties in buying raw materials or products 1. Yes 2. No 
3. Problems pertaining to reaching the place of work 1. Yes 2. No 
4. Inability to pay bank loans 1. Yes 2. No 
5. My/family business  went bankrupt in the past six months 1. Yes 2. No 
6. Inability to work because of curfew 1. Yes 2. No 
7. Damage to agricultural lands 1. Yes 2. No 
Household structure 
4. How many adults of 18 years or more (including yourself) live in this household?  
(Provide one response only.)
_______________________ 
5. How many of these adults are women?  
(Provide one response only.) 
________________________
6. The main breadwinner in this household is:  
1. Male
2. ��Female 
3. Both contribute significantly to the household (DO NOT READ, ONLY IF SPECIFIED BY 
RESPONDENT)
9. ��DK/NA 
7. How many of these adults are employed?  
____________
8. How many of these adults have lost their job in the past six months?  
____________
What is..... 
 Age Code Gender Code Hours per 
week in 
domestic 
work or 
activity 
Code Hours per 
week in 
economic
work or 
activity 
Code 
9.Respondent ___  1. Male
2. Female 
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
10. Adult #2 ___  1. Male
2. Female 
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
11. Adult #3 ___  1. Male
2. Female 
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
12. Adult #4 ___  1. Male
2. Female 
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
13. Adult #5 ___  1. Male
2. Female 
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
14. Adult #6 ___  1. Male
2. Female 
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
 1. none 
2. 1-19 
3. 20-39 
4. >40
15. How many children aged less than 18 years live in this household?  
_____________ 
16. Of these, how many are less than 15 years old?  
_____________ 
What is... 
 Age Code Gender Code Hours per 
week in 
domestic 
work or 
activity 
Code Hours per 
week in 
economic 
work or 
activity 
Code 
17.Child #1 ___  1 Male 
2 Female 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
18 Child #2 ___  1 Male 
2 Female 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
19. Child #3 ___  1 Male 
2 Female 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
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20. Child #4 ___  1 Male 
2 Female 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
21. Child #5 ___  1 Male 
2 Female 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
22. Child #6 ___  1 Male 
2 Female 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
 1 none 
2 1-19 
3 20-39 
4 >40 
Labor Market 
23. Are you currently employed or not?  
1. ���I am employed full-time 
2. ���I am employed part-time 
3. ���I am employed for few hours/day 
4. ���I am not employed (Skip to Q. 27)
5. ���I am a housewife (Skip to Q. 27)
6. ���I am a student (Skip to Q. 28)
7. ���I am retired (Skip to Q. 28)
9. ���DK/NA 
24. How did you hear about your current employment?  
1. ���From the newspapers 
2. ���From relatives and friends 
3. ���I am employed in the family business 
4. ���Others _______ 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
25. If you are employed now, how do you see the probability that you loose your job in the current year?  
1. ���Very unlikely 
2. ���Rather unlikely 
3. ���Rather likely 
4. ���Very likely 
8. ���Not applicable 
9.  DK/NA 
26. If employed, do you consider your present job matches your technical or academic training?  
1. ���Yes
2. ���Not fully 
3. ���Not at all 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
27. If you are unemployed, for how long have you been unemployed?  
1. ���For less than six months 
2. ���For less than one year 
3. ���For one to two years 
4. ���For over two years 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
28. Employment category (or previous one for the unemployed)?  
1. ���Professional (physician, engineer, etc…) 
Annex II: English Questionnaire 259
2. ���Skilled worker 
3. ���Unskilled worker 
4. ���Technician 
5. ���Employee 
6. ���Self-employed 
7. ���Others _______ 
9. ���DK/NA 
29. Type of employment (or last type for the unemployed)  
1. ���Government employee 
2. ���Employed by an international agency 
3. ���Employed by an international NGO 
4. ���Employed by a local NGO 
5. ���Employed by the private sector 
6. ���Self-employed in petty trade of agricultural products 
7. ���Self-employed in petty trade of manufactured products 
8. ���Other self-employed 
9. ���Others________ 
88.���Not applicable 
99.��� DK/NA 
30. Main place of work (or last place for the unemployed)?  
1. ���Jerusalem 
2. ���West Bank 
3. ���Gaza Strip 
4. ���Settlements 
5. ���Israel proper 
6. ���In another country 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
31. Did your employment situation change in the past six months?  
1. ���No, it remained the same 
2. ���Yes, I had to search for a different job 
3. ���Yes, I lost my job 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
32. Was this change a consequence of:  
(Select only one.)
1. ���Inability to reach the place of work 
2. ���Employer can no longer afford to pay my salary 
3. ���The business had to close because of losses 
4. ���Other :________ 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
33. What are you trained for?  
(Select only one.)
���Please specify ___________ 
88.���Not applicable �
99.���DK/NA 
34. If you are unemployed, did you try to find a job?  
1. ���Yes, a lot (Skip to Q. 36)
2. ���I tried, but not very hard
3. ���I did not try at all 
���Not applicable (Skip to Q. 36)
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9. ���DK/NA (Skip to Q. 42)
41. If your household income decreased in the past six months, what were the two most important causes 
for this change?  
The first cause The second cause 
1  Job loss of  breadwinner 1  Job loss of  breadwinner 
2  Working hour loss 2  Working hour loss 
3  Land for cultivation damaged 3  Land for cultivation damaged 
4 Damage in personal business 4 Damage in personal business 
5  Member of household in detention 5  Member of household in detention 
6 Member of household died 6 Member of household died 
7  Health problems of a family member 7  Health problems of a family member 
8  Increase in the prices of inputs and transportation 8  Increase in the prices of inputs and transportation 
9  Other ___________________ 9  Other ___________________ 
99 DK/NA 99 DK/NA 
42. Of the following items, which constitute the income of the household?  
(Select all that apply.) 
1. Salaries from long-term jobs 1. yes 2. No 
2. Salaries from short-term jobs 1. yes 2. No 
3. Income from independent activity or petty trade 1. yes 2. No 
4. Renting of property 1. yes 2. No 
5. Selling property 1. yes 2. No 
6. Financial help from family members living in Palestine 1. yes 2. No 
7. Financial help from family members living abroad   
8. Dividends   
9. Financial help from the PA, from local or international 
organizations 
1. yes 2. No 
43. Please rank in order of importance the five main expense types your household income is primarily 
devoted to:  
(Rank responses from 1 to 5.)
1st  main expense                                     �
2nd main expense                                      �
3rd main expense                                     �
4th main expense                                     �
1. Food 
2. Education 
3. Health 
4. Rent 
5. Household items 
6. Sustaining the family 
business 
7. Transportation 
8. Buying a house, a car or a 
business 
9. Clothes 
10. Leisure
5th main expense                                     �
44. How much money (in NIS) would you say your household needs monthly to be able to meet basic life 
necessities?
(Provide one response only.)
 ___________________shekels 
9. ���DK/NA
35. If you did not try to find a job or did not try very hard, please tell us your main reason?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���The pay is too low 
2. ���I know others tried and failed 
3. ���I want to emigrate 
4. ���I want to pursue my studies 
5. ���I want to stay at home 
6. ���I want to get married 
7. ����Other ___________ 
8. ��� Not applicable 
9. ��� DK/NA  
36. Looking back to the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, for how long in total has the 
main breadwinner of your household been unemployed?  
1. ���Never 
2. ���Less than two months 
3. ���Between 2 to 6 months 
4. ���Between 7 to 12 months 
5. ���Between 13 to 24 months 
6. ���Between 24 to  36 months 
7. ���The whole period (41 months) 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
Economic Situation 
37. How do you financially consider yourself and your household?  
1. ���Better-off than the people in my community 
2. ���About the same as the people in my community 
3. ���Worse-off than the people in my community 
9. ���DK/NA 
38. Are you the main breadwinner of this household?  
1. ���Yes
2. ���No, but I also bring income 
3. ���No, I do not bring income 
9. ���DK/NA 
39. How much is your family income?  
1. ���NIS 5000 and over 
2. ���Between NIS 4500-4999 
3. ���Between NIS 4000-4499 
4. ���Between NIS 3500-3999 
5. ���Between NIS 3000-3499 
6. ���Between NIS 2500-2999 
7. ���Between NIS 2000-2499 
8. ���Between NIS 1500-1999 
9. ���Between NIS 1000-1499 
10.���Between NIS 500-999 
11.���Less than NIS 500 
99.���DK/NA 
40. In the past six months, did your household income increase, decrease, or remain the same?  
1. ���It increased (Skip to Q. 42)
2. ���It remained the same (Skip to Q. 42)
3. ���It decreased (Skip to Q. 41)
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9. ���DK/NA (Skip to Q. 42)
41. If your household income decreased in the past six months, what were the two most important causes 
for this change?  
The first cause The second cause 
1  Job loss of  breadwinner 1  Job loss of  breadwinner 
2  Working hour loss 2  Working hour loss 
3  Land for cultivation damaged 3  Land for cultivation damaged 
4 Damage in personal business 4 Damage in personal business 
5  Member of household in detention 5  Member of household in detention 
6 Member of household died 6 Member of household died 
7  Health problems of a family member 7  Health problems of a family member 
8  Increase in the prices of inputs and transportation 8  Increase in the prices of inputs and transportation 
9  Other ___________________ 9  Other ___________________ 
99 DK/NA 99 DK/NA 
42. Of the following items, which constitute the income of the household?  
(Select all that apply.) 
1. Salaries from long-term jobs 1. yes 2. No 
2. Salaries from short-term jobs 1. yes 2. No 
3. Income from independent activity or petty trade 1. yes 2. No 
4. Renting of property 1. yes 2. No 
5. Selling property 1. yes 2. No 
6. Financial help from family members living in Palestine 1. yes 2. No 
7. Financial help from family members living abroad   
8. Dividends   
9. Financial help from the PA, from local or international 
organizations 
1. yes 2. No 
43. Please rank in order of importance the five main expense types your household income is primarily 
devoted to:  
(Rank responses from 1 to 5.)
1st  main expense                                     �
2nd main expense                                      �
3rd main expense                                     �
4th main expense                                     �
1. Food 
2. Education 
3. Health 
4. Rent 
5. Household items 
6. Sustaining the family 
business 
7. Transportation 
8. Buying a house, a car or a 
business 
9. Clothes 
10. Leisure
5th main expense                                     �
44. How much money (in NIS) would you say your household needs monthly to be able to meet basic life 
necessities?
(Provide one response only.)
 ___________________shekels 
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45. To what extent would you say your household income is close to this number nowadays?  
1. ���Much higher than this 
2. ���Slightly higher than this 
3. ���About the same 
4. ���Slightly less than this 
5. ���Much less than this 
9. ���DK/NA 
46. How long would you say you could keep up financially in the future?  
1. ���For as long as it takes 
2. ���For about one year 
3. ���For only few months 
4. ���We can barely manage now 
5. ���Our situation is serious and we do not have enough to live 
9. ���DK/NA 
47. Did you invest money in a business since the Intifada started?  
1. ���Yes
2. ���No
9. ���DK/NA 
48. Does your family own or rent this house?  
1. ���The house is owned 
2. ���The house is rented 
3. ���The house is part of the refugee camp 
9. ���DK/NA 
49. Do you or your family own or rent land?  
1. ���Yes, our family owns land since more than 10 years 
2. ���Yes, our family bought land in the past 10 years 
3. ���We rent land 
4. ���We do not own or rent land 
9. ���DK/NA 
Mobility 
50. To what extent would you say that restrictions on your mobility were a problem for you and your 
family in the past six months?  
1. ���A lot 
2. ���A little 
3. ���Not at all 
9. ���DK/NA 
51. How did the construction of the separation wall affect you and your household?  
(Select all that apply.) 
1. Had a direct affect 1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
2. It separated us from relatives 1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
3. It separated us from our land 1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
4. It prevented household members from reaching 
their place of work 
1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
5. It cut our land from water 1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
6. It forced members of our household to move to 
another place 
1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
7. It made access to basic services such as 
education or health more difficult 
1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
8. It made it difficult/impossible to market 
agricultural produce 
1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
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9. It made it difficult/impossible to prepare, plough, 
plant, harvest the land 
1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
10. It greatly increased the price of inputs and 
transportation costs 
1. Affected 2. Didn’t affect 
52. In the past 6 months, was it possible to go to work for you or your family members?  
1. ���Not difficult 
2. ���Difficult 
3. ���Very difficult 
4. ���Almost impossible 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
53. In the past 6 months, was it possible to cultivate land for you or your family members?  
1. ���Not difficult 
2. ���Difficult 
3. ���Very difficult 
4. ���Almost impossible 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
54. Have any of the children in this household been absent from school for more than two weeks since the 
beginning of the school year for reasons other than illness or Israeli measures?  
1. ���Yes
2. ���No
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
Assistance 
55. Looking back since the Intifada started, did you, or any of your household members receive any type 
of assistance? (Assistance such as food, medicine, job, money, education, etc.)  
1. ���Yes
2. ���No
9. ���DK/NA 
56. How important is the assistance received for the household's budget since the beginning of the second 
Intifada?  
1. ���We could not manage without it 
2. ���We would manage with great difficulties 
3. ���It constitutes a useful complement to the regular household income 
4. ���It only helps alleviate the hardship under difficult circumstances 
5. ���The household would manage anyway 
6. ���Assistance is not important to the household's livelihood 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
57. Have you or your family received any assistance from any party in the past six months? (Assistance 
such as food, medicine, job, money, education, etc.)  
1. ���Yes
2. ���No
3. ���DK/NA 
58. Would you say your household is in need of assistance or of more assistance ?  
1. ���Yes, a lot 
2. ���Yes, a little 
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3. ���Not sure 
4. ���No, we receive enough 
5. ���No we do not need assistance 
9. ���DK/NA 
59. In the past six months, did the importance of assistance increase or decrease in your household 
budget?  
1. ���It increased: Six months ago, assistance was less important for my household than today 
2. ���It decreased: Six months ago, assistance was more important to us than today 
3. ���It did not change much 
4. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
60. In the past six months and taking into account the assistance provided by the various Palestinian or 
international organizations, what is the proportion of your daily life expenditures/consumption which is 
covered by the money from your households' members income generating activities?  
1. ���None, no household members have an income 
2. ���One third or less 
3. ���One half or less 
4. ���Two thirds or less 
5. ���Entirely, we did not receive assistance 
61. In general, how do you evaluate the assistance provided to you and to your family in the past six 
months by various organizations?  
1. ���Very satisfied 
2. ���Satisfied 
3. ���Dissatisfied
4. ���Very dissatisfied 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
62. If dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, what is your main reason?  
1. ���Because of the quantity 
2. ���Because of the quality 
3. ���Because of the frequency 
4. ���Other______ 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
63. Did you personally receive employment assistance of the following types in the past six months?  
(Select all that apply.)
1. ���Long-term job (more than three months)  1. Yes  2. No 
2. ���Short-term job (less than three months)  1. Yes  2. No 
3. ���Unemployment funds    1. Yes  2. No 
4. ���Resources to sustain an activity as self-employed 1. Yes  2. No 
64. Who provided this assistance?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���The Municipality/village council 
2. ���The Palestinian Authority or any of its ministries or agencies 
3. ���UNRWA 
4. ���A Trade Union 
5. ���An NGO (non governmental organization) 
6. ���An international organization 
7. ���A religious organization 
8. ���A private source 
88.���Not applicable 
99. �        DK/NA 
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65. Did other household members receive employment assistance of the following types in the past six 
months?  
(Select all that apply.)
1. ���Long-term job (more than three months)  1. Yes  2. No 
2. ���Short-term job (less than three months)  1. Yes  2. No 
3. ���Unemployment funds    1. Yes  2. No 
4. ���Resources to sustain an activity as self-employed 1. Yes  2. No 
66. Who provided this assistance?  
(Select only one)
1. The Municipality/village council 
2. The Palestinian Authority or any of its ministries or agencies 
3. UNRWA 
4. A Trade Union 
5. An NGO (non governmental organization) 
6. An international organization 
7. A religious organization 
8. A private source 
88. Not applicable 
99. DK/NA 
67. In general, how do you evaluate this employment assistance received by you personally and/or by 
other household members?  
1. ���Very satisfied (Skip to Q. 69)
2. ���Satisfied (Skip to Q. 69)
3. ���Dissatisfied
4. ���Very Dissatisfied 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
68. If you are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with this employment assistance, could you please give your 
main reason of dissatisfaction?  
1. ���The amount of assistance is too little 
2. ���The period of employment is too short 
3. ���Other  
8. ���Not applicable  
9. ���DK/NA 
69. What is the first most important type of assistance that you or your household received in the past six 
months?  
(Select only one.)
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
���Type: 
70. What was the value (in NIS) of this first most important assistance type?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���No value 
2. ���No material value 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
���Value: _________ 
71. What was its source?  
(Select  only one.)
1. ���The Municipality/village council 
2. ���The Palestinian Authority/ministries/agencies 
3. ���UNRWA 
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4. ���A Trade Union 
5. ���An NGO (non governmental organization) 
6. ���An international organization 
7. ���A religious organization 
8. ���A private source 
72. How satisfied are you with it?  
1. ���Very satisfied 
2. ���Satisfied 
3. ���Dissatisfied
4. ���Very dissatisfied 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
73. What is the second most important type of assistance that you or your household received in the past 
six months?  
(Select only one.)
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
���Type:______________ 
74. What was the value (in NIS) of this second most important assistance type?  
1. ���No value 
2. ���No material value 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
���Value: _______________ 
75. How satisfied are you with it?  
1. ���Very satisfied 
2. ���Satisfied 
3. ���Dissatisfied
4. ���Very dissatisfied 
���Not applicable 
���DK/NA 
76. What was its source?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���The Municipality/village council 
2. ���The Palestinian Authority/ministries/govt. agency 
3. ���UNRWA 
4. ���A Trade Union 
5. ���An NGO (non governmental organization) 
6. ���An international organization 
7. ���A religious organization 
8. ���A private source 
77. Apart from the two above-mentioned assistance types, how many other assistance types have you 
received in the past six months?  
(Provide one response only.)
________________________ 
78. What is the total value (in NIS) of these assistance types?  
1. ���Not applicable 
2. ���DK/NA 
���Value: ___________ 
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79. From what sources did you receive these other assistance types?  
(Select the main three.) 
1st source________  
2nd source________ 
1. ��� The Municipality/village council 
2. ���The Palestinian Authority/ministries/govt. agency 
3. ���UNRWA 
4. ���A Trade Union 
5. ���An NGO (non governmental organization) 
6. ���An international organization 
7. ���A religious organization 
8. ���A private source 
3rd source________ 
80. How often did you receive food assistance in the past six months?  
1. ���More than six times 
2. ���Six times 
3. ���Five times 
4. ���Four times 
5. ���Three times 
6. ���Two times 
7. ���One time 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
81. How effective was the distribution of food?  
1. ���It was organized 
2. ���It was somewhat organized 
3. ���It was badly organized 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
82. What is your opinion about the targeting of food assistance in your community? To what extent would 
you say that food assistance is targeted to the needy?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���Food assistance is primarily targeted to the needy 
2. ���Food assistance targets the needy, but often others who do not need such assistance also receive it 
3. ���In general, food assistance is distributed without any distinction between the needy and those who 
do not need it 
9. ���DK/NA 
83. What is the main source of food in your household?  
1. ���Household relies primarily on relief assistance 
2. ���House relies primarily on support from its family or friends 
3. ���House relies primarily on own income for food 
9. ���DK/NA 
84. What are the two most needed food items in your household?  
1st most important need 2nd most important need 
1. [   ] Baby food 1. [   ] Baby food 
2. [   ] Basic commodities such as flour, sugar, 
lentils, beans, rice, oil 
2. [   ] Basic commodities such as flour, sugar, 
lentils, beans, rice, oil 
3. [   ] Milk and other dairy products 3. [   ] Milk and other dairy products 
4. [   ] Canned food 4. [   ] Canned food 
5. [   ] Fruits and vegetables 5. [   ] Fruits and vegetables 
6. [   ] Meat and poultry 6. [   ] Meat and poultry 
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85. Did your household consumption of DAIRY PRODUCTS increase, decrease or remain the same in the 
past year?  
1. ���It increased 
2. ���It decreased 
3. ���It remained the same 
4. ���It could not be reduced any further 
9. ���DK/NA 
86. Did your household consumption of MEAT increase, decrease or remain the same in the past year?  
1. ���It increased 
2. ���It decreased 
3. ���It remained the same 
4. ���It could not be reduced further 
9. ���DK/NA 
87. Did your household consumption of CARBOHYDRATES (such as potatoes, rice, etc.) increase, 
decrease or remain the same in the past year?  
1. ���It increased 
2. ���It decreased 
3. ���It remained the same 
4. ���It could not be reduced further 
9. ���DK/NA 
88. Did your household consumption of BREAD increase, decrease or remain the same in the past year?  
1. ���It increased 
2. ���It decreased 
3. ���It remained the same 
4. ���It could not be reduced further 
9. ���DK/NA 
89. Did your household consumption of FRUITS AND VEGETABLES increase, decrease or remain the 
same in the past year?  
1. ���It increased 
2. ���It decreased 
3. ���It remained the same 
4. ���It could not be reduced further 
9. ���DK/NA 
90. How many meals do the children of your household eat each day?  
(Select only one.)
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
���Number of Meals: ____________ 
Children
91. What do you think the children of your household need most?  
(Select two) 
1st most important need _______ 
1. ���Attend school regularly 
2. ���Safe opportunities to play with friends 
3. ���Get psychological support 
4. ���Unrestricted access to medical services 
5. ���Eat more than before the Intifada 
6. ���Eat better than before the Intifada 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
2nd most important need________ 
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92. Which of the following are the two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or 
below) of this household?  
1st source of water 2nd source of water 
[1]Piped water [1]Piped water 
[2] Public tap [2] Public tap 
[3] Borehole or pump [3] Borehole or pump 
[4] Protected well [4] Protected well 
[5] Protected spring or rain water [5] Protected spring or rain water 
[6] Vendor-provided water [6] Vendor-provided water 
[7] Bottled water [7] Bottled water 
[8] Tanker trucks [8] Tanker trucks 
[9] Unprotected wells and springs [9] Unprotected wells and springs 
93. Have any of the children in your household been involved in any of the following activities during the 
summer vacation?  
1. Playing in the neighborhood 1. yes 2. No 
2. Attending summer camp 1. yes 2. No 
3. Going to clubs 1. yes 2. No 
4. Attend remedial classes 1. yes 2. No 
5. Work/employment 1. yes 2. No 
6. Travel abroad 1. yes 2. No 
94. In the past 6 months, how often, on average, were your children unable to attend school or arrived late 
due to curfews/closures?  
1. ���Never or almost never 
2. ���Less than 10 times per month 
3. ���10 times or more per month 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
Health
95. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive PRIMARY HEALTH 
CARE (curative services)?  
1��� Nobody needed it 
2��� It was needed but we did not receive it 
3��   �It was needed and provided with delay 
4���  It was needed and provided without restriction or delay 
9��DK/NA 
96. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive HOSPITAL 
SERVICES?  
1��� Nobody needed it 
2��� It was needed but we did not receive it 
3��   �It was needed and provided with delay 
4���  It was needed and provided without restriction or delay 
9��DK/NA 
97. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive AMBULANCE service?  
1��� Nobody needed it 
2��� It was needed but we did not receive it 
3��   �It was needed and provided with delay 
4���  It was needed and provided without restriction or delay 
9��DK/NA 
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98. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive BIRTH CARE?  
1��� Nobody needed it 
2��� It was needed but we did not receive it 
3��   �It was needed and provided with delay 
4���  It was needed and provided without restriction or delay 
9��DK/NA 
99. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive SPECIALIZED CARE?  
1��� Nobody needed it 
2��� It was needed but we did not receive it 
3��   �It was needed and provided with delay 
4���  It was needed and provided without restriction or delay 
9��DK/NA 
100. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive PHYSICAL 
REHABILITATION?  
1��� Nobody needed it 
2��� It was needed but we did not receive it 
3��   �It was needed and provided with delay 
4���  It was needed and provided without restriction or delay 
9��DK/NA 
101. What was your main reason for choosing your health facility?  
1. ���Because I am insured and obliged to receive health services from this facility only 
2. ���Because I am not insured and this health facility was free of charge or cheaper than others 
3. ���Because of distance and time or because it is the only one available in the area 
4. ���Because of short waiting time 
5. ���Because of confidence in the quality of care 
6. ���Because of the availability of drugs 
7. ���Because of the humanity of care 
8. ���Because of the physician's gender 
9. ���DK/NA 
102. In the past six months, were you or any other member of your family prescribed drugs for 
CHRONIC problems and did the pharmacy of your health facility provide them?  
1  ��� It was not prescribed 
2  ��� It was prescribed and provided 
3  ��� It was prescribed but could not be provided 
9  ���DK/NA 
103. In the past six months, were you or any other member of your family prescribed drugs for ACUTE 
problems and did the pharmacy of your health facility provide them?  
1  ��� It was not prescribed 
2  ��� It was prescribed and provided 
3  ��� It was prescribed but could not be provided 
9  ���DK/NA 
104. Do you get any assistance for covering medical expenses?  
(Select only one.)
���Yes, through government health insurance 
���Yes, through UNRWA 
���Yes, through private health insurance 
���Yes, through charitable organizations 
���No, we cover our medical expenses from our own sources 
���No, we had to delay paying for medical expenses for financial reasons 
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105.  Does any of your household members suffer from any mental or physical or visual impairment and 
what is the type and the cause of that impairment?  
Age Type of impairment Cause of impairment 
1  1. Mental 2. Physical 3. Visual 1. Birth 2. 
Intifada/conflict 
3. Accident 
2  1. Mental 2. Physical 3. Visual 1. Birth 2. 
Intifada/conflict 
3. Accident 
3  1. Mental 2. Physical 3. Visual 1. Birth 2. 
Intifada/conflict 
3. Accident 
106. How many people in this household suffer from PHYSICAL impairment (physical or psychological 
disturbances affecting internal organs, the head, the trunk or the limbs)?  
_____________________ 
107. Of these, how many are children aged 14 years or less?  
_____________________ 
108. How many people in this household suffer from VISUAL impairment?  
_____________________ 
109. Of these, how many are children aged 14 years or less?  
_____________________ 
110. If you count the mentally, physically and visually impaired of your household all together, how many 
were caused by the second Intifada?  
_____________________
111. In case anyone in your household benefited from HOSPITAL SERVICES in the past six months, 
which was the service provider?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���A Palestinian Authority institution 
2. ���An Islamic organization 
3. ���Local NGO 
4. ���Arab government 
5. ���An Arab organization) 
6. ���UNRWA 
7. ���The Red Cross 
8. ���World Food Programme 
9. �        Other international organization 
10. �         Other ___________ 
88. �         Not applicable 
99. �         DK/NA 
112. How satisfied were you with this service?  
1. ���Very satisfied 
2. ���Satisfied 
3. ���Dissatisfied
4. ���Very dissatisfied 
���Not applicable 
DK/NA 
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113. In case anyone in your household benefited from PRIMARY HEALTH CARE in the past six months, 
which was the service provider?  
(Select only one.) 
1 ��A Palestinian Authority institution 
2 ��An Islamic organization 
3 ��Local NGO 
4 ��Arab government 
5 ��An Arab organization) 
6 UNRWA 
7 The Red Cross 
8 ��World Food Programme 
9 Other international organization 
10 Other ___________ 
88 Not applicable 
99 DK/NA 
114. How satisfied were you with this service?  
1. ���Very satisfied 
2. ���Satisfied 
3. ���Dissatisfied
4. ���Very dissatisfied 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
115. In case anyone in your household benefited from SPECIALIZED CARE in the past six months, 
which was the service provider?  
(Select only one.) 
1 ��A Palestinian Authority institution 
2 ��An Islamic organization 
3 ��Local NGO 
4 ��Arab government 
5 ��An Arab organization) 
6 UNRWA 
7 The Red Cross 
8 ��World Food Programme 
9 Other international organization 
10 Other ___________ 
88 Not applicable 
99 DK/NA 
116. How satisfied were you with this service?  
1. ���Very satisfied 
2. ���Satisfied 
3. ���Dissatisfied
4. ���Very dissatisfied 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
117. In case anyone in your household benefited from AMBULANCE TRANSPORTATION in the past 
six months, which was the service provider?  
(Select only one.)
1 ��A Palestinian Authority institution 
2 ��An Islamic organization 
3 ��Local NGO 
4 ��Arab government 
5 ��An Arab organization) 
6 UNRWA 
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7 The Red Cross 
8 ��World Food Programme 
9 Other international organization 
10 Other ___________ 
88 Not applicable 
99 DK/NA 
118. How satisfied were you with this service?  
1. ���Very satisfied 
2. ���Satisfied 
3. ���Dissatisfied
4. ���Very dissatisfied 
���Not applicable 
���DK/NA 
119. In case anyone in your household benefited from EDUCATION SERVICES (schools and 
Universities) in the past six months, which was the service provider?  
(Select only one) 
1 ��A Palestinian Authority institution 
2 ��An Islamic organization 
3 ��Local NGO 
4 ��Arab government 
5 ��An Arab organization) 
6 UNRWA 
7 The Red Cross 
8 ��World Food Programme 
9 Other international organization 
10 Other ___________ 
88 Not applicable 
99 DK/NA 
120. How satisfied were you with this service?  
���Very satisfied 
���Satisfied 
���Dissatisfied
���Very dissatisfied 
���Not applicable 
���DK/NA 
Assistance Priorities 
121. Which of the following, in your opinion, are the two most important needs of your household?  
First most important Second most important 
1. Employment 1. Employment 
2. Food 2. Food 
3. Health 3. Health 
4. Financial assistance 4. Financial assistance 
5. Housing and re-housing 5. Housing and re-housing 
6. Education 6. Education 
122. Taking into consideration the unmet needs only, which of the following, in your opinion, is the most 
important need of your household?  
(Select only one.)
���Employment 
���Food 
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���Health 
���Financial assistance 
���Housing and re-housing 
���Education 
8. ���Not applicable 
9. ���DK/NA 
123. What about your community, which of the following would you say are the two most important 
needs?
First most important Second most important 
1. Employment 1. Employment 
2. Food 2. Food 
3. Health 3. Health 
4. Financial assistance 4. Financial assistance 
5. Housing and re-housing 5. Housing and re-housing 
6. Education 6. Education 
124. Still about your community, which of the following would you say are the two most important 
facilities needed?  
First most important Second most important 
1. Water network 1. Water network 
2. Electricity network 2. Electricity network 
3. Sewage disposal network 3. Sewage disposal network 
4. Solid waste disposal network 4. Solid waste disposal network 
125. What about the following communication facilities, which in your opinion is the most important 
facility needed for your community?  
 (Select only one.)
1. ���Fixed phone line network 
2. ���Mobile phone network 
3. ���Permanent connection to the Internet 
4. ���Satellite TV 
���DK/NA 
Infrastructure 
126. Is your house connected to or does it receive the following services?  
1. Water network 1. Yes 2. No 
2. A well 1. Yes 2. No 
3. Electricity network 1. Yes 2. No 
4. Sewage disposal network 1. Yes 2. No 
5. Solid waste disposal service 1. Yes 2. No 
6. Fixed phone line network 1. Yes 2. No 
7. Mobile phone network 1. Yes 2. No 
8. Permanent connection to the Internet 1. Yes 2. No 
9. Satellite TV 1. Yes 2. No 
127. If you are not connected to a water network, how many tanks of water do you bring everyday for the 
household?  
________________ 
8. Not applicable 
9. DK/NA 
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128. Of those tanks of water brought every day to the household, how many are drinking water?  
________________ 
8. Not applicable 
9. DK/NA 
129. Do you think your household needs more water than this, less water than this, or the same amount of 
water specified?  
1. ���More water 
2. ���The same amount 
3. ���Less water 
���Not applicable 
���DK/NA 
130. Does your household have its own latrines, sewer or septic tank?  
1. ���Yes, we have our own latrines, sewer or septic tank 
2. ���No, we have to use public latrines 
���DK/NA 
Social Condition 
131. Are you a refugee or descendant of a refugee family?  
1. ���Yes, I am a refugee or a descendant of a refugee family 
2. ���No, we have never been displaced from our place of origin 
9. ���DK/NA 
132. What is your level of education?  
1. ���Never went to school 
2. ���Until elementary 
3. ���Until preparatory 
4. ���Until secondary 
5. ���Some college 
6. ���College & above 
���DK/NA 
133. What is your marital status?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���Single 
2. ���Married 
3. ���Divorced 
4. ���Widower 
9. ���NA
Coping Strategies 
134. In the past six months, did your household do the following to be able to relieve the hardship?  
1. We are getting assistance from family and friends living abroad 1. Yes 2. No 
2. We are getting assistance from family and friends living in Palestine or Israel 1. Yes 2. No 
3. We are using past savings 1. Yes 2. No 
4. We are selling estate property 1. Yes 2. No 
5. We are cultivating land 1. Yes 2. No 
6. More household members over the age of 18 yrs went into the labor market 1. Yes 2. No 
7. More household members below the age of 18 yrs went into the labor market 1. Yes 2. No 
8. We do not pay some bills (water, electricity, etc.) 1. Yes 2. No 
9. We are reducing expenses 1. Yes 2. No 
10. We are selling jewelry/gold 1. Yes 2. No 
11. We are buying on credit 1. Yes 2. No 
12. We are reducing the quantity of food 1. Yes 2. No 
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13. We buy less preferred food (quality) 1. Yes 2. No 
14. We have moved our place of residency to another city or village 1. Yes 2. No 
135. Of the above strategies utilized to relieve the hardship, would you say that those means are still 
available to your household, will be exhausted soon, are already exhausted, or were not available from the 
beginning?  
1. ���Those coping strategies are still available 
2. ���Those coping strategies will soon be exhausted 
3. ���Those coping strategies are already exhausted 
���DK/NA 
Politics
136. Which political or religious faction do you trust most?  
(Provide one response only.) 
_________________________
137. Which political or religious leader do you trust most?  
(Provide one response only.) 
_________________________
138. It is expected that presidential and national elections will take place soon in the Palestinian areas, do 
you support such elections in under the current conditions?  
1. ���Strongly support 
2. ���Support 
3. ���Oppose 
4. ���Strongly oppose 
9. ���DK/NA 
139. Do you agree with the manner by which Yasser Arafat is leading the areas under the control of the 
PA?
1. ���I strongly agree 
2. ���I agree 
3. ���I disagree 
4. ���I strongly disagree 
9. ���DK/NA 
140. Some say that the resignation of President Arafat will serve the Palestinian goal. What is your view 
regarding this issue?  
1. ���I strongly agree 
2. ���I agree 
3. ���I disagree 
4. ���I strongly disagree 
9. �DK/NA 
141. Looking at the PA, what are the two issues you are most concerned about?  
The first issue that is of concern to you most The first issue that is of concern to you most 
1  Lack of financial means 1  Lack of financial means 
2  Nepotism / Clientelism (assisting the relatives 
and friends) 
2  Nepotism / Clientelism (assisting relatives and 
friends) 
3  Inefficiency and mismanagement 3  Inefficiency and mismanagement 
4  Inability to deal with internal security problems 4  Inability to deal with internal security problems 
5  Inability to maintain public order 5  Inability to maintain public order 
6  Lack of democracy 6  Lack of democracy 
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7  Lack of transparency/accountability 7  Lack of transparency/accountability 
8  Lack of human rights 8  Lack of human rights 
9  Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons 9  Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons 
142. What is your opinion about reform in the Palestinian Authority?  
1. ���I did not hear of any such reform 
2. ���I think reform is real 
3. ���I think that the reform is only cosmetic 
9. ���DK/NA 
143. Have you or any of your household members given a bribe to a Palestinian official in return for a 
specific service?  
1. ���Yes, often 
2. ���Yes, but rarely 
3. ���No
9. ���DK/NA 
144. Have you heard of anyone who gave a bribe to a Palestinian official in return for a service?  
1. ���Yes, often 
2. ���Yes but rarely 
3. ���No
9. ���DK/NA 
145. What about corruption in the Palestinian Authority, would you say that:  
1. ���You think there is no corruption in the PA 
2. ���You are not sure but heard about it from reliable sources 
3. ���You are not sure but heard about it from friends 
4. ���You are certain of it 
9. ���DK/NA 
146. Since the beginning of the second Intifada, do you think the situation in general:  
1. ���Improved 
2. ���Remained the same 
3. ���Worsened 
9. ���DK/NA 
147. In case municipal elections are held before a peace agreement is reached, should the camp refugees:  
(Select only one.)
1. ���Hold separate elections at the camp level 
2. ���Not engage in any kind of local elections 
9. ���DK/NA 
148. How do you assess the camps services committees and other grassroots institutions work on behalf of 
the camp refugees?  
1. ���Very good (Skip to Q. 150)
2. ���Good (Skip to Q. 150)
3. ���Bad 
4. ���Very bad 
9. ���DK/NA (Skip to Q. 150)
149. In case you answered "bad" or "very bad", what is your main reason for this answer?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���Lack of funds 
2. ���Lack of expertise 
3. ���Lack of staff 
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4. ���Corruption 
5. ���Lack of technical cooperation with UNRWA and other actors 
9. ���DK/NA 
Peace
150. How do you feel about peace in general, do you support a peace settlement with Israel or oppose it?  
1. ���I support a peace settlement with Israel 
2. ���I oppose a peace settlement with Israel 
9. ���DK/NA 
151. Do you support the disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip?  
1. ���I strongly support 
2. ���I support 
3. ���I oppose 
4. ���I strongly oppose 
5. ���I do not know enough to decide 
6. ���I did not hear of it 
9. ���DK/NA 
152. Do you support the Road Map?  
1. ���I strongly support 
2. ���I support 
3. ���I oppose 
4. ���I strongly oppose 
5. ���I do not know enough to decide 
6. ���I did not hear of it 
9. ���DK/NA 
153. Do you support the Nusseibeh-Ayalon plan?  
1. ���I strongly support 
2. ���I support 
3. ���I oppose 
4. ���I strongly oppose 
5. ���I do not know enough to decide 
6. ���I did not hear of it 
9. ���DK/NA 
154. Do you support the Geneva Initiative?  
1. (Select only one.)
2. ���I strongly support 
3. ���I support 
4. ���I oppose (Skip to Q. 156)
5. ���I strongly oppose (Skip to Q. 156)
6. ���I do not know enough to decide (Skip to Q. 157)
7. ���I did not hear of it (Skip to Q. 157)
9. ���DK/NA (Skip to Q. 157)
155. Why do you support the Geneva Initiative?  
(Provide one response only.)
___________________________________________________________________ 
156. Why do you oppose the Geneva Initiative?  
(Provide one response only.)
___________________________________________________________________ 
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157. From where did you first hear about the Geneva Initiative?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���Palestinian radio 
2. ���Palestinian TV 
3. ���Al-Quds newspaper 
4. ���Al-Ayyam 
5. ���Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah 
6. ���Foreign media 
7. ���The mosque/ the religious leaders 
8. ���Political or religious faction 
9. ���Friends and relatives 
10.���Al-Jazeera 
11.���Al-Arabyyiah 
12.���Abu Dhabi 
13.���Al-Manar 
14.���Flyer in my mailbox 
15.���Other: ____________________________________ 
158. Which in your opinion should the Palestinian leadership relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian 
state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���Part of Jerusalem 
2. ���5-10% of the land of the West Bank 
3. ���Refugee right of return 
4. ���Palestinian control over borders 
5. ���Should relinquish anything if this will lead to ending occupation 
6. ���They should not relinquish anything of the Palestinian rights even if this keeps occupation 
9. ���DK/NA 
159. As part of a peace process, and as a temporary measure, would you accept an interim international 
force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?  
1. ���Yes and without reservation 
2. ���Yes, but under certain conditions 
3. ���No, I do not accept an interim international force 
9. ���DK/NA 
160. Which of the following do you see as the most likely outcome a temporary international force could 
achieve if it happens?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���An end to the occupation 
2. ���An end to the violence on both sides 
3. ���It will only guarantee my personal security 
4. ���It will not achieve anything 
9. ���DK/NA 
Media
161. What is the source of information that you trust most? What is the second?  
Most important source of information Second most important source of information 
1    Palestinian radio 1    Palestinian radio 
2    Palestinian TV 2    Palestinian TV 
3    Al-Quds newspaper 3    Al-Quds newspaper 
4    Al-Ayyam 4    Al-Ayyam 
5    Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah 5    Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah 
6    The mosque/ the religious leaders 6    The mosque/ the religious leaders 
7    The political/religious faction I trust most 7    The political/religious faction I trust most 
8    Friends and relatives 8    Friends and relatives 
9    Al-Jazeera 9    Al-Jazeera 
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10  Al-Arabyyiah 10  Al-Arabyyiah 
11  Abu Dhabi 11  Abu Dhabi 
12  Al-Manar 12  Al-Manar 
Interview 
162. INTERVIEWER: Area of residence:  
1. ���City
2. ���Village 
3. ���Refugee Camp 
163. INTERVIEWER: Governorate?  
(Select only one.)
1. ���Jenin District 
2. ���Toubas District 
3. ���Nablus District 
4. ���Salfit District 
5. ���Qalqilia District 
6. ���Tulkarem District 
7. ���Ramallah District 
8. ���Jerusalem District 
9. ���Jericho District 
10.���Bethlehem District 
11.���Hebron District 
12.���North Gaza District 
13.���Gaza City 
14.���Rafah District 
15.���Deir Al-Balah District 
16.���Khan Younis District 
164. INTERVIEWER: Name of the place of residence  
(Provide one response only.)
_____________________________ 
165 Religion of the respondent 
1.  Moslem 
2.  Christian 
3.  Other 
9.  DK/NA 
166. INTERVIEWER: Duration of interview (in minutes):  
__________________minute 
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� .����� .���� .�Q42-8:
� .����������� ������ �� ����� ������������� �� ����� ������� .���� .�Q42-9:
��� ������ �� ����� ��) ������ ����� ����� ���� �������� ������ ���� ��� ����� �� ������� ���� ������ ��� ����� ������ .��
(����� ���� ��� ���� �� �������
                           ���� ������� ��������Q43-1:
                            ������ ������ ��������Q43-2:
                            ������ ������ ��������Q43-3:
������ �������                           ������ ��Q43-4:
�.������
� .�������
� .�����
� .�����
� .������� �������
� .�������� ����� ������� ����� ��� ������
� .��������
� .����� �� ���� ��������� ��� ��
� .������
�� .�������                          ������ ������ ��������Q43-5:
�� .����� �������)������� (�������� ��������� ������
�����������
)��� ����� ����� ����� ������(
__________________________
Q44:
�� .������ ����� ��� ����� ����� ��� �� ����� ��� ��� .����� ����
� .� ��� ����
� .����� ��� ������
� .� ��� ���
� .����� ���
� .���� � /���� �Q45:
�� .���� ������ ������ ��� ����� ���� ������� ����� �� ��
����� ��� ������������� �
� .����� ��� �� ���� ����
� .������ ��� ����
� .��� ���� �����
� .������ ����� ����� ������
� .����� ������ �� ����� ���� �� ���� �����
� .���� � /���� �Q46:
�� .��������� ��� ��� ����� ��� �� �� � �� ������� ��� .���
� .�
� .� ���� /���� �Q47:
������������Code
�� .�������� �� �� �� ��� ���� ���� ����� ������ ���� ��� .������� ��� �����
� .�������
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� .������ ���� �� ��� �����
� .���� � /���� �Q48:
��.������ ��� �� �� ��� ���� ����� �� ��� ���� ��
� �� �����
� .��� ���� �� ��� ��� ���� ���� ����� ����
�����
� .��� �� ��� ���� ����� ����� ����������
� .��� ���� ������
� .��� ���� ��� ������ �� ���� �
� .���� � /���� �Q49:
�� .����� ���� ������ ��� ������ �� ����� ����� ��� ��
�� �� ������� �� ������������ ��� �
� .�����
� .� ���
� .����� ���� ��
� .���� � /���� �Q50:
��) .������ ����� ��� ��� ������ ���� (������ ���� ���� ������� ����� �� ����� ���� ��� ���
� .����� ���� ����.���� .���� ��Q51-1:
� .������� �� ��� ��.���� .���� ��Q51-2:
� .�� �� �� ��� ��.���� .���� ��Q51-3:
� .����� ��� ������ �� ����� ����� ����.���� .���� ��Q51-4:
� .������� �� �� ��� ����.���� .���� ��Q51-5:
� .��� ���� �� ����� ������� ��� ������ ����� �����.���� .���� ��Q51-6:
� .�� ������ ���������� ������� ��� ������� ������� ��� �������.���� .���� ��Q51-7:
� .������� ������� ����� �� ������ ���� ������� �� ����.���� .���� ��Q51-8:
� .����� ��� �� ���� ������� ������� ���� ������ ��� �� ����.���� .���� ��Q51-9:
�� .�� ���� ����������� ������ �� ���.���� .���� ��Q51-10:
�� .��� ���� �� �� ������ �� ��� �� ����� ��� ��� ��
������ ��� ����� ����� ���� �� �� �����
)��� ����� ����� ���� ������(
� .���� ��� ��
� .���� ���
� .������� ����
� .������ ���
� .����� �
� .���� � / ���� �Q52:
�� .����� �� �� ������ �� ��� �� ����� ��� ��� ��
� ��� ����� �����
)��� ����� ����� ���� ������(
� .���� ��� ��
� .����
� .������� ����
� .������ ���
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q53:
�� .���� �� ����� ����� ��� ���� ���� ���� ���
�� ��� ����� ������� �������� ����� ����� ��� �������
����������� �������� �� �����
� .���
� .�
� .���� � /���� �Q54:
�� .��������� ����� ��� ������ ��� ��������� �� � ��
���������� �� ��� �� ��� ����� ����� �� �� ��
)��� ������������ ������ ������ ������ �����...���(
� .���
� .�
� .���� � /���� �Q55:
�� .����� ��� ����� �� � ���� ��������� ����� ��� ��
������ ��� ������� �� ������� ��������
� .������ ������ ������� ��� ��
� .������ ���� ������ ����� �� ����
� .�� ��������������� ����� ���� ���
�.�������������� �� ��� �� �� �� ����� ���
� .������ ��� ���� ����� ���
� .������� ����� ���� ����� ��� ���������
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q56:
������������Code
�� .��� �� � �� ��� ���� ���� ����� ����� �� ��
���� �� �� ������� �� ��� ����� �����)��� �������
����� ������ ������ ������ �����...���(
� .���
� .�
� .���� � /���� �Q57:
�� .��� �� ������ ��� ����� ����� �� ����� ���� ��
���������� ��
� .����� ���
� .� ��� ���
� .����� ���
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)��� ����� ����� ���� ������(� .���� ���� ���� �� ��
� .������ ��� ����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q58:
�� .�� ��� ���� ���� ����� ��������� �� ���������
� ����� ��� ������� �� ���������
� .��� ����� ��� ��� �� ���� ���� ����� �� ��� �����
�� ��� ������� �� ���
� .����� ��� ��� �� ���� ���� ����� �� ��� �������
����� �� ����� ��� �� ����
� .����� ���� ��
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q59:
�� .������� �� ���� ���� ����� �� � ���� ���������
����� �� �������� �������� ������������� ��������
�� ���� .���� � �� ����� �� �� ������ ���� ����
������� �������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .��� �� ����� �� �� �� ���� ��� �������
� .��� �� ���
� .��� �� ���
� .��� �� �����
� .������� ��� ���� �� ����� ����Q60:
�� .��� ����� ��� ���� �������� ��� ��� ���� ��
����� ��������������������� �������� �� �������� ��
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .��� ���)���� ��� �������(
� .���)���� ��� �������(
� .��� ���
� .��� ��������
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q61:
�� .��� ���� ��� �� ��� �������� ������� �� �� �
��������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .������ ����
� .������� ����
� .����������� ���
� .�����)���(_________________
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q62:
�� .� ������ �� ��� ������ ��� �� � ����� ��� �� �������� ���� ����� ����������
� .���� ���� ���)���� ���� �� ����(� .���� .�Q63-1:
� .���� �� � ���)���� ���� �� ���(� .���� .�Q63-2:
� .����� �� �������� ���� .���� .�Q63-3:
� .��� ��� ������� ������ ������� ��� �� .���� .�Q63-4:
�� .���� ����� �� ����������� ����
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .������� /������ ������
� .���������� �������������� �� ������� ���� ��
� .������� ��� �����UNRWA
� .������ ������ ���� /�����
� .������ ��� �����NGO
� .������ �����
� .����� �����
� .��� ���� / ����� /������
�� .����� �
�� .���� � /�����Q64:
�� .�� �������� ����� ����� �������������� ������ �� ��� ������ ��� ����� ����� ���
� .���� ���� ���)���� ���� �� ����(� .���� .�Q65-1:
� .���� �� � ���)���� ���� �� ���(� .���� .�Q65-2:
� .����� �� �������� ���� .���� .�Q65-3:
� .��� ��� ������� ������ ������� ��� �� .���� .�Q65-4:
�� .��������� ���� ���� ����� �� ��
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .������� /������ ������
� .�������� �� ������� ���� �� ���������� ������
� .�������� ��� ����UNRWA
� .������ ������ ���� /�����
� .������ ��� �����NGO
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� .��� ���� /����� /������Q66:
�� .����� �� � ���� ����� ������ ���� ��� ���� ����
������ ����� ��� �� �� �� ���
� .��� ���)��� �������� ������(
� .���)���� ��� �������(
� .���� ���
� .������ ��� ���
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q67:
�� .������ ������� ������ ��� ��� �� ��� ��� ��� ���
��� � ��� ��� ���� �� ������ ��
� .��� ���� �������� ���
� .��� ��� � ����� ����
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� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q68:
�� .�� ��� ��� ��� �� �� ��� ���� ����� ����� ���
������ ����� ����� ��� �� ��� �� � ���� ���������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
�����)��� (________________
� .����� �
� .���� � /��� ��Q69:
�� .� ��������� �� ��� ��� ��� ������� ������ ���� ����
)��� ����� ����� ����(
������)��� (_________________
� .���� �
� .����� ���� �
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q70:
�� .��������� ���� ���� ����� �� ��� .������� /������ ������
� .�������� �� ������� ���� �� ���������� ������
� .������� ��� �����UNRWA
� .������ ������ ���� /�����
� .������ ��� �����NGO
� .������ �����
� .����� �����
� .��� ���� /����� /������Q71:
�� .������� �� � ���
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .������
� .���
� .��� ���
� .������ ��� ���
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q72:
�� .�� ��� ��� ���� �� �� ��� ���� ����� ����� ���
������ ����� ��� �� ��� ����� �� � ���������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
�����)��� (________________
� .����� �
� .� ���� /���� �Q73:
������������Code
�� .� ��������� �� ��� ��� ����� ������� ������ ���� ����
)��� ����� ����� ����(
������)��� (_________________
� .���� �
� .����� ���� �
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q74:
�� .����� �� � ��� ��
)���� ����� ����� ���(
� .��� ���
� .���
� .��� ���
� .������ ��� ���
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q75:
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� .������� /������ ������
� .�������� �� ������� ���� �� ���������� ������
� .��������� ��� ���UNRWA
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_______________________
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������� ���
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .������ ��� ����� ���� ������ ������ �������
� .���� ���� ������� ��� ������ ������ �������
����� ��� �� ��������� ��� ���� ������� � �����
� .� ������� ����� �� ���� ���� ������ ������� ���
������� � ��� ���� �� ������ ���
� .���� � /�����Q82:
�� .������ �� ������ ������� ������ �� ��� .������ ������� ��� ���� ���� ����� �����
� .�� ������� �� ��� ��� ���� ���� ����� �����
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�� .� ����������� ������ ���� �� ����� ������ ���
���� ����� ���������� ������� ������
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� .�������� ��� ��� ���� ������
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� .������ ����)������(� .������ ����)������(
� .��� ����� ����� .��� ����� ����
� .�� ��� ����� ���������� .����� ��� ����� ������
Q92a:Q92b:
�� .������� ����� ���� ��� ������� �������� ���� ����� �� ������ ��� ��
� .���� .�Q93-1:
� .���� .�Q93-2:
� .���� .�Q93-3:
� .���� .�Q93-4:
� .���� .�Q93-5:
� .������ �� �����
� .��� ���� ��� ������
� .������� ��� ������
� .������� ������ ��� ���
� .����� /�����
� .������ ��� ������ .���� .�Q93-6:
�� .������ ������� ����� ����� �������� ������ ���� �� ��
����� ������������ �� ������� ��� ������ �� ������
������ ��� ���� ��������������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .����� ������ �� �����
� .����� �� ���� ��� �� ���
� .������� �� ���� �� ����
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����� ���� ����� ��� ��� �� �����)����� ���(�
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .��� ����� ��
� .����� ���� ��� ���� ���� ���
� .����� ��� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� ���
� .����� �� ���� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� ���
� .���� � /���� �Q95:
�� .����� ��� �� ��� �� ��� ���� ���� ����� ��������
������� ����� ��� ��� �� �����
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .��� ����� ��
� .����� ���� ��� ���� ���� ���
� .����� ��� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� ���
� .����� �� ���� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� ���
� .���� � /���� �Q96:
�� .��� ���� ����� �������� ����� ��� �� ��� �� ��� �
������ ����� ������ �� �����
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .��� ����� ��
� .����� ���� ��� ���� ���� ���
� .����� ��� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� ���
� .����� �� ���� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� ���
� .���� � /���� �Q97:
�� .����� ����� ��� �� ��� �� ��� ���� ���� ����� ���
��� ��� �� ������� ���� �� ����������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .��� ����� ��
� .����� ���� ��� ���� ���� ���
� .����� ��� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� ���
� .� �� ���� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� �������
� .���� � /���� �Q98:
������������Code
�� .����� ����� ��� �� ��� �� ��� ���� ���� ����� ���
��� ��� �� �������� ��� ����
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .��� ����� ��
� .����� ���� ��� ���� ���� ���
� .��� ��� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� �����
� .����� �� ���� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� ���
� .���� � /���� �Q99:
��� .����� ����� ��� �� ��� �� ��� ���� ���� ����� ���
������ ��� ��� ��� �� �����
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .��� ����� ��
� .����� ���� ��� ���� ���� ���
� .���� ���� �������� ��� ��� ����� ��� ��
� .����� �� ���� ��� ����� ��� �� ���� ���� ���
� .���� � /���� �Q100:
���.������� ������� ������� ������� ����� ��� ����
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .������� ��� ������ ��� ����� ���� ��� ����
�� ������������ ������
� .���� �� ����� ��� ������ ���� ��� ��� ����
���� ��
� .���� �� ������ ������� ����������������� �������
������� ��
� .������� ��� ��� ����
� .����� �� �������� ����� ����
� .������ ���� ����
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� .����� �� �������� ���� / ������ ��������
� .� ���������� ��� ��
� .���� � /���� �Q101:
��� .����� ����� ��� �� ��� �� ��� ���� ���� ����� ��
����� ���� �� ��� ����� ���� ������ ����� �� ���
���� �� �� �������� ��� ������ ��������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .���� ��
� .���� ��� �� ���
� .������� ������ ����� �� ����
� .���� � /���� �Q102:
��� .����� ����� ��� �� ��� �� ��� ���� ���� ����� ��
����� ���� �� ��� ���� ���� ������ ����� �� ���
���� �� �� �������� ��� ������ ��������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
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�.���� ������ ����� �� ���� ���
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� .������ ������ ��� �� ���
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��� .������� ����� �� ������ ����� ����� ��� �� ���� ��
)������� �����  (��� ���� ���� ����� ���������� �� ��
������� ���� ���
)�������� ������(
� .���������� ������� ������ ������ �� �����
� .������ �����
� .����� ������ ��� �����
� .����� �����
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� .������� ������ ������
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� .������ .�����
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������� �� ������� �� �� ����� ������������� ����
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .�����
� .������
� .�����
� .������� ���������
� .����� ������ �����
� .�������
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q122:
��� .������� �� �� ������ �� �������� �� ����������� ��� �����
���� ����� ���������� ������� ������
� .������ .�����
� .������� .������
� .������ .�����
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������������������� ������� ������
� .���� ����� .���� ����
� .������ ����� .������ ����
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� .���� �� ���� �� �����
� .������
� .���� � /���� �Q125:
��� .�������� ������� ������ �� ����� ���� ��
� .����� ���� ����� .���� .�Q126-1:
� .���� .���� .�Q126-2:
� .������ ����� .���� .�Q126-3:
� .����� ����� .���� .�Q126-4:
� .� �� ������ �������� �� �������� .���� .�Q126-5:
� .��������� ������ ��� .���� .�Q126-6:
� .�������� ����� .���� .�Q126-7:
� .������� �� ���� �� ��� .���� .�Q126-8:
� .������� .���� .�Q126-9:
��� .�� ������ ���� ����� ����� ��� �� ������ �����
������ ����� ������ ���� ������� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q127:
��� .��� ������������� �� ������ ����� ��� ������ ����
������ ����� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q128:
��� .�� ���� ������ ���� ���� ��� ����� ����� �� ����� ��
���������� ������ ���� ������ �� ������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .���� ���� ����
� .������ ���
� .��� ���� ����
� .����� �
� .���� � /���� �Q129:
������������Code
��� .���� �� ������� � ���� ���� ����� ��
��� � ���
� .������� � ���� ���� ������ � ��� �����
� .������ �������� ������� ���� ��
� .���� � /���� �Q130:
��� .����� ����� �� ����� �� ���� ��� ��
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .���� ����� �� ����� �� ���� ��� ����
� .������ ���� ��� �� ��
� .���� � /���� �Q131:
��� .���������� ������ �� �
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .����� ������� ��� ���� ��
� .������� ���
� .������ ���
� .����� ���
� .����� ���
� .���� �����
� .���� � /���� �Q132:
��� .��������� ���� �� ��� .����
� .�����
� .����
� .����
� .���� �Q133:
��� .����� �� �������� ���� ����� ����������/��� �� � ������� ��� ����� �� ��� �� �������
� .������ �� ������ ������� ����� �� ������ ��� ����� .���� .�Q134-1:
� .�������� ������ �� ������ ������� ����� �� ������ ��� ����� .���� .�Q134-2:
� .�������� ������� .���� .�Q134-3:
� .������ ������� ���� ����� .���� .�Q134-4:
� .���� ������ ����� .���� .�Q134-5:
� .�� ��� ����� �� �� ����������� ��� ��� ����� ���� .���� .�Q134-6:
� .�� �� ��� ����� �� �� ��������� ���������� ���� .���� .�Q134-7:
� .�������� ��� ���� �)������ �����...���(� .���� .�Q134-8:
� .���� ��� �� ����� .���� .�Q134-9:
�� .��������� ���� ����/������ .���� .�Q134-10:
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��� .������������ ������������������������ �� ���
�� ��� ��� ����� ���� ������ ������ ���� �������� �
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� .������ ���� �� ��� �� �� ��� ������ ����������
� .����� ������ ��� �� �� ��� ������ �����������
� .��� ������� �� �� ��� ������ �����������
� .�������������� ������ ��� �� �� �� ��� ������
�������
� .���� � /���� �Q135:
���.����� ��� ��� ������� �� �������� ��������� �� ��
)��� ���� ����(Q136:
��� .����� ��� ��� ������� �� �������� ��� ���� �� ��
)��� ���� ����(Q137:
��� .������� ���� ����� ������ ������ �������� ����
�� ��������� ��� ����� ���� �� ����������� �������
�������� ������
� .���� ����
� .����
� .�����
� .���� �����
� .���� � /���� �Q138:
������������Code
��� .���� �������������� ����� ���� �� ���� ������
����������� ������ ����� ���
� .����������
� .������
� .���� ���
� .���� �������
� .���� � /���� �Q139:
��� .��� ����� ���� ������ ������� ��� ���� �����
�� ������� ����������� .���� ���� ���� �� ��
� �����
� .���� ����
� .����
� .���� �
� .���� ���� �
� .���� � /���� �Q140:
��� .��� �� �� ����������� ������ ��� ���������� ����� �������
���� ����� ���� ����� ���������� ����� ���� ������� ������
� .������� ������� �� ���� .������� ������� �� ���
� .������� �� ������ ������ / �������� .������� �� ������ ������ /�������
� .����� ���� ������� ���� .����� ���� ������� ���
� .�������� ������ ������� �� ������� ��� ������� ���� .�������� ������ ������� �� ������� ��� ������� ���
� .������ ��� �������� ��� ������� ��������� .����� ������ ��� �������� ��� ������� ���
� .����������� �� ���� .����������� �� ���
� .�������� �� ���/��������� .�������� �� ���/��������
� .������ ���� �� ���� .������ ���� �� ���
� .����� ����� ������ �� ������� ��� ������� ���� .����� ����� ������ �� ������� ��� ������� ���
Q�41a:Q141b:
��� .����������� ������ ���� �� ������ ���� �� ��� .������ �� �� ���� ��
� .������ ������ �� �������� �������
� .��� ����� �������
� .���� � /���� �Q142:
��� .������ �� ������ ���� ���� ����� ����� ��
������ ����� ����� ����������� ���������
� .���������
� .����� ��� ����
� .�
� .���� � /���� �Q143:
��� .����������� ��� ���� ���� ��� ��� �� ���� ��� .����� ����
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������ ����� ���������� .����� ��� ����
� .�
� .���� � /���� �Q144:
��� .���� ���� �� ����������� ������ �� ������ �� ����:� .���������� ������ �� ���� ����� ����� �
� .������ ��� � �� ��� �� ���� ���� ����� ���
� .����� �� ���� ���� ����� ���
� .������ �� ����� ���
� .���� � /���� �Q145:
��� .���� ����� ��� ����� �� �������� �������� ����� ���
���:
� .����
� .���� �� �� ��� ���
� .���� �� �
� .���� � /�����Q146:
��� .������� �������� ���� ���� �� /��� ������ ������
������� ������ ��� �� ������ ����� ��� ������:
� .����������� �������� �� ���� /������ ������
� .������ ���� ��� �� ��� ��������� ������
� .������� ��������� �� �� �� �������� ���
� .���� � /���� �Q147:
������������Code
��� .��������� �������� ���� ����� ����� ���� ���
�� ���� ����� ��������������� ���� ������ ��
� .��� ���)���� ��� ��������(
� .���)���� ��� ��������(
� .���
� .��� ���
� .���� � /���� �Q148:
��� .���� ������ ������ ��� ���� ��� ��� ��"��� "��
"��� ���"������� ����� �� �� ����� ������� �����
� .� ����� ��������
� .������ ���
� .�������� ���
� .������
� .�� ������� ������������� ����� ����� ��UNRWA
������� �� ������
� .���� � /���� �Q149:
��� .����� ���� �� ������ ���� ���� ���� ��� ����
�������� �� ������� �� �����
� .���� �� ����� ����� �������
� .������� �� ����� ����� �����
� .���� � /���� �Q150:
��� .� ��� ���� ���������� ���� �� ������ ������� .���� ������
� .������
� .�������
� .���� �������
� .���� ��� ������ ���� �
� .��� ���� ��
� .���� � /���� �Q151:
��� .���� ��������� ������ .���� ������
� .������
� .�������
� .���� �������
� .���� ��� ������ ���� �
� .��� ���� ��
� .���� � /���� �Q152:
��� .����� ��� ���� ��-������� .���� ������
� .������
� .�������
� .���� �������
� .���� ��� ������ ���� �
� .���� ���� �
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� .���� � /���� �Q153:
��� ,����� ������ ���� ��� .���� ������
� .������
� .�������)���� ��� ��������(
� .���� �������)���� ��� ��������(
� .���� ��� ������ ���� �)���� ��� ��������(
� .��� ���� ��)���� ��� ��������(
� .� ���� /���� �)���� ��� ��������(Q154:
���.����� ������ ���� �����
)��� ����� ����� ���(___________________________Q155:
���,����� ������ ����� �����
)��� ����� ����� ���(___________________________Q156:
������������Code
���.������� �� �� ����� ���� ��� �������� ������ ��
)��� ���� ������ ����(
� .������ �����
� .������ �������
� .����� �����
� .����� �����
� .������� ������ �����
� .������� �������
� .������ /�������� ������
� .����� �� ������ �����
� .������ ������
�� .������� ����
�� .������� ����
�� .��� ��� ����
�� .������ ����
�� .������ �� ���� / ������
�� .�����)���:(__________________Q157:
���.��� ������ ���������� ������� ��� ���� �� �� ������
���� ���� ��� ������� ����� �������� ���� ������� �����
��� ������� ��������
)��� ����� ����� ����(
� .����� �� ���
� .�–�� %������� �� �� ����� ��
� .������ ������ ��
� .������� ��� ����������� �����
� .��� ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� �� �� ������ �����
������ �����
� .�� ��� �� �� ������ ��� ���������� ����
������ ��� �� ��� ���������
� .���� � /���� �Q158:
��� .���� ���� ��� ����� �� ������ ����� �� ����
����� ������������ ����� ������� �� �� ��
� .������ ����� ���
� .����� ���� ��� ���� ����
� .�� ��� ���� ���� ��� ����� � �����
� .���� � /�����Q159:
���.������ �� �� ������ ����� ��� ���� ���� ��� ��
���� �� ���� ������ ��� ��� �� ������
� .������ �����
� .����� ������� ���������
� .������ ���� ���� ���
� .��� ���� �� ���� �
� .���� � ���� �Q160:
��� .�� ���������������� ������ �� ��� ���� �� ��� ���� ���������
��������� ���� ������������ ���� ��� ����
� .������ ������ .������ �����
� .������ �������� .������ �������
� .����� ������ .����� �����
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� .����� ������ .����� �����
� .����� ������������ �� .������� ������ �����
� .������ /�������� ������� .������ /�������� ������
� .���� �� ��� ���� ������ �� ������� �������� .���� �� ��� ���� ������ �� ������� �������
� .������ ������� .������ ������
� .������� ������� ����� .���� ����������� ���
�� .������� ������� ������ .������� ������� ����
�� .��� ��� ������� ������ .��� ��� ������� ����
�� .������ ������� ������ .������ ������� ����
Q161a:Q161b:
������������Code
��� .������� ��� ������ .�����
� .����
� .��� �������Q162:
��� .������ ���� ���� ���� �������� / ���������� .���� �����
� .����� �����
� .����� �����
� .����� �����
� .������� �����
� .������ �����
� .�� ��� �����
� .����� �����
� .����� �����
�� .��� ��� �����
�� .������ �����
�� .��� ���� �����
�� .������� ��� �����
�� .��� �����
�� .����� ��� �����
�� .���� ��� �����Q163:
��� .������ ����� ���
___________________________
Q164:
��� .��������� .����� .������ .��� ���Q165:
��� .�������� ���)��������(�
____________________________Q166:
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